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This thesis explores the experiences of ordinary people living under 
Japanese occupation in Manchukuo from 1932 to 1945. By examining the harsh 
nature of colonial rule and the impact on the people, this dissertation shows the 
multiple ways in which the everyday life of ordinary people was influenced by the 
various upheavals and hardships. This research mainly uses newspapers, primary 
published materials, documents, compilations, dictations and other Chinese 
language sources.   
This thesis thus establishes a detailed account of the sufferings that colonial 
subjects encountered in their daily lives and the coping methods that they 
employed to circumvent them. The experiences of the people were highlighted 
through the role of education, access to and rationing of goods, the sense of 
homelessness in the midst of ongoing housing crises, as well as sanitation and 
hygienic issues, which constituted altogether the core aspects of the everyday life 
of the people. 
 In essence, ordinary people of Manchukuo lived a life overwhelmed by 
shortages, misfortunes and difficulties. Focusing on both rural and urban areas, this 
thesis argues how the people of Manchukuo were passive in face of the various 
policies implemented by the regime, but yet active in face of the hardships that 
followed. This sense of passivity, or the general lack of initiative, demonstrates in 
fact how motives of self-protection and survival beneath the acts of superficial 
compliance directed the people’s everyday life in Manchukuo. With the current 
literature’s emphasis on the economic and social structures of the puppet state, 
this thesis seeks to fill the gap by recognizing the importance of the everyday 
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For the usage of Chinese, this thesis uses the standardized Pinyin system to 
transliterate Chinese names and places in most cases, with the few exceptions of 
well-known terms such as Hsinking instead of Xinjing, Dairen instead of Dalian, 
Kwantung instead of Guandong, and Manchukuo instead of Manzhouguo. Japanese 
names and locations are transliterated through the standardized Hepburn system, 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
This thesis focuses on ordinary people’s1 experiences of life in Manchukuo, 
as well as the various tensions and impacts of state policies that affected their 
livelihoods and living standards in the years from 1931 to 1945. On the evening of 
18 September 1931, a carefully staged bomb was detonated on the railroad tracks 
near Fengtian (also known as Mukden, nowadays Shenyang) by the Kwantung army 
in hopes of provoking conflict with the Chinese troops stationed nearby in 
Beidaying. In short, the act was used as the pretext for the full Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria that followed, and was known to the world as the Mukden Incident.2 
Roughly six months later, Manchukuo was formally established with Henry Puyi, the 
last emperor of China, as the ruler (later declared as the Kangde emperor in 1934) 
of the regime.3 Independent by appearance and a puppet state of Japan by nature, 
it is safe to say that the effortless occupation of Manchuria and the smooth 
founding of a new regime was not without the help of its residents and the local 
collaborators of the Japanese. 
 
The scholarly literature on Manchukuo published in both English and 
Chinese after 1945 productively explored the top-down management of the puppet 
                                                        
1 To avoid general confusion, this thesis refers to the people of Manchukuo to its 
politically correct term “Manchukuoans (man zhou guo ren)”. 
2 Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-
1937 (Cambridge mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, 1991), p. 11. 
3 This dissertation supports the idea of Manchukuo as a puppet state. However, 
since this thesis pertains to the discipline of social history and focuses on ordinary 
people, this thesis uses the term “puppet state”, “regime”, and “state” 
interchangeably to facilitate reading. 
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state. Drawing heavily on Chinese language sources, this research shifts the focus 
towards the detailed examination of the everyday life of Manchukuoans, exploring 
more specifically the aspects of education, economy, housing and healthcare, as 
recorded in Manchukuo era publications, official documents, newspapers, post-war 
narratives and personally-conducted interviews. More precisely, oral histories of 
education in the puppet state reveal how Manchukuoan students challenged their 
imposed national identities through everyday acts of resistance that were 
expressed in a sophisticated manner. Press coverage of the various difficulties 
associated with food supply and rationing decisions emphasises on how ordinary 
Manchukuoans managed to overcome the tremendous hardships by developing 
their own tactics for survival. On the other hand, official propaganda sources and 
the experiences of the people demonstrated how modernization efforts of the 
regime were achieved at the expense of its subjects, who more often than not were 
forced into appalling living conditions. Lastly, government documents and post-war 
narratives presented a sharp contrast between the puppet state’s effort to 
establish a more advanced and modernized healthcare system that led to the 
decrease of indigenous treatment options, and the ordinary people’s resistance in 
the process. Indeed, by looking at these core elements that constituted the 
everyday life of ordinary people, this thesis argues that instead of actively resisting 
against the various hardships and policies that were imposed upon them, ordinary 
people in Manchukuo managed to adopt a passive stance for survival, but also to 
deal with the various difficulties on a daily basis. By exploring the everyday life of 
Manchukuoans, this thesis uncovers how the Manchukuo government, as an 
authoritarian state that strived to be in total control, failed to control every aspects 
of its subjects’ lives. This thesis therefore argues that when state oppression was at 
its highest, so were the Manchukuoans’ expressions of dissatisfaction and 
resistance. Lastly, this thesis also shows how in the face of hardships, ordinary 
people developed their own tactics to overcome imposed rules, which sometimes 




The clear starting point to study the everyday life of ordinary people in 
Manchukuo is to define the terms collaboration and collaborators. In essence, to 
ask and answer the question of the ordinary masses’ position invites a deeper 
examination of the various roles played by the subjugated subjects and their 
respective relationship with the colonizers. To begin with, the stories of 
collaboration were well discussed and explored in the global context, with a rich 
literature focusing on German-occupied Europe during the Second World War. This 
kind of history has examined wartime collaboration in multiple layers, arguing the 
core of it being “the necessary adaptation of the entire society”.4 In this process, 
historians have often perceived political collaborations in particular as ideological 
choices, whether it is motivated by desires to change or to preserve the existing 
structures or hierarchy of the occupied regions. 
 
The topic of elite collaboration in Manchukuo is well examined by Rana 
Mitter in his innovative book The Manchurian Myth published in 2000.5 More 
precisely, Mitter considered one of the main reasons behind the willingness of local 
elites to collaborate with the Japanese was that the governmental structure of 
Manchukuo bears a close resemblance to traditional Chinese style governance.6 H. 
R. Kedward has identified this particular pattern of collaboration as “attentisme” 
through his study of Vichy France, fundamentally a “wait and see” attitude that 
                                                        
4  Henrik Dethlefsen, “Denmark and the German Occupation: Cooperation, 
Negotiation or Collaboration?”, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 15 (1990), p. 
198. 
5  See Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and 
Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). The 
topic of wartime collaboration in China proper with the Japanese are well discussed 
by a number of scholars. See for example Marjorie Dryburgh, “Rewriting 
Collaboration: China, Japan and the self in the diaries of Bai Jianwu”, Journal of 
Asian Studies, Vol. 68, No. 3 (2009), pp. 683-714; David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu 
eds., Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at 
War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1972). 
6 Mitter, The Manchurian Myth, 19; Mitter’s arguments is explored in greater detail 
in the literature review of this thesis. 
10 
 
could be defined as a defensive strategy for survival in face of a foreign occupying 
power.7 Most of the elite collaborators under Mitter’s description fit well into this 
criteria, as they were able to secure the continuity of their socio-economic status in 
the new regime in return for their cooperation. 
 
However, as crucial as how the local elites were motivated to collaborate 
with the Japanese for the regime to function properly might appear to be, the 
examples of political collaborators alone are not enough to explain the lives of the 
colonized people as a whole in the complicated context of foreign occupation. It is 
understandable for one that holds sufficient political power to endorse a new 
regime in exchange for something that is somewhat favourable to them, a “victory 
over disasters” at the very least. But for the remainder of the ordinary population 
that were not in this position to leverage with the occupying forces, their 
relationship and experiences with the occupying force and means to “collaborate” 
were very different. Upon the founding of the regime, the Japanese were tasked 
with only a handful of elite collaborators and a large submissive and unwilling 
population, British journalist H.G.W. Woodhead noted in his travels to Manchukuo 
that he had not met a single person, who favoured the new regime.8 The ordinary 
population’s stance towards the Japanese presence brings out the interesting 
question of how did the people manage to conduct their daily lives under a 
suppressive regime, which has not yet been scrutinized by historical research. 
 
Like many equivocal concepts, collaboration is a term that rejects precise 
definition, and is thus problematic to apply directly to examine the behaviours of 
the ordinary people who accommodated the occupiers’ demands from a distance. 
Previous studies of collaboration have focused on understanding local collaboration 
                                                        
7 H.R. Kedward, Occupied France: Collaboration and Resistance 1940-1944 (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1985), p. 45. 




as the continuous “exercise of power under the pressure produced by the presence 
of an occupying power.”9 This definition has enabled us to analyze and question the 
placement of the ordinary people within the power structures and hierarchies of 
Manchukuo in greater depth and detail. Can the Manchukuo peasants that worked 
in farmlands, or the urban shopkeepers and business owners who paid their taxes 
and benefited the growth of the Japanese empire be considered collaborators? Can 
the Manchukuo residents, who had no choice but to respond to the calls of 
economization to fuel Japan’s aggression in China proper after the mid-1930s, be 
considered hanjian (traitors) and guilty of moral failure?10 The answers to these 
questions lie within the ambiguity of intentions of the ordinary people to comply 
with the regime’s requirements. For the colonized subjects living under occupation 
in Manchuria, it was impossible for them to tell when the occupiers would leave, or 
if they were to leave at all. With nothing to leverage for, the Japanese demanded 
acquiescence from the ordinary people who they considered to be powerless, and 
the ordinary people responded with passivity, a subtle but yet significant force of 
power to highlight their dissatisfaction towards the regime that was forcefully 
imposed upon them. This sense of passivity does not carry the full weight of 
collaboration, nor does it carry the full weight of active or passive resistance. 
Instead, it allowed the ordinary people to survive and get by in the presence of an 
aggressor that showcased astonishing violence and was not shy in punishing 
dissidents. 
 
                                                        
9  Henrik Dethlefsen, “Denmark and the German Occupation: Cooperation, 
Negotiation or Collaboration?”, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 15 (1990), p. 
198. 
10 Similar to implications of “les collabos” in the French context, the term “hanjian” 
carries a derogatory meaning that not only suggested being a traitor, but also a 
subhuman that forfeited any remaining claims to be Chinese. See for example, 
Poshek Fu, Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied 
Shanghai, 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 82; The concept 
of the term hanjian exceeded its boundaries of applying solely to Han ethnicity 
after the Opium War when China was challenged by foreign imperialist powers, 
thus now the definition of hanjian refers to traitor of the Chinese people (Zhonghua 
minzu), which includes all ethnicities in China. 
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Indeed, the choice to collaborate or not was never presented as an option 
to the ordinary masses. They could, however, choose the way with regards to how 
to engage with the regime. What might seem to be only a subtle difference would 
in fact allow us in retrospect to further explore what was beneath ordinary people’s 
apparent non-resisting attitudes. Both the dependency towards the regime as a 
provider and the fear of punishments stimulated the people’s will to comply with 
the state’s agenda. At the same time, the type of passivity generated in this process, 
which the Manchukuo and Japanese authorities have often perceived as 
“backwardness”, showcased how consciousness and dissatisfactions can emerge 
from the very fabric of the everyday lives of ordinary people beneath the grand 
narratives of collaboration and resistance that are often monolithic to the 
understandings of the lives of the people. 
 
The history of everyday life under occupation by no means should be only 
considered as a history of defeat.11 Paying attention to the experiences of ordinary 
                                                        
11 Good examples of the history of everyday life under suppressive regimes that are 
relevant to this study could be found in the works on Soviet Russia. See for 
example, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism - Ordinary Life in Extraordinary 
Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance & Survival in the Russian Village After 
Collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Sheila Fitzpatrick and Alf 
Ludtke, “Energizing the Everyday: On the Breaking and Making of Social Bonds in 
Nazism and Stalinism,” in Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, 
eds., Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), pp. 266-301. A more general argument could be found in Orlando Figes, A 
People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (London: Pimlico, 1997); For 
everyday life focusing on resistance in South Asia see Douglas Haynes and Gyan 
Prakash eds., Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South 
Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); For everyday life in relation to 
wartime recollections see Norman Longmate, How We Lived Then: A history of 
everyday life during the Second World War (London: Hutchinson, 1941); For social 
history with the focus on Beijing see David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City people and 
politics in the 1920s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Marjorie 
Dryburgh, “Living on the edge: welfare and the urban poor in 1930s Beijing”, Social 
History, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2016), pp. 14-33; This thesis seeks to deploy the term 
everyday life to examine the daily conducts of the colonized people. For concepts of 
everyday life as a cultural theory that investigates the sphere of private life and 
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people illustrates the ways that people who were situated far down the power 
structure could express their antagonisms towards their colonial masters. By 
exploring passivity, this thesis intends to provide an original analysis of how the 
ordinary people within the political and social context of foreign occupation, 
managed to survive by developing certain strategies and behaviours through the 
practice of their everyday activities. In his examination of Chinese collaboration 
with the Japanese in wartime China, Timothy Brook called for historians to examine 
how historical events were fashioned and the conditions that caused individuals in 
difficult times to behave in certain ways. By what he called “detaching the moral 
map”, Brook argued that history should be studied objectively without making 
decisive judgments on the colonial subjects’ actions retrospectively.12 This thesis 
follows Brook’s suggestions. 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
workplace behaviours, see Ben Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An 
Introduction (London: Routledge, 2002); Ben Highmore ed., The Everyday Life 
Reader (London: Routledge, 2002); Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday 
Life, trans. Steven F. Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Henri 
Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1991). 
12 Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China 
(Cambridge mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 5. 
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1.2. Chinese Literature 
 
 Republican-era Chinese literature has generally maintained the position of 
emphasizing the brutal nature of Japanese imperial aggressiveness as well as the 
economic exploitation of the South Manchuria Railway Company in the Northeast 
through a considerable number of essays and book-length investigations. The 
political standpoint that defined the establishment of Manchukuo as “bogus” 
remained unchanged long after the signing of the Tanggu truce between the 
Kuomintang and the Japanese government in May 1933 that temporarily halted 
Japanese military aggression and resulted in the de facto recognition of 
Manchukuo. 13  After the founding of the People’s Republic, mainland Chinese 
scholars have continued this legacy that focused on exploring various war crimes 
conducted by the Japanese empire in the region. 
 
 Research on Manchuria has always been a sensitive topic to touch upon in 
Chinese academia. To be sure, strict political censorship is perceived to be the main 
obstacle that discouraged the production of new scholarship in the area. In line 
with the CCP guidelines that suggested that the primary role of academics should 
be to inform and educate the public, the majority of existing Chinese literature is 
                                                        
13 See for example, Liu Jian, Riben de dalu zhengce (Japan’s Continental Policy) 
(Zhejiang: Zhejiangsheng jingcha xunliansuo zhengxun chu, 1937); Xu Xingkai, Riben 
diguozhuyi yu dongshansheng (Japanese Imperialism and the three Northeastern 
Provinces) (Shanghai: Kunlun shudian, 1930); Chen Binhe, Manzhou weiguo (Bogus 
Manchukuo) (Shanghai: Shenghuo shudian, 1933); Song Feiru, Riben tieti xia de 
dongbei (The Northeast under the cruel oppression of Japan) (Shanghai: Zhanshi 
duwu bianyishe, 1938); Hou Zhenzhong, Wangsheng hou de dongbei (The 
Northeast under occupation) (Shanghai: Heibai shudian, 1936); Hu Yuzhi and Du 
Zhongyuan, Lunxian qi shounian de dongbei (The fall of the Northeast after seven 
years) (Shanghai: Shenghuo Shudian, 1938); Wang Yuping, Riben dui dongbei de 
jinrong qinlue (Japan’s economic aggression in the Northeast) (n.p.: Dongbei wenti 
yanjiushe, 1940); Wu Jingheng, Cai Yuanpei and Wang Yunwu, Riben qinlue dongbei 




monolithic in its Marxist approach but rich and detailed in its historical narratives.14 
The study of Manchukuo in the PRC was initiated in the early 1970s by prominent 
scholars including Jiang Niandong, Xie Xueshi, Lü Yuanming, Qi Hongshen and Zhang 
Fulin, who were all historians and Japan specialists by training. Subsequently, a 
comprehensive study that focused on Japanese exploitation and the false 
establishment of Manchukuo was published in 1980 in light of the counter-
hegemony trends that occurred during that period.15 The publication served as a 
ground-breaking work in Chinese literature that also served its political purposes by 
emphasizing on the misconducts of the Japanese empire during the Second World 
War. 
 
 However, heavily influenced by the Communist Party’s political standpoint, 
scholars during this particular era were more or less persistent in their limited 
Maoist approaches that would often be considered as biased or controversial in 
today’s scholarship. Xie Xueshi for example, considered war, invasion, and 
enslavement to be the only aspects that constituted imperialism whilst defining the 
nature of the Japanese empire simply as a fascist regime.16 Xie defended his notion 
in the second revision of his co-authored book in 2008, dismissing the 
achievements of industrial developments in Manchukuo by the Japanese and 
                                                        
14  Isabella Jackson, “Managing Shanghai: the International Settlement 
administration and the development of the city, 1900-1943” (PhD diss, University of 
Bristol, 2012), p. 32; On Manchukuo, a good example that focused on wide 
readership could be found in a recently published study jointly conducted by 
Chinese and Japanese scholars. See Dongbei lunxian shisinian shi zongbian shi and 
Riben zhimindi wenhua yanjiu hui eds., Wei manzhouguo de zhenxiang – Zhongri 
xuezhe gongtong yanjiu (The truth of bogus Manchukuo – A joint study of Chinese 
and Japanese scholars) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chuban she, 2010).  
15 Jiang Niandong, Yi Wencheng, Xie Xueshi, Lü Yuanming and Zhang Fulin, Wei 
manzhouguo shi (The History of Bogus Manchukuo) (Changchun: Jilin renmin 
chuban she, 1980). 
16 The argument on fascism in Western scholarship can be found in Ivan Morris, 
Japan 1931-1945: Militarism, Fascism, Japanism? (Boston: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1963); Robert O. Paxton, “The Five Stages of Fascism”, The Journal of 
Modern History, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1998), pp. 1-23. 
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heavily criticizing the works of contemporary Japanese scholars (most noticeably 
Yamamuro Shin’ichi) as “violations of historical facts”.17 
 
 On the other hand, the first generation of PRC scholars to systematically 
study Manchukuo provided praiseworthy contribution and experience from the 
ground up that shaped the field of study in Chinese scholarship to how it is today. 
To overcome the lack of sources, Xie and his colleagues have built up a sizeable 
collection of primary documents (mostly from the South Manchuria Railway 
Company) at the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences in Changchun during the time of 
their tenure. Following Xie’s (semi) retirement, the subsequent generation of 
scholars at the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences continued to benefit from the 
academy’s archives and made a noticeable contribution to the field of study. 
 
 Different from the first generation that prioritized writing for a wide 
readership and conservatively followed the Party’s political guidelines, the new 
generation of scholars acknowledged the perspectives of foreign researchers and 
thus were more focused on providing scholarly analysis. Similar to the focus in 
mainstream western literature, the attention of Chinese scholars was largely 
devoted to examining Manchukuo from the top-down perspective. Jiao Runming 
provided a thorough investigation of the Chinese response to the Mukden Incident 
as well as the legitimacy issue of Manchukuo surrounding Sino-Japanese relations in 
the 1930s.18 Along these lines, the international politics and relations regarding 
                                                        
17 Xie Xueshi, Wei manzhouguo shi xinbian (New Edition of the History of Bogus 
Manchukuo) (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 2008), p. 14. 
18 See Jiao Runming, “Zhongguo jindai faxue jie bochi riben ‘manzhou minzu zijue’ 
miulun kaoyi (The Study of China’s modern legal circle refuting Japan’s fallacy of 
‘Manchuria nation self-determination’)”, Riben yanjiu, No. 3 (2015), pp. 44-51; Jiao 
Runming and Jiao Jie, “Lun ‘jiuyiba’ hou de kangzhan jiwei ‘quanmin kangzhan’ 
(Defining the resistance after the ‘September 18th’ Incident as the ‘National 
Resistance’)”, shehui kexue zhanxian, No. 5 (2017), pp. 94-100; Jiao Runming and 
Jiao Jie, “Jiuyiba shibian hou zhongguo chaoye dui ‘zhongri qinshan’ yanlun de 
fanying (On the Reponse and Signifiance of the Chinese government and People to 
17 
 
Manchukuo are well covered by Duan Yongfu, who made detailed use of US 
archives in examining the impacts of Manchukuo’s oil monopoly law in the making 
of the Stimson Doctrine.19 Additionally, the most notable scholars to examine the 
economic aspect of Manchukuo are Fu Liying and Yi Baozhong, who both published 
multiple articles on aspects of Japanese financial control of Manchukuo. 20  Li 
Shujuan on the other hand focused extensively on exploitation in rural Manchukuo 
as well as the Japanese mobilization efforts on agricultural production.21 Although 
by no means deviating from the CCP’s mandatory guidelines, academic journal 
articles on the topic of Manchukuo were less subject to strict political censorship, 
and the scholars who published came from a variety of academic backgrounds and 
were not all necessarily historians by training. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
‘Sino-Japanese Rapprochement’ after the September 18th Incident)”, Shixue yuekan, 
No. 9 (2017), pp. 95-104. 
19  Duan Yongfu, “Fulankelin Luosifu zongtong diyirenqi nei meiguo dui wei 
manzhouguo zhengce de yanbian (The evolution of the United States’ policy 
towards bogus Manchukuo under the first term of Franklin Roosevelt)”, Kangri 
zhanzheng yanjiu (January 2012), pp. 14-23. 
20 See for instance Fu Liying, “Taipingyang zhanzheng baofa hou weiman de jinrong 
tongzhi (Financial Domination in bogus Manchukuo after the Outbreak of the Pacific 
War)”, Waiguowenti yanjiu, No. 2 (2014), pp. 7-12; Sun Quanjie and Fu Liying, 
“Weiman xingye yinhang yu riwei dui dongbei de zijin kongzhi (Manchurian 
Industrial Bank and Japanese Capital Control in Northeast China)”, Waiguowenti 
yanjiu, No. 2 (2015), pp. 80-85; Fu Liying, “Weimanzhouguo qiangzhi chuxu zhengce 
de jingji houguo (Economic Results of Manchukuo’s Mandatory Saving Policy: 
Analysis based on two sections’ National Income Determination Model)”, 
Waiguowenti yanjiu, No. 4 (2010), pp. 16-22; Yi Baozhong, “Lun weiman shiqi de 
zhimindi quyu jingji yitihua (On Colonial Regional Economic Integration in the 
Period of Puppet Manchukuo)”, Jilindaxue shehui kexue xuebao, No. 4 (July 2001), 
pp. 87-93; Yi Baozhong and Lin Sha, “Lun jindai dongbei diqu de gongyehua jincheng 
(The Industrialization process of Modern Northeast China)”, Dongbeiya luntan, No. 
4 (November, 2011), pp. 54-64. 
21  Li Shujuan, Riben zhimin tongzhi yu dongbei nongmin shenghuo (Japanese 
Colonialism and Peasant Life in the Northeast) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian 
chuban she, 2014); See also Li Shujuan, “Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun 
shulun, 1931-1945 nian (An overview study of the rural northeast under the bogus 
rule of the Japanese, 1931 to 1945)” (PhD diss, Nankai University, 2005). 
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 The relatively relaxed censorship environment on journal articles allowed 
Chinese scholars to explore more sensitive issues that would be considered taboo 
topics if published in a book format. This is evident in Liu Xiaoli’s research on the 
literary works of various ethnic groups in Manchukuo. With a Post-colonial 
approach, Liu provided a fresh perspective on how Manchukuo literature was 
essential to the anti-colonialism struggles and yet at the same time accommodating 
to the needs of the colonial authorities.22 On the topic regarding the development 
of a modern health system in the region, the issue of foreign-induced achievements 
and modernity was well debated among most notably Hu Cheng, Wang Yuqin, Li Na, 
Yu Xinzhong and Zhao Xiaohong.23 It is clear that Chinese scholars in this area are 
                                                        
22 Liu Xiaoli, “Jiezhixing neizaiyu zhimindi wenxue (Lyo-colonization is inherent in 
Colonial Literature)”, Wenhua shiye, No. 1 (2017), pp. 111-116; See also Liu Xiaoli, 
“Dongya zhiminzhuyi yu wenxue – Yi weimanzhouguo wentan wei zhongxin de 
kaocha (East Asian Colonialism and Literature – A Survey Based on the Puppet 
Regime Manchukuo Literary Circle)”, Xueshu yuekan, No. 47 (October 2015), pp. 
136-143; Liu Xiaoli, “Zhimin tizhi chayi yu zuojia de kuayu, kuayu he wenxue 
xiangxiang (The differences in Colonial systems and the writer’s cross-region, cross-
language and cross-literary imagination)”, Shehui kexue jikan, No. 2 (2016), pp. 159-
167. 
23 Although not his main area of research, Hu Cheng has published a number of 
articles focusing on the region of Manchuria. See for example Hu Cheng, “Zhongri 
duikang yu gonggong weisheng shiye lingdaoquan de jiaoliang – dui ‘nan manzhou’ 
tielu, gangkou zhongxin chengshi de guancha 1901-1911 (The Sino-Japanese 
Confrontation and the Contest over Leadership in Public Health Services: 
Observations on Major Cities along the Railway and Coastline in South Manchuria, 
1901-1911)”, Jindaishi yanjiu, No. 1 (2011), pp.31-46; See also Hu Cheng, “Jindai 
jianyi guocheng zhong ‘jinbu’ yu ‘luohou’ de fansi – yi 1910 nian dongchun zhiji de 
dongsansheng feishuyi wei zhongxin (‘Advancements’ and ‘backwardness’ in 
modern times - Reflection on the outbreak of the Plague in 1910)”, Kaifang shidai, 
No. 10 (2011), pp. 50-67; Wang Yuqin, “Riben zhimin shiqi de dongbei yixue tongzhi 
– Yi mantie yiliao weisheng jigou wei zhongxin de yanjiu (The medical system in the 
northeast during Japanese colonial occupation – A study on SMR’s medical and 
health institutions)”, Shehuikexue zhanxian, No. 8 (2015), pp. 114-119; Li Na, 
“Houteng xinping yu dongbei zhimin weisheng tongzhi tixi (Goto Shinpei and the 
Northeastern colonial health system)”, Waiguowenti yanjiu, No. 1 (2015), pp. 29-36; 
Yu Xinzhong, “Cong biyi dao fangyi: Wanqing yinying jibing guannian de yanbian 
(From evasion to prevention: The evolution of epipdemic concepts in the late Qing 
period)”, Huazhong shifandaxue xuebao, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2008), pp. 51-60; Zhao 
Xiaohong, “Zongzhuguo yu zhimindi yixuejiaoyu de liandong yu chayi – Dui weiman 
shiqi yixue jiaoyu de kaocha (The connection and difference in medical education 
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generally interested in examining Japan’s imperial domination of Manchuria as 
much as the impact on its colonial subjects. Compared to the works of the first 
generation of scholars, they no longer emphasised solely the victimization of the 
Chinese people, although traces of the Party’s political stance can still be found in 
the rhetoric means in today’s scholarship. 
 
 All in all, the body of literature on Manchukuo in the recent decades has 
been growing at a steady pace. This thesis acknowledges the Chinese scholarship’s 
attention to both the positive and negative impacts of Manchukuo’s policies on the 
people and seeks to examine it in greater detail through a series of case studies. 
Moreover, this thesis also intends to build upon the detailed narratives of the 
Chinese literature and to address a gap by exploring the impacts on ordinary people 
in the context of everyday life.  
                                                                                                                                                            
between the suzerain and the colony – A study on the medical education in bogus 
Manchukuo)”, Minguo dangan, (January 2012), pp. 100-107. 
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1.3. English Literature 
 
 To begin with, the history of late nineteenth to the first half of the twentieth 
century Manchuria was first recorded and written by those who were intrigued by 
the region following the decline of the Qing Dynasty. The political establishments, 
as well as local customs and practices, were first documented by Alexander Hosie in 
1910, the British Consul-General to Tientsin who also possessed a confident 
command of written and spoken Chinese. 24  Additionally, one of the most 
prominent early English language works was subsequently published by British 
medical missionary Dugald Christie in 1914, who resided in Fengtian from 1883 to 
1913. Founder of the Shengjing Clinic and Mukden Medical College25, Christie made 
detailed observations and documented his impressions of foreign aggression, 
political upheavals, subsequent reforms and the outbreak of epidemics first-
handedly.26 Following the result of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the ever-
changing political climate in the region began to attract more attention from 
scholars to investigate the Japanese economic penetration of Manchuria.  
 
During this period, a detailed survey of the economic conditions and 
development of the region was prepared by Baron Y. Sakatani and Grover Clark. 
Their manuscript included a comprehensive overview of the region as well as 
statistical data and figures gathered from Japanese reports.27 A similar study with a 
                                                        
24 Alexander Hosie, Manchuria: Its People, Resources and Recent History (London: J. 
B. Millet Company, 1910). 
25 Renamed as the 2nd Affiliated hospital of the China Medical University after the 
Chinese Civil War, and restored back to Shengjing Hospital following its 120th 
anniversary in 2003. 
26 Dugald Christie, Thirty years in Mukdoen, 1883-1913: Being the Experiences and 
Recollections of Dugald Christie, C.M.G. (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 
1914). 
27 Baron Y. Sakatani, “Manchuria: A survey of Its Economic Development. [Revised 
by Grover Clark, prepared for the Divison of Economics and History of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.] 1932,” in The Modern Chinese Economy, A 
Garland Series, ed., Ramon H. Myers (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1980). 
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focus on the newly established South Manchuria Railway Company was carried out 
by Henry W. Kinney, in which the institution’s industrial efforts and policies were 
elaborately examined and published in 1928.28 The years following the Mukden 
Incident witnessed a peak of interest invested in the region. The controversial 
establishment of Manchukuo was debated in the English language literature, most 
noticeably by T’ang Leang-Li, editor of the “China To-day” Series, and Japanese 
apologist Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami.29 A good deal of attention was also directed 
towards questioning the status quo and future of Manchukuo, with Henry L. 
Stimson, P.T. Etherton and H. Hessell Tiltman producing the most noteworthy 
examination of the diplomatic efforts and political structures surrounding the 
regime and Japan.30 Additionally, a considerable amount of work was done by 
journalists, documenting their experiences and knowledge via their travels and 
interviews with political figures in the newly established government.31 
 
After the collapse of Manchukuo and the Japanese empire in 1945, post-war 
historians have examined and studied Manchuria from the top-down, focused 
almost exclusively on the perspective of institutions and structures as well as 
debating the rationale behind Japan’s military commitment and expansionism to 
incorporate the region into its sphere of influence. The key literature here lies 
within the pioneering works of Sadako Ogata, Yamamuro Shin’ichi, James Crowley, 
Jack Snyder, Takehiko Yoshihashi, Robert Butow, Alvin Coox, Mark Peattie, Emer 
                                                        
28 Henry W. Kinney, Modern Manchuria and The South Manchuria Railway Company 
(Tokyo: The Japan Advertiser Press, 1928). 
29  See T’ang Leang-Li ed., The Puppet State of “Manchukuo” (Shanghai: China 
United Press, 1935) and Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami, Manchoukuo: Child of Conflict (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1933). 
30 See Colonel P.T. Etherton and H. Hessell Tiltman, Manchuria: The Cockpit of Asia 
(London: Jarrolds, 1932) and Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections 
and Observations (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936).  
31  See for example H.G.W. Woodhead, A Visit to Manchukuo (Shanghai: The 
Mercury Press, 1932); Ernst Cordes, Das jüngste Kaiserreich. Schlafendes, 
wachendes Mandschukuo, trans. Wang Yingxian (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin 
chuban she, 2013); For travelogues to Manchuria before the Mukden Incident see 
Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict (New York: Macmillian, 1932). 
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O’Dwyer along with a few others. 32  Discussions over the making of Japan’s 
Manchuria was continued over the course of the past few decades, interrogating 
the decisions made by both the Kwantung Army and the Japanese government. As 
the debate on whether the creation of Manchukuo was due to Ishiwara Kanji’s 
obsession regarding the need to prepare for the inevitable final world war or a 
dubious decision for aggression made by the Tokyo government continued, scholars 
in general have established the Mukden Incident as a historical event marking the 
significant shift in imperial Japan’s China policies from a moderate commercial 
expansionist stance to an aggressive territorial expansionist stance. 
 
On the other hand, the economic and industrial aspects, as well as state 
policies and diplomatic efforts surrounding Manchuria, were explored by F.C. Jones, 
Michael Barnhart, W.G. Beasley, Kungtun Sun, Ramon Myers, Herbert Bix, 
Nakagane Katsuji, Takafusa Nakamura, Ian Nish and Florentino Rodao to name a 
few.33 Much work was devoted towards the examination of the experimental 
                                                        
32 See Sadako Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese foreign Policy, 
1931-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964); Yamamuro Shin’ichi, 
Manchuria Under Japanese Dominion, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), pp. 9-38; James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest 
for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics 
and International Ambition (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991); Takehiko 
Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1975); Robert Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); Alvin Coox, “The Kwantung Army 
Dimension,” in The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, eds., Peter Duus, 
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 
pp. 395-428; Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the 
West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Emer O’Dwyer, Significant Soil: 
Settler Colonialism and Japan’s Urban Empire in Manchuria (Cambridge mass.: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2015). 
33 See F.C. Jones, Manchuria since 1931 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1949); 
Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 
1919-1941 (London: Cornell University Press, 1987); W.G. Beasley, Japanese 
Imperialism 1894-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Kungtun Sun, The 
Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1969); Ramon H. Myers, The 
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nature of Manchuria’s economy and private capital investments, in which the 
notion of a “modern enclave economy”, or the “yen bloc”, that integrated 
Manchuria, Northern China and Japan as a whole was established to analyze the 
mobilization of resources and ambitious programs of rapid industrialization. Some 
dated but still highly relevant to the research of Manchuria today, the 
aforementioned scholarship generated a substantial contribution to the shaping of 
the field and the placement of Manchuria in Japan’s imperial empire. 
 
Histories from the bottom-up looking at Manchuria from the Japanese 
perspective could also be found in literature from the past years.34 Louise Young 
recognised that Manchuria was presented as Japan’s “lifeline”. She explored 
thoroughly the incentives for how a variety of social groups in Japan responded and 
how they were mobilised to the calls for the building of Japanese Manchuria after 
                                                                                                                                                            
Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 1932 to 1945 (New York: Garland, 
1982); See also Nakagane Katsuji, “Manchukuo and Economic Development,” in The 
Japanese Informal Empire in China, eds., Duus, Myers and Peattie, 133-58; Takafusa 
Nakamura, “The Yen Bloc, 1931-1941,” in The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945, 
eds., Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (New Jersey: Princeton 
University, 1996); Ian Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and 
the League of Nations, 1931-1933 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993); 
Florentino Rodao, “Japan and the Axis, 1937-8: Recognition of the Franco Regime 
and Manchukuo”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2009), pp. 431-
447; A considerable amount of journal articles was also published with the focus of 
economic development in the region over the past few decades. See Tim Wright, 
“The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression”, Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 41, No. 5 (2007), pp. 1073-1112; A classic debate over the role of SMR 
with regards to the Kwantung Army can be found between Herbert Bix and Ramon 
H. Myers. See Herbert P. Bix, “Japanese Imperialism and the Manchurian Economy, 
1900-1931”, The China Quarterly, Vol. 51 (1972), pp. 425-443 and Ramon H. Myers, 
“Economic Development in Manchuria under Japanese Imperialism: A Dissenting 
View”, The China Quarterly, Vol. 55 (1973), pp. 547-556;  
34 A focus on the colonial building environment has also attracted a good amount of 
scholarship, which in a way evolved into a sub-field of study. See Bill Sewell, “Beans 
to Banners: The Evolving Architecture of Prewar Changchun,” in Harbin To Hanoi: 
The Colonial Built Environment in Asia, 1840 to 1940, eds., Laura Victoir and Victor 
Zatsepine (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013); David Tucker, “France, 
Brossard Mopin, and Manchukuo,” in Harbin To Hanoi: The Colonial Built 
Environment in Asia, 1840 to 1940, eds., Laura Victoir and Victor Zatsepine (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013). 
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the outburst of a “war fever” generated by the Mukden Incident. Additionally, 
through the examinations on how the Japanese perceived Manchuria as an 
imagined empire to fulfil their various goals, Young further suggested that Japanese 
Manchuria yielded two types of imperial systems for both the colonized and the 
colonizers, indicated by the term “total empire”.35 Responding to Young’s focus on 
the Japanese home society’s relations with Manchuria, Sandra Wilson discussed the 
impacts of the Mukden Incident during the early stages of Manchukuo. In 
opposition to Young’s theory of the total war fever, Wilson illustrated that Japanese 
attention was diverted to more direct concerns instead of Manchuria by mid-1933 
when a truce between China and Japan was achieved, such as the economic 
depression, which impacted the Japanese society more significantly.36 
 
The ordinary Japanese experience in Manchuria also received a good 
amount of scholarly attention. Ronald Suleski made detailed examinations of the 
daily life of members of the Manchurian Youth Corps. He investigated the 
ideologies behind the Youth Corps and the complicated reality of life in Manchukuo. 
Suleski recognised the forced nature of the conformity demanded by the Kwantung 
Army officers (the adults) and the rebellion against it by the Youth Corps (the 
youths).37 Mariko Asano Tamanoi’s work on the experiences of Japanese emigrants 
to Manchukuo and the left-behind children after the war highlighted the 
victimization of the ordinary Japanese people and their offspring in the name of 
                                                        
35 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime 
Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); See also Louise Young, 
“Imagined Empire: The Cultural Construction of Manchukuo,” in The Japanese 
Wartime Empire, eds., Duus, Myers and Peattie. 
36 Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33 (New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
37 Ronald Suleski, “Reconstructing Life in the Youth Corps Camps of Manchuria, 
1938-45: Resistance to Conformity”, East Asian History, Vol. 13, No. 30 (2005), pp. 
67-91; also see Ronald Suleski, “Northeast China under Japanese Control: The Role 




empire.38 From an anthropological perspective, Tamanoi’s arguments on Japanese 
rural immigrants acting both as colonial agents that exploited the local peasants’ 
land and victims of Japanese mobilization provided an interesting alternative to 
Louise Young’s investigation of the “people’s war responsibility” and her concept of 
“total empire”. Indeed, this thesis does consider Japanese immigrants in 
Manchukuo as both state actors and social agents that represented the interest of 
Japan at the foremost. The privilege and prestige of colonial actors could be 
reflected through the social hierarchy and everyday interactions with the 
subjugated peoples in Manchukuo, which this thesis seeks to demonstrate. 
 
Compared to the overwhelming body of literature on the Japanese aspects 
of Manchuria, works on the Chinese aspects are far fewer in numbers. To begin 
with, the city of Harbin gradually began to emerge as a sub-area of research in 
recent years. Once an international settlement created by Russian imperialists and 
frequently described as the “Paris of the Far East” or “Oriental Moscow”, the city 
bore some of the transnational elements of colonial Shanghai, although currently 
being studied at a much smaller scale. 39  The latest monograph that made a 
substantial contribution to this field of study was Kathryn Meyer in her work on the 
daily lives of ordinary people in the Garden of Grand Vision (Da guan yuan), a 
                                                        
38 Mariko Asano Tamanoi, Memory Maps: The State and Manchuria in Postwar 
Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009). See also Mariko Asano Tamanoi, 
“A Road to ‘A Redeemed Mankind’: The Politics of Memory among the Former 
Japanese Peasant Settlers in Manchuria,” in Harbin and Manchuria: Place, Space, 
and Identity, ed., Thomas Lahusen (Durham: Duke University Press 2001); For more 
detailed focus on Japanese identity in Manchukuo see Mariko Asano Tamanoi, 
“Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classification: The “Japanese” in “Manchuria”, The 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2000), pp. 248-276. 
39 For works on the city of Harbin see Soren Clausen and Stig Thogersen, The 
Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc, 1995); Victor Zatsepine, “Russia, Railways, and Urban Development in 
Manchuria,” in Harbin To Hanoi: The Colonial Built Environment in Asia, 1840 to 
1940, eds., Laura Victoir and Victor Zatsepine (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2013), pp. 17-36; Thomas Lahusen ed., Harbin and Manchuria: Place, Space, 
and Identity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); James H. Carter, Creating a 
Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916-1932 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002). 
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housing complex in Harbin during the Japanese occupation. Tracing the reports of 
police lieutenant Goto Reiji and his colleagues, Meyer made detailed examinations 
regarding the living conditions of the Manchukuoan residents within the garden, as 
well as their daily interactions with the police. She highlighted how Japanese police 
officers maintained their prejudiced opinions of viewing the residents as inferior 
subjects and refused to believe in any modernization efforts in a slum where drugs, 
prostitution, violence and gambling ran rampant.40 Meyer’s research provided an 
excellent understanding of everyday conflict and compromise within the framework 
of occupation, whilst providing new findings on the ways that subjugated people 
interacted with the colonial organization in which this thesis seeks to build. 
 
On the other hand, Norman Smith placed great emphasis on the history of 
Chinese literary life during the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo. Smith took the 
case of the lives of women writers who lived in Manchukuo and illustrated how the 
female writers utilised their publications to criticise both the Manchukuo regime 
and the conservative Confucius ideology of good wives and wise mothers (xian qi 
liang mu).41 In addition to literary works in Manchukuo, Smith’s recent research 
explored the transition of Manchuria’s status quo from an undeveloped wilderness 
to a vital industrialised part of Japan’s empire by looking at the historical alcohol 
and opium usage in Manchukuo. He explained how the Japanese promoted alcohol 
as a potent symbol to showcase the progress of modernity and the development of 
a “modern lifestyle”, but subsequently degraded it to the status of an intoxicant 
that poisoned the population during the “holy war” period when the consumption 
no longer had a place to serve in Japan’s wartime interests.42  
                                                        
40 Kathryn Meyer, Life and Death in the Garden: Sex, Drugs, Cops, and Robbers in 
Wartime China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 
41 Norman Smith, Resisting Manchukuo: Chinese Women Writers and the Japanese 
Occupation (Toronto: UBC Press, 2007). 
42 Norman Smith, Intoxicating Manchuria: Alcohol, Opium, and Culture in China’s 
Northeast (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012); see also Norman 
Smith, “Writing and Remembering the Battle against Opiates in Manchukuo,” in 
Beyond Suffering: Recounting War in Modern China, eds., James Flath and Norman 




Rana Mitter conducted a ground-breaking exploration of grassroots 
reactions to the founding of Manchukuo by coining the creation of modern Chinese 
nationalism and the resistance to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria as a 
“resistancialist myth”. To elaborate, he questioned the myth of resistance in the 
puppet state of Manchukuo by examining the various ways in which the Chinese 
reacted to the Japanese invasion and giving great focus on the issue of local elite 
collaboration from both the provincial and local level. Moreover, Mitter 
deconstructed Chinese nationalism during that time from acknowledging the major 
scale collaboration in Manchukuo and argued that nationalism primarily existed 
within the urban populace of China, especially among the literate urbanites who 
were constantly involved with journalism and new institutes such as the YMCA. In 
such a sense, Mitter demonstrated that the majority of the resistance groups were 
not motivated by nationalism in the way perceived by China proper activists such as 
the Northeast National Salvation Society (Dong bei min zhong kang ri jiu guo hui) 
assembled by northeastern exiles, whereas resistance in Manchukuo portrayed by 
narratives such as the heroic acts of Ma Zhanshan were more the result of careful 
political calculations rather than driven by nationalist ideas.43 This notion of the 
“resistancialist myth” was further developed by Mitter in his 2005 book chapter 
examining the propaganda efforts of northeastern political activist Du Zhongyuan, 
who failed to generate a sympathetic response from the petty urbanites in China 
proper towards his cause.44 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Norman Smith, “Opiate addiction and the entanglements of Imperialism and 
Patriarchy in Manchukuo, 1932-45”, The Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, Vol. 20 
(2005), pp. 66-104. 
43 Mitter, The Manchurian Myth; See also Rana Mitter, “Evil Empire? Competing 
Constructions of Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria, 1928-1937,” in Imperial Japan 
and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945, eds., Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb 
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 146-168. 
44 Rana Mitter, “Manchuria in Mind: Press, Propaganda, and Northeast China in the 
Age of Empire, 1930-1937,” in Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire, 
ed., Mariko Asano Tamanoi (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), pp. 25-49. 
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In a sense, by debunking the myth of Chinese resistance against Manchukuo, 
Mitter’s detailed research challenged the conception of “evil empire” as suggested 
by mainstream historiographies. With a careful illustration of how the Japanese 
successfully justified themselves as “natives” of the region and the bringers of 
modernity, Mitter arrived at the conclusion that the population of Manchuria was 
manipulated into believing that the Japanese presence was a better and more 
trustworthy option to safeguard their livelihoods and interests compared to the old 
warlord regime.45  
 
This thesis does agree with Mitter’s arguments on the incentives behind 
widespread collaboration among local political elites. However, to extend this 
argument to the rest of the population would create the tendency to overlook the 
fundamental reason why Manchukuo was created by the Japanese in the first place. 
Both Smith’s examination of Japanese modernity serving as a propaganda tool to 
showcase enlightenment and Mitter’s argument of how the construction of modern 
facilities by the Japanese actually benefited the local population is all highly 
relevant to this thesis.46 However, this thesis suggests that for the ordinary people 
of Manchukuo that were never in a position to exercise power nor had anything to 
offer to weight in the balance of bargaining power with the Japanese, the 
relationship between them and the colonial agents was simply exploitative by 
nature. As such, this thesis seeks to deploy and highlight imperialism and 
colonialism to examine the daily lives of the people under Japanese domination as 
well as filling the gap in the literature on the ordinary experiences of Manchukuo, 
which is currently under-researched. 
                                                        
45 Mitter, “Evil Empire?”164. 
46 Different arguments on the effects of foreign influenced modernity in the case of 
Shanghai can be found by Isabella Jackson and Hanchao Lu. See Isabella Jackson, 
Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China’s Global City (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017); Lu Hanchao, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday 








In a narrow sense, the Marxist-Leninist approach suggests that the concepts 
of imperialism from the late nineteenth century stemmed from industrial 
capitalism’s incessant desires for expansion. Lenin, in his own words, described the 
phenomenon as “a world system of colonial oppression and financial strangulation 
of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world by a handful of advanced 
countries”, in which the powerful, rich in capital and lack in labour nations 
plundered the entire world. 47 Similarly, post-Marxian economist John Atkinson 
Hobson argued that the reason behind capitalism’s obsessive search for new 
markets to exploit was, in fact, its own power of production exceeding home 
consumption growth. 48  The “tap-root” nature of imperialism, as Hobson have 
described, thereby refers to the inevitable outcome wherein imperialism, to secure 
incoming profits, ultimately results in the necessity for annexation or colonization. 
Therefore, as long as costs of labour, land, and raw materials are low in states 
regarded as “less advanced” compared to the home country, the pursuit of surplus 
capital will never stop. 
 
Alternatively, non-Marxist theorists suggest that imperialism implies a 
relationship between advanced imperial countries on the one hand and colonized 
                                                        
47 Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (London: Penguin 
Classics, 2010), preface; See also Tom Kemp, “The Marxist theory of imperialism,” in 
Studies in the theory of imperialism, eds., Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: 
Longman, 1972), pp. 15-33. For a more comprehensive debate on theories 
surrounding western hegemony, See Patrick Wolfe, “History and Imperialism: A 
Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism”, The American Historical Review, 
Vol. 102, No. 2 (1997), pp. 388-420.  
48 John Atkinson Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 
2011), pp. 76-100. 
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regions annexed into the empire’s territory on the other hand. 49  Joseph A. 
Schumpeter described the process of empire building as “an objectless disposition 
on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion.”50 Based on Schumpeter’s 
understanding of imperialist aggressiveness, imperialistic behaviour can be 
qualified as aggressive towards the appearance of opportunities instead of being 
determined by the attractiveness of potential profits. Hannah Arendt further 
described the imperialistic powers as “the never-ending, self-feeding motor of all 
political action.”51 This concept is essential as it sheds light on the mobilizing nature 
of imperialism as the main driving force towards the building and preservation of 
the empire and its colonies.  
 
With regard to terminology, imperialism and colonialism are frequently used 
interchangeably. Jurgen Osterhammel distinguished the terms by suggesting that 
imperialism is a more extensive concept involving international politics, while 
colonialism can be viewed as an expression of, or “one special manifestation of 
imperialism”.52 In the case of colonization, Leninists argued that the “enormous 
superabundance of capital” generated by capitalist countries cannot be invested 
profitably in a labour-limited home country. Conversely, it was regarded as an ideal 
form of investment in the capital-limited, labour-abundant colonies. 53  Building 
upon this reasoning, Tom Bottomore argued that modern colonialism does not only 
seek to plunder wealth and commodities from the occupied regions but it also 
actively engages in the process of reconstructing the conquered economic 
                                                        
49 Tom Kemp, “The Marxist theory of imperialism,” in Studies in the theory of 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 17-63. 
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Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 3. 
53  Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism: The New Critical Idiom (London: 
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structures. 54  This process of “restructuring the economy” and “forming new 
communities” in the colonized land hence inevitably generated the “de-structuring” 
and “un-forming” of the already existing communities. Furthermore, Frederick 
Cooper suggested that the most prominent and preconditioned features in the core 
of colonialism include brutality, enslavement, forceful requisition of land, 
denigration of indigenous cultures, and finally, the coercion of religious conversion, 
which are not unique to any era or region.55 To sum up, imperialism as a global 
system can function without formal colonies, but colonialism cannot. 
 
1.4.2. An Overview of Imperialism and Colonialism in China 
 
As for China, the concepts of imperialism and colonialism began taking root 
in complicated shapes through a variety of agencies from the nineteenth century 
onwards. Although Chinese historiographies often associated imperialism with 
narratives of a century-long national humiliation and subjugation, it is also 
important to consider imperialism as the presumption for competition between 
imperialistic powers to incorporate China into the global economy, or what Robert 
Bickers described as “the international scramble for China”.56 James Peck further 
suggested that Qing China, as a self-sustaining and relatively isolated empire, was 
confronted by its own inadequacy in the face of the challenges of modernization 
and encounters with the western powers.57 China’s inability to achieve fundamental 
changes to its society by itself led to a weighty sense of victimization among the 
Chinese people. To put it simply, according to Peck’s own words, “imperialism 
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55 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), p. 28. 
56 Robert Bickers, The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire 1932-
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existed in Chinese people’s heads and it was not real.”58 On the other hand, Robert 
Dernberger considered China an ossified civilization that needed western powers to 
“reactivate” its history to move forward. Addressing this school of thought from an 
economic perspective, Dernberger, along with other scholars, thus maintained that 
“China’s problem in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not that it had too 
much imperialism but that it did not have enough”.59 
  
The role of imperialism being a key stimulus for the development of the 
modern sector in China, regardless of it being a negative or positive argument, has 
triggered much debate among historians and theorists. Generally owing to the 
vagueness and equivocal nature of the term, exploring imperialism in China proved 
to be a cumbersome task given the distinct features of various imperialistic powers, 
which Paul Cohen criticised, calling it “the problem with the problem of 
imperialism”.60 To be sure, Cohen advocated for a “China-centred history”, inviting 
a more interior approach to the “impact-response” framework (adopted notably by 
John King Fairbank) for the understanding of nineteenth and twentieth-century 
China. However, it is equally crucial not to dismiss scholarly assumptions and 
interpretations of the effects of foreign influence and encroachments in China, 
insofar as any history written without considering those aspects easily risks being 
overly simplified or one-sided. 
 
Western imperialistic powers largely entrenched their interests eastward in 
the form of “semi-colonies”, with Britain acquiring its first treaty-ports in China 
                                                        
58 James Peck, “The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America’s China 
Watchers,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1969), pp. 59-69 
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60 Ibid., p. 141. 
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following the end of the Opium War in 1842. In general, semi-colonialism refers to 
the partial control of territories without the formal demand for sovereignty.61 
However, Sun Yat-sen, the founder of Republican China, rejected the traditional 
Leninist approach of defining semi-colonialism as the in-between period to 
colonialism by categorizing China as a “hypo-colony”, arguing in his own words, that 
“China is not the colony of one nation but of all, and we are not the slaves of one 
country but of all.”62 Focusing on Shanghai, Isabella Jackson echoed this argument 
by applying the concept of Transnational Colonialism to examine the nature of 
western colonialism in China. In her study, Jackson provides a detailed analysis of 
the administrative role of the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC), uncovering the 
ways in which foreign influence was exerted in China, primarily via the participation 
of non-state actors (NSAs) in the shaping and developing of the city.63 Along this 
line of argument, it becomes evident that the extent of control exercised by the 
foreign authorities not only suggested a comfortable amount of power endowed in 
the agencies, but also a clear claim for legitimacy beneath the indistinct nature of 
western colonialism in China. Finally, the method of indirect rule beneath the 
concept of transnational colonialism is also valuable to improve our understandings 
of the nature of Manchukuo and its mechanisms in a comparative context. 
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1.4.3. The Unique Japanese Way 
 
A closer look into the case of Japanese imperialism in East Asia reveals 
characteristics similar to its European counterparts in their earlier stages. James 
Huffman observed western traits in the Japanese imperial language, while in 
parallel, he noted a resemblance with the rhetoric of the “white man’s burden”, as 
part of the “civilizing mission” rationale.64 Moreover, when referring to subjugated 
(or yet to be subjugated) peoples, degrading terms and phrases were frequently 
adopted, dismissing non-Japanese Asians into discriminatory categories such as 
“natives” or “subhuman”, which Kawamura Minato regarded as the Japanese 
version of Orientalism.65 In view of those arguments, the sense of superiority, along 
with ethnic prejudice, can thus be understood as essential features in the processes 
by which Japan shaped and maintained a self-imaginary consciousness, wherein its 
duty, as a civilised nation, was to guide other Asian civilizations out of the quagmire 
created by western imperialists.  
 
Nevertheless, the Japanese belief in their own responsibility to lead Asia was 
one of the few fundamental features distinguishing Japanese imperialism from 
other forms of western imperialism. Indeed, forcefully incorporated into the global 
capitalist system via gunboat diplomacy, Japan’s primary concern was not economic, 
but to ensure its own security, with the objective of becoming an imperialistic 
power strong enough to resist the “white” imperialistic powers.66 The Treaty Port 
system that forced China into multiple capitulations triggered vigorous reactions in 
                                                        
64 James Huffman, Japan and Imperialism, 1853-1945 (Ann Arbor: Association for 
Asian Studies, Inc, 2010), p. 3. 
65 Michele M. Mason and Helen J.S. Lee eds., Reading Colonial Japan: Text, Context, 
and Critique (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 272; For concepts 
regarding Orientalism see Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003). 
66 Mark R. Peattie, “Introduction,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, 
eds., Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), p. 8; See also William Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan: 
Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
35 
 
late Tokugawa Japan, which ultimately fostered political revolutions leading to the 
inauguration of Meiji Japan. With the colonization of Taiwan in 1895 and the 
annexation of Korea in 1910, it was clear that Japan’s empire building process was 
strategically driven from a geographical standpoint. The acquisition of the Korean 
peninsula that pushed Japan deeper into the core continent was followed by a less 
blatant period of expansion into Manchuria.67 It is not to say that the economical 
penetration of its acquired territories did not play a vital role. Indeed, if Meiji 
imperialism can be described as a chaotic period guided by neither the pursuit of 
capital expansion nor imperial conquest,68 the subsequent decade of the great 
depression after 1929 clearly drove Japanese imperialists towards the priority of 
economic autarky. This consecutive stage, which James Huffman identified as the 
“multicausal” pattern of Japanese imperialism, was crucial in the formation of 
Manchukuo.  
  
One of the most influential scholars to have instituted the notion of the 
authenticity of Manchukuo under the theme of Japanese imperialism is Prasenjit 
Duara. The end of the Great War saw the rise of “Anti-imperialist Nationalism”, 
which inevitably became problematic for Japan to further its imperialist goals, in 
pursuit of capital and prestige on the global stage. As such, mainstream Chinese 
scholarship has long established that Manchukuo was created neither as an 
independent state nor as a formal colony, but as a puppet state of Japan, strongly 
emphasizing the illegitimacy of its status. However, whilst preserving this notion, 
Duara incorporated the concept of the nation-state to explain how Manchukuo, 
despite existing as a modern state form, could be “distinguished not only from 
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premodern states, but also from most nineteenth-century colonial states.”69 Duara 
coined the term “East Asia Modern” to illustrate how the discourse of civilization 
could be mobilised towards the identity formation of Manchukuo in light of the 
global “anti-imperialism” trend. Although weak and unpopular amongst the people 
of Manchukuo, the realm of authenticity nonetheless came through by means of its 
subjects’ participation in political organizations, such as the Concordia Association 
(xie he hui) and in the active production of literature.70 This thesis acknowledges 
the fact that Manchukuo was indeed a puppet state during its existence and also 
maintains the usefulness of Duara’s argument that Manchukuo was structured 
upon repressive instruments by the Japanese to exploit the people and the land of 
its resources to advance in its own imperialist agendas. 
 
The exploitative nature of Japan’s disguised imperialism within the social 
structure of Manchukuo was further illustrated with Mark Driscoll’s 
conceptualization of necropolitics within the Japanese capitalist framework, 
through which he demonstrated how Japan’s imperial ambitions were perpetuated 
by its colonized subaltern workforce. Taking on a Marxist approach, Driscoll noted 
the “indispensably dispensable” nature of Chinese labourers in Manchuria and the 
tendencies of Japanese colonial capitalists to disregard them as “disposable 
consumables” but yet “indispensable” for mobilization and further exploitation.71 
Driscoll’s critique of Japan’s colonial violence placed Japanese imperialism and its 
industrial capitalist advancements largely at the expense of its endless supply of 
“living-dead zombies” that were forcefully generated from coolie immigrants, 
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opium addicts and the homeless wanderers, who, according to him, were “neither 
killed nor allowed to die”.72 Driscoll’s argument on the case of drug addicts in 
Manchukuo is illustrated further in this thesis with an examination of the 
consequences behind state opium monopolization in Chapter Five. 
  
On the other hand, Hyun Ok Park explored the essence of the Japanese 
colonial process of Manchuria. Bearing resemblance with Isabella Jackson’s work 
with regard to the sub-imperialist role of the Sikh policemen in Shanghai to 
represent the influence of British presence, Park theorized that Korean migrants to 
Manchuria were the bearers of the Japanese empire, delocalizing and disseminating 
power.73 Acting as colonial agents, Korean peasants within the “webs of empire”, or 
what Park described as the process of “territorial osmosis”, challenge the 
traditional suggestion of territorial boundaries as the container for colonial power, 
and defined Japan’s colonial strategy as a continuous outward flow of Japan’s 
sovereign power embodied in its series of vassal states. 74  In essence, the 
consistency in Japan’s imperialist imaginary construction of a unified Asian 
community under its leadership and its de-emphasis on physical boundaries 
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problematised the Eurocentric understandings of the relationship between the 
metropole and the colonized otherness.  
  
It is critical to note that the Japanese empire, and its “empires within the 
empire”, was constructed upon the ideological belief of Pan-Asianism, which 
evolved into the political form of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the 
late 1930s.75 However, as a puppet state from the beginning and thus excluded 
from Japan’s formal empire, the subjugated peoples of Manchukuo were neither 
subjected to the full Japanization of Korea, which Mark Caprio considered to be a 
peripheral colony of Japan (which also resulted in ultimate failure), nor to the 
political assimilation and imperialization of the peoples in Taiwan (which achieved 
partial success). 76  Manchukuo was indeed based upon the fact that it was 
established as a puppet state, thus weak by nature in its claim for sovereignty and 
legitimacy, and had to resort to express Japan’s imperial Pan-Asianism framework 
in its traditional Confucian form. Whilst advocating fundamental concepts of racial 
harmony, the “Kingly Way” ideology justified the Japanese presence in Manchukuo 
by stressing the importance of Japan being the saviour of Manchuria, and the 
intimate relationship between the two as a cover for the exploitative nature of 
Japanese colonialism. This concept is especially evident in the examination of the 
education received by the Manchukuo youths in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
  
Overall, this thesis adopts the perspectives of imperialism and colonialism in 
a broader context to examine the sufferings of the peoples in Manchukuo under 
Japanese domination. As noted by Louise Young, Manchuria was not only altered by 
the Japanese presence, but also was never in a position to reject any influence or 
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interventions instilled by its “colonizers”.77 Therefore, without overcomplicating the 
nature of Japanese imperialism and colonialism, this thesis establishes the concept 
of Manchukuo as a puppet state implemented by the Japanese, wherein the local 
population, despite being exploited and suppressed by the regime, managed to 
overcome hardships by adopting various strategies over the course of Manchukuo’s 
fourteen years of its existence. 
  
                                                        





1.5.1. Primary datasets 
A wide variety of sources, mainly in Chinese, have been gathered and used 
in this thesis to reconstruct ordinary people’s experience of Manchukuo during the 
period of 1931 to 1945.  
 
To begin with, this thesis draws heavily upon Manchukuo periodicals, 
namely reports and stories from Shengjing Shibao (Sheng Jing Times). These types 
of sources were primarily concerned with specific social issues within each 
particular time period that were frequently overlooked and neglected by 
government publications, therefore crucial to the detailed examination of the 
everyday life of ordinary people. Founded in 1906, the Japanese-owned daily 
newspaper Shengjing Shibao was one of the most influential Chinese language 
newspapers in Manchuria. Despite its pro-Japan political and editorial stance, the 
newspaper was also well-known for its sharp linguistic reporting styles of domestic 
social issues that were subjected to less, sometimes no political interference and 
censorship, a tradition inherited from its Qing Dynasty reporting days. Indeed, while 
the newspaper cannot be considered to be an objective reflection when examining 
political events, it provides a valuable indication of issues affecting the everyday 
lives of the people, and therefore can be seen as more illustrative of the public 
opinion and common areas of anxiety and concern at the time. It is also important 
to specify that during the data collection and analysis processes, no specific events 
or times were targeted, apart from the 1931-1945 timeframe. When collecting and 
analysing data, I looked for recurrences across daily reports to highlight some of the 
main social issues that affected ordinary people’s everyday life and activities in 
Manchukuo. Themes began emerging and topics were grouped together, with 
stories and testimonies collected in news reports illustrating each theme. The use 
of newspapers allowed for continuity, and enabled looking at the development of 
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some social issues across time rather than looking at isolated events, and see how 
these issues unfolded as the days passed. In all, even though Manchukuo 
newspaper sources cannot be fully used uncritically as a reflection of all 
Manchukuoans, it does provide valuable insights through the snippets of the social 
issues that affect the entire society.  
 
Major bodies of official publications consulted in this thesis include 
Manchukuo government gazettes (Man zhou guo zheng fu gong bao), local gazettes 
(Di fang zheng fu gong bao), and Manchukuo Yearbooks (Man zhou nian jian). 
Published each year from 1932 to 1945, these sources documented rules, laws, 
regulations and official edicts from both the central and the county administration 
level. This thesis also used a variety of Manchukuo published books collected during 
the course of fieldwork in China. These range from the topic of urban and rural 
industries, welfares, meeting memoirs, commerce to sanitation development and 
many more. In addition, this research has also drawn from republished primary 
materials, such as the Bogus Manchukuo Historical Data Compilation (Wei man 
zhou guo shi liao), Bogus Manchukuo Statistical Data Compilation (Wei man zhou 
guo tong ji zi liao hui bian), and The Selection of Archival Materials of the Japanese 
Imperialist Invasion of China (Ri ben di guo zhu yi qin hua dang an zi liao xuan bian) 
to name a few. Enormous in volume, these compilations contain a wide range of 
photocopied original documents including aspects of politics, economy, society, 
statistical data, local reports, education, inter-departmental correspondences, 
announcements, speeches, etc. Covering almost all aspects of the puppet state, this 
body of sources provided the necessary context for this thesis to examine and 
reconstruct the experiences of the people.  
 
Major volumes of narratives and witness accounts used in this thesis include 
but are not limited to the Bogus Manchukuo Historical Compilation (Wei man shi 
liao cong shu) edited by Sun Bang, China Oral History Compilation (Zhong hua kou 
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shu li shi cong shu) and Testimonies of Japanese Invasion and Colonization 
Compilation (Jian zheng ri ben qin hua zhi min jiao yu) edited by Qi Hongshen and 
Cultural and Historical Data (Wen shi zi liao) compilation edited by the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Committees (Zhong guo ren min zheng zhi xie shang 
hui yi wei yuan hui) in various counties and cities in Northeast China. This body of 
sources provided a great deal of personal narratives, dictations, and recollections 
that reflected the essence of the experiences of the people during the Manchukuo 
era. Indeed, following the proposal of Zhou Enlai to record and save the memories 
and histories of the past in order to pass the knowledge down to younger 
generations, post war narratives were systematically collected by the Chinese 
government since 1959. This body of sources was inevitably subjected to political 
censorship that favoured the Party. Exemplary of the CCP’s political stance in regard 
to past sufferings, the majority of these post war narratives were thus meant to 
fulfil the political agenda by evidencing the improvements brought about by the 
Party in contrast with the sufferings of the past.78 It is equally important to note 
that this body of materials was also subjected to changing political imperatives as it 
was collected over the course of a few decades, which would suggest some 
inconsistencies in the degree of censorship, and that the materials were inevitably 
constrained in different ways at different times and to different extents. 
Nonetheless, the numerous and rich personal narratives, dictations, and 
recollections reflecting the essence of the experiences of the people were 
undeniable, and the use of this combination of sources allows for a more balanced 
assessment of Chinese experiences in Manchukuo. 
1.5.2. Interviews 
While the above sources consist of the core primary dataset I use for this 
thesis, 12 qualitative interviews were conducted to supplement those, and were 
triangulated accordingly for confirmation and validation. Concentrated in Liaoning 
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Province, the information obtained from the interviews provided crucial first-hand 





Identifying and recruiting interviewees 
 
Participants were recruited via multiple methods. I started by contacting my 
personal and extended networks in north-eastern China (grandparents, their 
friends, and other acquaintances) to reach out to potential respondents, which 
turned out to be inconclusive. I thus identified places where senior citizens were 
likely to cluster, and found that retirement homes and exercise grounds in public 
areas were good options to investigate, insofar as these are public, yet quiet spaces 
that would allow enough privacy for potential interviews.  
 
If my network did not generate interviews directly, it proved to be helpful 
later on, as I was granted access to a few retirement homes thanks to the contacts 
generated by members of my extended network. Indeed, in order to be allowed to 
speak and interview any elderly person residing in a retirement home, I had to 
obtain the authorisation of the administrator in charge of the institution. While 
some administrators were understanding of my purpose and allowed me through, a 
few others refused me access to the residents, even after I told them that I was a 
doctoral student researching Manchukuo (I made it short) and that the interview 
was going to be conducted ethically without bothering anyone or the resident. It 
was only after contacts established through prior networking introduced me to the 
administrators that I was allowed through. Here, retirement home administrators 
were what the literature refers to as gatekeepers, and were key in obtaining access 
to potential interviewees.79 The administrators and the nurses’ contributions and 
help were essential insofar as they were able to judge whether potential 
interviewees were in good enough health or not, or whether they would have the 
capability to answer my questions. 
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Some of the retirement homes I visited housed a few dozen elderly 
residents, but not all fitted in my interview criteria (see below). Moreover, 
administrators implicitly (sometimes very explicitly) expressed that I should not 
bother the residents too much by overstaying or enquiring each of them one by one. 
In order to filter them more efficiently, I asked nurses to help me identify 
beforehand residents that I could potentially interview – residents who were above 
80 years of age, who they knew have lived in the region since they were young. 
Indeed, in order to be eligible for an interview, participants had to fulfil a few basic, 
yet essential criteria. Each interviewee thus must have lived in Dongbei (a more 
familiar term to Northeastern Chinese residents) during the time of the occupation 
at least as a child or teenager. Individuals born during the later years of Manchukuo 
were therefore not eligible insofar as they would not be able to recollect memories 
since they were too young.  
 
All 12 interviews were thus conducted at a time and place chosen by the 
participant, and ultimately, most of the interviews took place in the retirement 
homes I visited in Liaoning, in the comfort of the interviewee’s room, except for 
Interviewees 10 and 11, respectively recruited at an exercise ground and at a library, 
who both invited me (separately) to visit their own homes.  
 
Interview process and structure 
 
Before proceeding to the actual interview with the respondents, I made sure 
one last time that they corresponded to my pre-set criteria. I then reminded them 
of the purpose of the interview, which was simply to learn about their daily 
experiences and activities of whatever they could remember of the time during 
Manchukuo, in order to better understand Chinese people’s experience of the 
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regime. I presented them with the information sheet and consent form to sign. 
Since both forms were in English, I translated each form directly to the interviewees 
and confirmed that they were happy to proceed on that basis. When going through 
the information sheet that I live-translated for them, I told the interviewees they 
could speak at ease without restriction, giving them the freedom to speak about 
anything they remembered and were willing to share. Respondents were also 
reminded that they could withdraw their participation at any time, without giving 
any reason, with no consequence for them at all. All respondents were asked if they 
were comfortable with the discussion being voice-recorded, and all agreed without 
hesitation when I told them I would transcribe our exchanges and eventually delete 
the recording.   
 
The interview structure was very loose. The first few questions enquired the 
participant’s basic demographic details (name, if they were willing to disclose it, 
current age, and place(s) of residence in Manchukuo). The second part mostly 
revolved around anything that the respondents could remember living under the 
colonial rule.  
 
As the researcher interviewing the participants, the process was a reactive 
one for the most part. Since they were told to share anything they could remember 
that was related to their everyday activities, it was difficult to partition topics and 
themes cleanly. The interview flow was directed by the memories of the 
participants who often switched from one topic to another based on what they 
could recall, and I reacted and followed up accordingly, enquiring more details 
about whichever event, or instance was just mentioned. For example, if the 
interviewee said they used to live in a big city, I would enquire more specific 
questions about how living in the city was like on a daily basis, if during the entire 
time of the occupation they remained sedentary or had to relocate at any point, 
and for what reasons. This would later on, provide me with more details to better 
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understand some of the living differences between cities and rural regions. If the 
interviewee suddenly recalled a specific favourite childhood dish they often ate, I 
would enquire where they used to eat it, if it was home cooked, in their kitchen or 
in a shared space, if the cooking ingredients were expensive or difficult to obtain, 
where they acquired them, and as many details that mark one’s everyday life. 
Occasionally, interviewees would make references to the presence of Japanese in 
their lives by mentioning very casually “there were a lot of Japanese”80 for instance. 
I would then pick up on that comment, let them finish their story, and try to further 
enquire about this later in the interview. All throughout the interview, I punctuated 
my sentences with “If you are okay with this, can you tell me more about it?”81 to 
enquire more details, and with “It is okay if you don’t remember the details 
clearly.”82 to remind the interviewee they should not feel pressured to tell me 
anything.  
 
When there were moments of silence because the interviewee seemed to 
have run out of stories to share by themselves, I would then enquire specific 
themes by asking broader questions that were related to everyday life and activities, 
for example: “Do you remember anything about your school days?”, “Was it easy to 
shop for groceries?”, “When you were sick, did you go see the doctor?”, “Did you 




                                                        
80 “yu dao guo hen duo ri ben ren” in Chinese. 
81 “Ru guo ke yi de hua, neng bu neng geng jia xiang xi de shuo yi xia?” in Chinese 
82 “Ji bu de de hua ye mei guan xi” in Chinese. 
83  “Ni ji de shang xue shi hou de shi qing ma?”, “Shang jie mai dong xi fang bian 
ma?”, “Sheng bing qu kan guo yi sheng ma?”, “Ni shi zu fang zi zhu hai shi you zi ji 




Profiles of the participants 
 
Appendix 1 lists the profiles of each of the 12 interviewees, and indicates 
their name if provided, date of the interview, place of residence in Manchukuo, 
gender, age, and where in the thesis their testimonies appeared. Two interviewees 
chose to remain anonymous (Interviewees 1 and 2), and three chose to give their 
surnames only (Interviewees 5, 8 and 9), replying [surname] plus 
grandpa/grandma84 when asked. All the other interviewees disclosed their full 
names without hesitating, and when asked if they wanted to be pseudonymised or 




As explained above, I followed the most appropriate ethical practices in 
obtaining the respondents’ consent, as approved by the University’s ethics 
committee. It should be noted that I made sure with the nurses working in the 
retirement homes that participants had the competence to give consent. 
Interviewees 10 and 11 were also competent in that regard as well. As I had 
ensured it to the participants, interviews were transcribed, and recordings were 
deleted later on. 
 
However, even though interviewees were informed about the content and 
purpose of the interview beforehand, questions related to participants’ 
vulnerability could be raised given their (old) age, but also because of potential 
sensitive issues related to colonial discrimination or lack of equality, or simply, 
negative experiences and memories of suffering during atrocious episodes. Such 
                                                        
84 For instance, He ye ye (grandpa He) and Liu nai nai (grandma Liu). 
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situations could potentially be difficult to deal with, which is why as soon as I 
detected any form of discomfort, I would immediately tell them not to feel 
obligated to share anything they did not want to talk about and switch topics 
before ending the interview. I encountered this particular case on one occasion 
while interviewing a participant who invited me for afternoon tea at his home for 
us to conduct the interview. However, within a few minutes, the man began 
weeping, most likely due to remembering painful memories. Following ethical best 
judgement, I chose not to question any further about his time during Manchukuo in 
order not to trigger any more discomfort for him, and we began speaking about his 
hobbies instead. Insofar as no information or valuable content could be extracted 
from this interview (since it was stopped within a few minutes), the interview was 
left out of the research sample.  
 
Further considerations that needed to be taken into account across the 
entire process (from planning interviews, to conducting them, until I analysed the 
transcripts) regarded the truthfulness and accuracy of the stories and memories 
shared during the interview due the respondents’ older age, but also due to the 
characteristic nature of qualitative interviews. In order to offset any shortcoming 
this qualitative data could have, I triangulated the information collected during the 
interviews with the other primary sources collected during fieldwork, as well as 




1.6. Structure of the thesis 
  
 This thesis consists of an introduction, four substantive chapters, and a 
conclusion chapter. Chapter One of the thesis introduces the theme as well as the 
background of this research. This chapter also contains a literature review and 
introduces the theoretical bases to this study. 
 
Chapter Two is the first of four chapters devoted to research findings. This 
chapter focuses primarily on the daily lives and roles of the youths in Manchukuo. 
The assessment of the education that they received as well as their behaviour in 
classrooms reveals the Japanese authorities’ endeavours in creating a new 
generation of active collaborators, an effort that ultimately failed. In addition, this 
chapter also acknowledges the conflicted identities of the youths, one that is 
associated with the newfound national consciousness of being a modern 
Manchukuo “citizen” but also retained a strong sense of Chinese values that the 
Japanese sought to extirpate. The general appearance of an appreciation of Japan’s 
“superior culture” among the youths led to an outward obedience, but also 
generated profound resentment towards the harsh requirements of the Japanese, 
which was expressed in a rather discreet manner in their everyday activities. 
  
Chapter Three details the various hardships that occurred in rural and urban 
Manchukuo. More precisely, this chapter establishes how the people’s living 
standards were impacted by shortages of food staples and commodities as well as 
the social turbulence that followed. In this process, this chapter identifies how 
behaviours were shaped, as well as how the people negotiated their own terms for 
survival. Following the introduction of the monopolised distribution and rationing 
system after 1937, this chapter reveals how the process of obtaining and having 
access to goods under the context of scarcities heavily depended upon the 
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establishment of personal connections and favours, which took the edge off of the 
everyday hardships for some, but weigh down the lives of many. 
  
Chapter Four examines the sense of “homelessness” among Manchukuo 
residents. In other words, this chapter takes the modernization and development 
efforts of the regime into consideration and highlights the consequences and 
impacts of the transformation of living environments of ordinary people. In essence, 
this chapter discovers how the authorities forcefully relocated parts of its rural 
population into defensive collective villages in the name of combating banditry and 
improving their lives, where in reality the rural residents often had to resort to 
living in primordial huts and sheds that lacked the most basic amenities. The nation-
building mission in urban areas led to significant overhauls of major cities, in which 
public parks and boulevards gradually replaced the old and disordered alleyways 
and neighbourhoods. Consequently, countless residents and tenants were forced to 
relocate to small and cramped living spaces while being charged unreasonable 
prices by their landlords due to the limited supply.  
  
Chapter Five considers the impacts of the various health and sanitation 
measures implemented by the Manchukuo authorities to the ordinary people. This 
chapter uncovers how the ordinary people were frequently subjected to mandatory 
sanitation duties and forceful vaccinations in the name of disease control, but 
which resulted in little improvements in their general health. The establishment of 
a modern health system came at the cost of traditional Chinese medicine and its 
practitioners, which were the main medical treatment means for the people prior 
to the founding of Manchukuo. This chapter showcases how traditional medicine 
was used as the scapegoat for modernization and how the increase of quality in 
terms of westernized medical care was accompanied by a decrease in the quantity 
of traditional practitioners, which placed severe constraints on the treatment 
opportunities for the ordinary people. Through the examination of opium, this 
52 
 
chapter details the widespread drug abuse among ordinary people under the semi-
legalization laws implemented by the Manchukuo authorities, who forcefully 
transformed a large number of opium addicts into physical labourers to satisfy the 
demands for its Five-Year Plan after 1937.  
 
 The conclusion chapter draws upon the various elements discussed in the 
substantive chapters and summarises the findings as a whole. This chapter explores 
the implications of the thesis and also identifies its limitations as well as suggestions 
for future research. Although the ordinary people’s stories of everyday encounters 
are neither dramatic nor unique, they remain important to the study of Manchukuo 








The formation of a new national identity was crucial in the Manchukuo 
authorities’ attempt to cultivate the new generation of Manchukuoan youths to aid 
in the cause of the Japanese empire. However, whilst the kominka movement 
sustained a long-standing impact on the social practices of Koreans and inspired 
discourses for Taiwanese independence from China, few traces of this substantial 
effort of Japan to create active and willing collaborators can still be found among 
the people in post-war Northeast China.1 This chapter intends to address the 
reasons for the ultimate failure in the Japanese efforts to create a new identity in 
Manchukuo by examining the people that made up the new generation of the 
regime through their behaviour and responses to the education that was given to 
them.    
 
 Although Manchukuo was presented as a sovereign state, it was 
independent in name only, which was enough for the Japanese authorities to 
introduce dramatic changes and interfere with the education system in the regime 
over the years. Residues of the warlord administration were quickly scrapped and 
replaced with educational policies that favoured the new rulers. Shortly following 
the establishment of the puppet state, Japanese personnel were assigned to more 
than half of all influential positions within the new government’s education sector.2 
                                                        
1 See Chou Wan-yao, “The Kominka movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons 
and interpretations,” in The Japanese Wartime Empire, eds., Duus, Myers and 
Peattie, 40-68; See also Ching, Becoming “Japanese”, 15-32. 
2 “Dui qinzhan dongbei diqu de jiaoyu qinlue (Educational aggression and invasion 
of the Northeast),” in Riben dui hua jiaoyu qinlue: Dui riben qinhua jiaoyu de yanjiu 
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Equipped with substantial power over general academic affairs, the Japanese 
administrators reformed the existing primary education system in attempt to 
reverse the damages caused by the occupation. Consequently, parents of eligible 
pupils were threatened with financial penalties unless they placed their children in 
mixed schools that were supposedly Chinese, but were in fact headed by a 
Japanese Vice-Principal who retained decisional authority.3  
 
 However, even though the Japanese made education available to all people 
regardless of their social classes, it did not imply that the well-being of their 
subjects was an utmost priority for the authorities in the regime. The compulsory 
approach towards education was key in bringing the attendance rate across the 
regime back to an acceptable level, where 9,128 out of the 14,330 primary schools 
reopened by July 1933, and 173 out of the 194 secondary schools became 
operational by 1937.4 With time, secondary schools were divided into boys’ schools 
and girls’ schools in late 1937 to cater to the practical needs of the regime.5 
Accommodating the New Academic Structure implemented the same year, girls’ 
schools emphasized on the cultivation of “wifely virtues (fu de)” whilst boys’ 
schools heavily focused on the development of labouring habits, which will be 
explored in greater detail further in this chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
yu pipan (Chinese education under the Japanese Invasion: A critique of education 
under the Japanese invasion), Riben dui zhongguo de wenhua qinlue yanjiu congshu, 
ed., Qi Hongshen (Beijing: kunlun chuban she, 2005), p. 46. 
3 Song Enrong and Yu Zixia eds., Riben qinhua jiaoyu quanshi (The complete history 
of education under Japanese invasion) (Beijing: Renminjiaoyu chuban she, 2005), 
vol. 1, p. 124; See also Manzhou guo wenjiaobu xuewu si, Quanguo xuexiao tongji: 
Kangde yuannian shier yue mo xianzai (Statistics of schools in the country: From 
1935 until now) (Hsinking: Kangde tushu yinshua suo, 1935). 
4 Song and Yu eds., Riben qinhua jiaoyu quanshi (The complete history of education 
under Japanese invasion), p. 81-82, 84. 
5 Ibid., p. 153. 
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The key point to comprehend the behaviour showcased in the daily activities 
of young people is to examine the constructed identities that were imposed upon 
them. In its initial phase, the authorities placed strong emphasis on the creation of 
a new identity that centred itself around traditional Confucian ideologies which 
advocated racial harmony. In line with the efforts to present the newly created 
Manchukuo as an independent entity to the international audience, the authorities 
encouraged students to perceive the regime as a nation in Northeast Asia with its 
own long and established history that was, to a certain degree, distinguishable from 
both China and Japan.6 Following Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 
1933, Manchukuo authorities began to gradually downplay the influence of 
traditional Chinese ideologies, which was achieved by replacing the role of such 
conceptions with the significance of Japan as the leader to guide Manchukuo into 
prosperity. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the 
national identity was reinforced with a stronger association with Japan, 
emphasizing the need for youths to adapt to the “superior” elements of Japanese 
culture and customs. This trend was further intensified after the beginning of the 
Pacific War in 1942, whereas the self-sacrificing spirit of Bushido became the 
dominant element and was instilled in youths via mandatory participation in 
military training and labouring activities.7 
 
This chapter defines the new generation of Manchukuo as Manchukuoan 
students who started their education after the establishment of the regime. Indeed, 
to study the people who were not subjected to any influence from the previous 
                                                        
6 Lou Zhe, Geke changshi wenda (Questions and answers of common subjects) 
(Hsinking: Qizhi shudian, 1943), p. 48; See also “Manri shuangfang diyue de jichu an 
(yuanwen ji xiuzheng wen) (Agreements between Manchukuo and Japan (Original 
and revised text),” in Puyi sicang weiman midang (Puyi’s Possession of Bogus 
Manchukuo confidential files), ed., Liaoning sheng dang’an guan (Beijing: Dang’an 
chuban she, 1990), p. 36. 
7 Naoki Saito, Manzhouguozheng zhidao zonglan (Comprehensive political guidance 
of Manchukuo) (Hsinking: Manzhou chanye diaochahui, 1944), p. 257; See also 
Andrew Hall, “Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity: Japanese Education in 
Manchukuo, 1931-1945” (PhD diss, University of Pittsburgh, 2003), pp. 311-313. 
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warlord administration grants for a more equitable analysis of the reasons behind 
their behaviours and actions as “Manchukuoans”. By doing so, it also allows the 
case of Manchukuo, a regime with a relatively short history, to be more comparable 
objectively to Korea and Taiwan, which were both subjected to a much longer 
duration of Japanese rule that made assimilation of its younger generations 
possible (35 years and 50 years of colonial rule respectively). Furthermore, this 
chapter also focuses mainly on senior year elementary and secondary level school 
students, as they were the most amenable to ideological and political 
indoctrination by the Manchukuo authorities while also having the capability to 
make rational choices and decisions compared with younger age groups. In such a 
way, this allows us to limit the scope to the period after the beginning of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, in which the majority of Manchukuoan students 
within the focus of this chapter were either on their way to becoming or already 
high school attendees.  
 
In his innovative research, Duara highlighted Japan’s desire to formulate a 
competent Manchukuo identity to strengthen domestic control but yet at the same 
time weak in its territorial sense to maintain Japan’s interest and superiority over 
the region. As he argues, Manchukuo’s national identity in the international context 
was ultimately expressed as a “spatial representation of a frontier nation” that 
upheld Japan’s claims and severely sabotaged Chinese sovereignty. 8  With the 
primary focus on Manchukuoan students in Manchukuo, this chapter thus begins by 
examining the emergence of public and private selves among youths, and shows 
how despite their outward obedience to imposed ways of being, students were in 
fact challenging the regime’s national ideologies in a private manner. This enables 
us to better understand the arduous processes by which the Manchukuoan youths, 
whom the school authorities strived to mold into the future generation of loyal 
subjects, challenged their constructed identities through minor acts of everyday 
resistance. The chapter then moves onto discussing how such a fragile balance 
                                                        
8 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, 248. 
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shifted and took a turn because of new educational policies endorsing a 
discriminatory, militaristic and slave-like curriculum. This reveals how the 
authorities failed in the construction of a new Manchukuoan identity. Through the 
detailed examination of youths’ everyday life, this chapter sheds new light on the 
realities of education in Manchukuo, and how its structural changes affected youths’ 
daily experiences and responses. With the examination of Japanese cultural 
aggressiveness under the disguise of Pan-Asianism, this chapter demonstrates more 
particularly how students’ hidden acts of resistance contrast with the dominant 
literature that tends to focus on the macro-features of education under the colonial 
rule.   
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2.2. Long “lived” the Empire of Japan 
 
“… The imperial army fights in the frontline every day in order to 
defend the Greater East Asia Sphere and to secure our country’s 
safety. We all feel sad to witness such noble sacrifices and we feel 
ashamed to be safe and sound and not contributing to the war. 
Therefore, we should work hard [to contribute to Japan]. A little 
more sweat is nothing, we just need to tighten our belts and we can 
handle it...”9 
 
The making of Manchukuo’s national consciousness for the new generations 
of Manchukuo was largely evident in the mandatory ceremonial rituals and school 
curriculums. To be sure, the Japanese influence was prevalent in practically every 
aspect of youth’s lives. The Manchukuo government in place implemented a series 
of strict disciplinary rules and pro-Japan activities into the daily routines of the 
youths, in school and in their wider lives. As such, students in Manchukuo were 
required to attend ceremonies at the beginning of each month, which were usually 
performed in nearby monuments and landmarks that were erected in 
remembrance of Nogi Maresuke and the Japanese soldiers lost since the Russo-
Japanese War. Manchukuoan students were required to pay respects to the 
martyred servicemen by prostrating to the east and listen to their principal’s 
lectures regarding the importance of Pan-Asianism, as well as how to devote 
themselves to the Japanese emperor and goodwill between Manchukuo and 
Japan.10 Although Manchukuo was established as a sovereign state, these types of 
ceremonies conveyed the messages of Manchukuo’s dependent status to Japan and 
                                                        
9 “Wang Ziheng jianju Zhang Jinghui de cailiao (Wang Ziheng’s report on Zhang 
Jinghui)” in Weimanzhouguo de tongzhi yu neimu - Weiman guanyuan gongshu 
(The inside Rule of Manchukuo - Officials Confession), ed., Zhongyang dang’an guan 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), p. 48. 
10 “Weiman wenjiaobu xunling guanyu jianguo jingshen puji chedi zhi jian (bogus 
Manchukuo Ministry of Culture and Education instructions on the complete 
popularization of the founding nation spirit)”, in Liaoningjiaoyu shizhi ziliao 
(Liaoning Educational Historical Documents Compilation), ed., Liaoning sheng jiaoyu 
zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chuban she, 1990), p. 92. 
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how the Manchukuoan students should maintain their loyalty to both states for the 
greater good of Asia. 
 
This particular sense of Pan-Asianism and the justification of Japan’s right to 
be the caretaker of Manchukuo was expressed in the form of anti-western 
propaganda. Indeed, anti-Western activities were ubiquitous, organized in schools 
throughout Manchukuo. Posters that contained the words “ying (British)” and “mei 
(American)” had an additional Chinese component character “犭(quan zi pang)”11 
attached to the character to indicate the brutality of Western imperialism and the 
damage it inflicted upon the colonized peoples. As Japan further entrenched its 
position in Asia, war correspondents were frequently invited to give lectures in 
Manchukuo classrooms to propagate the “bloodshed and sacrifices” of the 
Japanese army to liberate and remove Western imperialism out of the “small and 
weak” Southeast Asian countries. One Manchukuoan high school student, Yan 
Jiaren, who studied at Lüshun National School, recalled attending one such 
presentation that detailed the struggles that the Japanese army faced in the 
tropical rainforests of Malaysia and Myanmar, where they suffered from deadly 
mosquito bites and encountered harsh weather conditions. The graphical images of 
Japan’s militaristic hardships to relieve the Asian peoples, in Yan’s own words 
aroused much hatred among the students against the “savage and barbaric” 
Western imperialists.12 
 
This well-orchestrated display of prestige granted the Japanese their 
superior status in the schools of Manchukuo, which was also reflected in the series 
                                                        
11 ‘犭’ is a Chinese component of a character which does not have any specific 
meanings but was often used as components of Chinese letters to write animals 
such as “狗” (gou/dog), “狼” (lang/wolf), “猕” (mi/monkey) and “狮” (shi/lion) etc. 
12 Yan Jiaren, “guandongzhou jiaoyu qinliji (Personal experience of education in the 
Kwantung leased terrority),” in Mosha bule de zuizheng: riben qinhua jiaoyu koushu 
shi (Undeniable Evidence: Oral history of education under Japanese invasion), ed., 
Qi Hongshen (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chuban she, 2005), p. 52. 
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of instructional documents given to school teachers on how to further convey these 
types of messages to their students. One issued by the Minister of Civil Affairs Lü 
Ronghuan in 1940 placed great emphasis on the teaching of Japan being the only 
nation in East Asia that has the ability to represent and administrate the claims of 
all peoples within the region. Therefore, it said all peoples of East Asia should unite 
and follow after Japan’s footsteps to pursue the ultimate goal of establishing the 
paradise and ideal nation.13 Indeed, this sense of Japanese prestige and authority 
was not only evident in school lectures, but also expressed outside schools as well. 
“Yao sha gei sha (give whatever they want) [to the Japanese]” was the catch phrase 
of Manchukuo’s Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui, which later became his nickname as 
Zhang stated that “all will be done in the spirit of one moral and one heart between 
Manchukuo and Japan” and to “support the Imperial Army’s Holy War”,14 by giving 
instructions to the teenagers that they should be obedient to their Japanese 
superiors, and promising that the more obedient they were, “the more promising 
their future will be”.15  
 
To a certain extent, the conceptions of ethnic strife against the demonised 
west and a united Asian community were constructed in a way for the Manchukuo 
students to recognise and respect Japan as the leader of Asia both subconsciously 
and in a direct manner. In this sense, the national consciousness of being 
Manchukuoan was always associated with the help of Japan. During his school life 
in Fengtian No. 5 National School, Gao Changwu along with his schoolmates did not 
mind too much about the patriarchal authority of the Japanese on their school 
campus. He wrote: 
 
                                                        
13  Lü Ronghuan, “Gao quanguo jiaoshi zhujun (Instructions to the National 
teachers)”, Jianguo Jiaoyu, Vol. 6, No. 6 (1940) pp. 8-9. 
14  Zhang Fulin, Hanjian miwen lu (Confidential Hanjian Records), Wei man shi 
congshu (Jilin: Jilin jiaoyu chuban she, 1990), pp. 1-15. 
15 Liu Diqian, “wo suo liaojie de weiman jianguo daxue (My understandings of the 
Jianguo university),” in Weiman wenhua (Bogus Manchukuo Culture), Weiman 
Shiliao Congshu, ed., Sun Bang (Changchun: Jilin renmin chuban she, 1993), p. 602. 
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“… The Japanese told us that the Mukden Incident and the Second 
World War was because that the British and Americans all wanted 
to have a piece of us. But Japan had the sense of righteousness, so 
they did not allow the westerners to do so. At the time, I was 
thinking if the western invaders came to Manchuria, it would not 
necessarily be good for us. The Japanese won the war, and we do 
not need to live under Western colonization and occupation.”16 
  
Being sympathetic to Japan’s cause of liberating and protecting the Asian 
peoples, it was not uncommon for ordinary schoolboys like Guo to come to the 
conclusion that no matter what the Japanese did, they were still better compared 
to the western imperialists because they were “Asians after all”. The importance of 
“being Asians after all” justified the Japanese leadership in East Asia. Folk ballads of 
racial unity against white imperialism and the Holy War of East Asia were prevalent 
in schoolyards and taught tirelessly in textbooks, which were sung passionately by 
the Manchukuoan students.17 Among them was the Asian Youth song (Ya zhou qing 
nian ge): 
 
Huang zhong ying xiang huang hai quan (The Yellow peoples should 
enjoy the rights of the Yellow sea) 
Ya ren ying zhong ya zhou tian (The Asians should farm the Asian lands) 
Qing nian! Qing nian! (Youths! Youths!) 
Qie mo tong zhong zi xiang can (Please do not fight each other) 
Zuo jiao ou mei zhuo xian bian (And wait for the West to thrash) 
Bu pa si, bu ai qian (Do not be afraid to die, do not yearn for money) 
Zhang fu jue bu shou ren lian (A real man will not take pity from others) 
Hong shui zong tao tian (Even if the disasters are monstrous) 
Zhi shou wan kuang lan (We can single-handedly turn the tide) 
Fang bu fu shi bi tie guan (We will not disappoint our disciplines) 
Hou zhe xian xian (And our sages and ancestors)18 
 
                                                        
16 No. 0341 in Jianzheng riben qinhua zhimin jiaoyu (Witness Japanese Colonial 
Education), ed., Qi Hongshen (Shenyang: Liaohai chuban she, 2005), p. 273. 




Ostensibly, the Asian Youth song served its purpose to demonstrate to the 
Manchukuoan students how much the Japanese authorities were willing to 
contribute to the cause of racial unity in Asia and the fight against the imperialistic 
West. In a constructed manner, the passionate lyrics of the carefully crafted 
patriotic songs reinforced and directed the Manchukuoan students’ attentions 
westwards, towards a powerful enemy that proved its militaristic capabilities in the 
eyes of the Japanese empire, but a largely vague and obscure concept that only 
projected its harm and evilness in lectures and textbooks in the eyes of the 
Manchukuoan students. 
 
Without a doubt, the symbolic significance behind anti-western propaganda 
was intended for more than just fortifying the image of Japan’s unquestionable role 
of leadership of Asian peoples. The efforts to maintain Japan’s “superiority” and the 
power of awe over the Manchukuo students without carrying the full force of 
Japanization like in Korea or Taiwan placed the Japanese authorities in a precarious 
position, which often required the bending of a few truths here and there to serve 
the purpose of propaganda. More precisely, the Asian Youth song, introduced to the 
Manchukuo students in 1937, came with an ironic twist, as it was originally named 
“the Yellow People’s song (Huang zhong ge)” and created by CCP’ co-founder Li 
Dazhao to alert Chinese citizens against the consequences of following the Twenty-
One Demands (Taika Nijuikkajo Yokyu) proposed by Japan in 1915.19  
 
Even more so, not only was the original author and his implications 
concealed by the authorities, the topic of China itself was often considered to be 
taboo and was taught with caution by teachers. Indeed, despite the majority of the 
youth was of Han Chinese descent –and therefore not ethnically Manchurian (Man 
zu/Manchu), the Japanese authorities had them use new appellations to address 
                                                        
19 Li Shuling, “Li dazhao huangzhongge bei hanjianhua zhenxiang (The truth behind 
Li Dazhao’s huangzhong ge)”, Wenshi Jinghua, Vol. 6 (2013), pp. 66-67. 
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one another, or to refer to themselves. Consequently, “man xi” or “man ren” 
(Manchukuoan/Manchurian)20 could habitually be heard across the schoolyards and 
classrooms of Manchukuo. This artificial appellation was introduced by the Japanese 
authorities as a way to instil a distance between the youths and their Chinese roots 
and cultural heritage, backbones of their once Chinese identities. Another way for 
the authorities to have the youths move further away from their heritage, was to 
control the amount of knowledge passed onto them in classes. For example, 
teachers were instructed to deliver filtered lectures. Lessons on Chinese history 
represented a minor part of the history module, and were taught along with the 
histories of Korea, Mongolia, and to a certain extent, India, all of which were re-
categorised under “Oriental history (Dong yang shi)”.21 On the other hand, modern 
Republican China was portrayed as a nation deep in social turmoil, whilst the 
Kuomintang government was associated with its anti-Japanese agendas and the 
various upheavals and disturbances that it brought to its people.22  
 
However, as the Second Sino-Japanese War dragged on, teachings on China, 
or “Shina (Zhi na)”, the preferred term popularised by the Japanese authorities, 
witnessed a steady amount of attention paid to current affairs. 23  Japanese 
aggression was thus reinterpreted as the holy war for liberation, a necessary but 
selfless act taken by the Japanese empire, which the people of China embraced 
with open arms. This was illustrated through the successive and frequent news of 
military victories that often became central topics of discussion in the schools of 
                                                        
20 The correct term to address the people of Manchukuo is Manchukuoan (Man 
zhou guo ren). However, in the Chinese context, the term “Man zhou guo ren” 
could be abbreviated as “Man ren”, which could also refer to ethnic Manchurians 
(Man zu ren). Due to the ambiguous nature, both terms were used interchangeably 
to address the people of Manchukuo in a variety of primary documents and 
accounts.  
21 Lou Zhe, Geke changshi wenda (Questions and answers of common subjects) 
(Hsinking: Qizhi shudian, 1943), pp. 68-82. 
22 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
23 For a comprehensive analysis on the usage of the term “Shina” See Joshua A. 
Fogel, “New Thoughts on an Old Controversy: Shina as a Toponym for China,” Sino-
Platonic Papers, Vol. 229, (August 2012), pp. 1-25.  
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Manchukuo.24 Indeed, despite being far beyond their understandings, repeated 
news of triumph by the Japanese military often produced a sense of pride among 
the Manchukuo students, who developed a new form of belonging, rallying 
themselves to a greater cause that strived to bring equality to the Asian peoples. 
Wang Chengjiang, a student in Longjiang county, remembered such moments: 
 
“… One day in Japanese class, our Japanese teacher pinned a 
battlefield schematic report map onto the blackboard to show how 
victorious the Japanese imperial army was. Our teacher told us the 
imperial army has now occupied approximately twenty cities from 
China including Tsingtao, Shanghai, and Nanking, and is currently 
advancing towards the south of the Yangtze River. Later that day in 
the afternoon, all of our school’s teachers and students joined 
together in a parade, in which we were singing Japanese military 
songs while holding both the Manchukuo and Japanese flag and 
marched down the streets…. We also shouted slogans of “long live 
the unity between Manchukuo and Japan!” and “long live the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere!” as we were all filled with 
joy.”25 
 
However, as they delivered the good news to their parents, Wang and his 
classmates’ excitement and new-found passion were met with anger and 
disappointment. Indeed, insofar as in the midst of the “holy war”, alienating oneself 
from the “enemy” was part and parcel of the process of building a new national 
consciousness among the youths, those who had not taken part in the making of 
the new imposed identity could not help but oppose strongly this forced process. 
“My father told me not to shout banzai, and said that those are all our cities”; “My 
mother does not allow me to say good things about Japan”; “My dad got angry, and 
he does not want me to say that the imperial army was victorious”; those were the 
post-parade conversations that Wang and his classmates Huang Shide, Bai Zhongyu, 
                                                        
24 Lou Zhe, Geke changshi wenda (Questions and answers of common subjects) 
(Hsinking: Qizhi shudian, 1943), p. 47. 
25 No. 0977 in Jianzheng riben qinhua zhimin jiaoyu (Witness Japanese Colonial 
Education), ed., Qi Hongshen, 585. 
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Bo Xianchen, Wu Wansheng and Wang Junshan had after being scolded by their 
parents. 26  Certainly, parents who had lived days before Manchukuo often 
stigmatised the Japanese authorities, and generally had more than just dissenting 
views of Japan’s war efforts. Their negative perceptions thus seeded doubts in the 
youths who questioned their roots, mostly with regards to their ethnic origins and 
nationality.  
 
In addition to the confusion raised during casual conversations between the 
Manchukuoan students and/or with their parents, the constructed sense of 
national consciousness was challenged in obscure ways, sometimes during the most 
trivial acts occurring in the youths’ everyday activities. Jiang Shaofu, a student at 
Fengtian Xiaodong National School, expressed his doubts one day regarding the 
textbooks that were handed to him by his teacher in Japanese class. “One of the 
things that made me feel weird was that the Japanese textbooks had ‘national 
language (Guo yu)’ printed on its cover”. However, Jiang also pointed out that, “Our 
Manchukuoan (Chinese) language textbooks also had ‘national language’ printed on 
its cover. I often heard my family mumbling [about China], so I thought to myself, 
how did the Japanese language become our national language when we already 
had our own?”27 A similar type of suspicion was raised by Li Hongze, an elementary 
school student in Xingcheng, during one of his after-class discussions with his senior 
schoolmates about the foundation of Manchukuo. However, when Li uttered his 
confusions about the lecture he had received about the Japanese driving the 
warlords out of Manchuria, he only heard more rumours and speculations in return, 
as his friends were equally puzzled.28 
 
Nonetheless, in most cases, the youths’ confusion and questions were met 
with vague, standardised answers. The school authorities and parents alike thus 
                                                        
26 Ibid. 
27 No. 0974 in ibid., p. 722. 
28 No.0239 in ibid., p. 764. 
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incessantly retorted “Never you mind”, and similar other non-answers to dispel the 
youths’ uncertainties. This near-conditioned response was justified by the fact that 
having “ideological problems” was fundamentally not tolerated by the authorities. 
Moreover, various surveillance and intimidation methods were implemented to 
enforce the making of the youths’ national consciousness in a consistent manner. 
To be sure, surveillance meant that the behaviours and actions of the students 
were closely monitored, and at all times. Intimidation meant that those who failed 
to properly associate themselves with the constructed ideologies were subjected to 
harsh disciplinary punishments, which often resulted in physical violence. However, 
not all students placed under surveillance were necessarily under intimidation. 
Those who moved on from those doubts, content with the above-mentioned 
standardised answers, enjoyed a school life relatively free from such organised 
terrors. On the other hand, unfortunate students who did not accept those answers, 
and kept doubting their Manchukuoan identity, told a completely different story.   
 
“… Our family was woken up by the sound of our dog barking and 
the banging on the door. My mom hastily hid me and my little sister 
into the firewood piles while my father rushed to open the door 
without even having the time to put his shoes on. Two Japanese 
police officers violently hit my dad in the face for not opening the 
door sooner. My sister and I were very scared and started to shake 
as we saw that the corner of our dad’s mouth was full of blood.”29 
 
Such was the encounter of Liu Guizhi with the police officers in their attempt 
to arrest potential “ideological criminals (si xiang fan)” on an ordinary evening. As a 
student from Lishu county, Liu recalled a similar situation wherein the Japanese 
police had previously caused a ruckus at her school, creating chaos among startled 
students as the police rounded up suspects in the schoolyard.30 Constant suspicion 
was characteristic of the Japanese authorities’ mentality, which only increased over 
time, affecting more and more spheres of the youths’ lives. For instance, 
                                                        




publications and magazines dating from the warlord era were discarded, and 
dictionaries that contained the word “China” or reference books with information 
regarding the Sino-Japanese treaties were either blanked out with black ink or 
prohibited altogether.31 
 
In a way, as randomly as the students started discovering hints about their 
concealed Chinese identities while carrying on their ordinary activities, the 
Japanese authorities were also trying to find signs of “ideological failure” in parallel, 
in the most arbitrary ways. A post-war Confession made in 1954 by Imazeki Kitaro, 
the squad leader of the War Affairs Ideology Countermeasures Division (Zhan wu ke 
si xiang dui ce ban) in Fengtian under the command of Kobayashi Hitori, revealed 
how the gendarmerie would actively plant spies and informants to monitor 
potential “ideological criminals” among the students. During this process, portraits 
of Sun Yat-sen, as well as posters and leaflets that advocated the Three Principles of 
the People (San min zhu yi) and the Mukden Incident as a national humiliation were 
regularly used to trick out any “illegal” behaviours from the suspects.32 He Xilin, a 
student of Wenhua High School in Fengtian, recalled being lured into one of those 
carefully orchestrated traps implemented in a movie theatre by the Japanese 
gendarmerie in 1937. 
 
                                                        
31 Song Guangbi, “Benxi ‘sixiang fan’ an qinli ji (My experiences during the Benxi 
ideological crime case),” in Weiman wenhua (Bogus Manchukuo Culture), ed., Sun 
Bang, 509; See also Xia Deyuan, “Zai weimanzhouguo dang jiaoshi (Being a teacher 
in Bogus Manchukuo),” in Mosha bule de zuizheng (Undeniable Evidence), ed., Qi 
Hongshen, 144. 
32 “Imazeki Kitaro’s report on the crimes of Kobayashi Hitori,” in Weiman xianjing 
tongzhi (The Japanese Gendarmerie in Manchukuo), Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua 
dang’an ziliao xuanbian, eds., Zhongyang dang’an guan, Zhongguo di’er lishi 




“… the Guanglu movie theatre in Zhong Street advertised a film 
regarding the 29th Army’s 33  military drills on one of the big 
billboards in front of the theatre. The advertisement of the film had 
stirred up some excitements among my schoolmates. We were all 
shocked that it could be released [for a film of this type] … I 
remembered that I rushed to purchase a ticket and sat in the 
centre-right of the theatre.”34 
 
However, shortly after the film started, the lights in the theatre suddenly 
turned on as the nightmare began. Fully-armed Japanese officers and gendarmes 
erupted from all corners of the theatre and marched onto the stage. An 
announcement was made to the audience to remind and warn them of the 
consequences should they not remain quietly seated while the soldiers conducted 
their searches. “We only realised after the facts happened that the whole idea of 
the film was just a hoax to test and inspect our ideologies and thoughts”, stated 
Zhang as he recalled several people being arrested and taken away by the 
Japanese.35 Not unexpectedly, the scheduled film was not shown to the audience. 
 
In parallel, school authorities were also actively hunting for hidden dissidents. 
School librarians would frequently scour through student dormitories during 
random inspections, and anything suspected to be out of the ordinary was 
systematically reported back to the Japanese gendarmerie for them to carry out 
further investigations.36 Yang Fuyi, who attended Dehui County National School, 
recalled his classmate being accused of an “ideological crime” by their Japanese 
                                                        
33 Formerly named as the Northwest Army (xi bei jun), the Chinese 29th Army was 
well known for its participation in active resistance against the Japanese after the 
Mukden Incident under the leadership of Song Zheyuan. See Marjorie Dryburgh, 
North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937: Regional Power and the National 
Interest (Richmond: Curzon, 2000). 
34 No. 0944 in Jianzheng riben qinhua zhimin jiaoyu (Witness Japanese Colonial 
Education), ed., Qi Hongshen, 136. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Bai Yingping, “Zhongrishisheng he zhongri tongxuejian de guanxi (Relationships 
between Chinese and Japanese Students),” in Mosha bule de zuizheng (Undeniable 
Evidence), ed., Qi Hongshen, 334. 
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school principle, merely after his classmate had made a “Tengu ate the sun (Tian 
gou chi ri)” remark while witnessing an eclipse.37 Even though “Tengu (literally, 
heavenly dog) ate the sun” had no political meaning attached to it, and was simply a 
rhetorical way of describing the astronomical phenomenon, the Japanese 
authorities still considered the remark to be a violation and taboo term. The sole 
fact that “sun (ri in Chinese)” could refer to Japan (Ri ben), made the phrase “the 
heavenly dog ate Japan” unacceptable to the authorities. 
 
Superstitious or not, the main message behind such drastic measures was 
simple and clear. The Japanese authorities considered any Manchukuoan student 
who dared to voice the slightest of their doubts out loud as hidden enemies, even if 
it was unintentional. This distrustful mindset gained momentum and became most 
evident in the outline of ideology services and countermeasures (Si xiang dui ce fu 
wu yao gang) issued by the Japanese Gendarmerie Headquarters in May 1940. 
Based on the long list of potential targets identified by the document, the 
gendarmerie emphasised the need for “information gathering” and corresponding 
“preventive measures” to ensure the most important priority of “the suppression 
and prevention of ideologies that would potentially harm the interests of 
Manchukuo and Japan”38 
 
In the schools of Manchukuo, this mostly translated into numerous 
accusations targeted at students accused of having “anti-Manchukuo and Japan (Fan 
man kang ri)” thoughts and activities. The authorities considered these to be serious 
allegations, which therefore resulted in an interrogation, followed by a severe 
beating. In some instances, suspected students were sent to Correctional Counseling 
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38  “Sixiang duice fuwu yao gang (the outline of ideology services and 
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Facilities (Jiao zheng fu dao yuan) under the orders of the Security Corrections Act in 
order to conduct further “crime preventions” and “behavioural corrections”. 39 
However, although the correctional facilities were supposed to have a corrective 
counselling function, they were, in fact, barely distinguishable from prisons and 
labour camps. Detainees were subjected to long periods of labouring activities 
stretching up to more than twelve hours a day, and were given pitiable amounts of 
rations that would often make the detainees sick. A testimony from Zhang Yufeng 
detailed the horrific and inhumane correctional methods he had to use when he 
served in the counselling staff at the Quegang Correctional Counselling facility: 
 
“… There was an escaping incident during my first ten days working 
at the facility. We captured around 20 escapees and three of them 
were beaten to death on the spot… our chief Shigematsu would 
hang the detainees from the ceiling beam and beat them with 
cowhides made out of rubber tubes to interrogate and correct them. 
Whenever the detainees passed out from the beating, Shigematsu 
would wake them up with cold water and beat them until they 
passed out again…”40 
 
Without a doubt, stories like these occurring in correctional facilities rapidly 
became rumours that made their way back to the schoolyards, with fear spreading 
like wildfire among the students which the Japanese school authorities did not fail 
to exploit to further warn students. Threats such as “I know four words to take your 
life (Fan man kang ri)” were used by the senior school directors to intimidate the 
students into behaving according to their ways.41 In a way, these types of threats 
                                                        
39 “Bao’an jiaozheng fa zhaiyao (A summary of the Security Corrections Act),” in 
Dongbei jingji lueduo (Predatory of the Economy of the Northeast), Riben diguo 
zhuyi qinhua dang’an ziliao xuanbian, eds., Zhongyang dang’an guan and Zhongguo 
di’er lishi dang’an guan and Jilin sheng shehui kexue yuan (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
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40 Ibid., p. 924. 
41 Su Chen, “benxi dushuhui dui wo de yingxiang (The Influence of the Benxi 
Reading Group),” in Hei’an xia de xinghuo – wei manzhouguo wenxue qingnian ji 
riben dangshi ren koushu (Spark under the dark – Dictations of literary youths and 
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were efficient insofar as intimidations often turned into actual accusations, even 
though they seem unjustified, ambiguous, or unreasonable. Perhaps one of the 
most widespread rumours among school students in Manchukuo was the infamous 
“Gao Baicang Incident” that occurred in April 1941. In the eyes of the school 
authorities, Gao Baicang was a merit student of Jilin Shidao University, selected as 
one of the very lucky few to attend a graduation trip to Japan and report his 
impressions and experiences in front of his class. Yao Zhixue, who was Gao’s 
schoolmate, attended the presentation and recalled: 
 
“… In the beginning, Gao Baicang was giving his speech in Japanese 
as he was using a prepared and vetted script approved by the 
school in advance. However, halfway through his speech, he 
suddenly stopped and told us that he felt awkward to speak to us in 
Japanese, and continued his presentation in Chinese.”42 
 
The bold act was echoed with applause from the Manchukuoan students 
while the Japanese students who attended the meeting were in such shock that 
some of them protested against this act by leaving the room.43 Shortly after, a 
statement was passed down from the school authorities, accusing Gao of moral 
failure and deemed him an “anti-Manchukuo and Japan” criminal. Soon enough, 
Gao was “removed” from the campus. With his whereabouts unknown, a wave of 
investigative actions was initiated by the school to search for dissidents. More 
Manchukuoan students “disappeared” in a ritual like manner, as most of them were 
taken away by the Japanese authorities late in the evening. With the unrelenting 
terror spreading across the campus, rumours continued to be passed around, some 
of which speculated that Gao had received a severe beating and was expelled from 
                                                                                                                                                            
the Japanese in Bogus Manchukuo), Zhonghua koushu lishi cong shu, ed., Qi 
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school. Other rumours, however, insisted that the young man had been imprisoned 
in a correctional facility somewhere far away.44 
 
What was known to the students as the “Gao Baicang Incident” officially 
ended a year later, with the protagonist returning back to school with a deaf ear. 
Like many convicted “anti-Manchukuo and Japan” criminals at the time, Gao was 
detained in a closely monitored environment whilst being subjected to frequent 
beatings by his dormitory supervisors Yuzuki and Shikuda, as well as humiliations 
and tortures by the Japanese students who had the chance to lay their hands on him. 
“[At first] many of my friends advised me to flee and some tried to help by giving me 
money, but it was too late already”, Gao recalled. “My philosophy teacher Fujiwara 
even passed down a note to me telling me that I should commit suicide [to save 
myself from the humiliation]”.45 Gao’s first reaction when he was brought into 
interrogation was to try to explain his innocence: 
 
“[From my trip] I focused on the cultural aspects of Japan and gave 
a presentation on the importance of the Latinization of Chinese 
characters… During my report, I remembered witnessing how 
Japanese pupils can write words such as chicken (チキン/chikin) as 
soon as they learned Gojuon, while it took so much longer for 
Manchukuoan (Chinese) pupils to learn to write chicken (雞/ji) due 
to the complexity of the word. So, I thought Chinese characters 
must Latinized as well.46 As I got more and more excited in my 
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speech, I unthinkingly started to continue my speech in my native 
tongue.”47 
 
Claiming the incident to be an honest mistake was unfortunately not a good 
enough explanation for Gao to be exempted from the charges. A series of meetings 
ensued to discuss Gao’s case, wherein the majority of the faculty members 
recommended expelling the student and handing him over to the gendarmerie. 
Luckily for Gao, his former biology teacher Abe opposed this decision, arguing that 
no actual evidence of “ideological failure” was found in Gao’s scripted speech nor 
possessions. Concerned about the potential damages a convicted political criminal 
could do to the school’s reputation and honour, Gao ended up being suspended, 
and subjected to receive “ideological corrections” under the guidance of academic 
dean Sugo in his home.48 
 
The deliberation of Gao’s case supports the idea that students who drifted 
away from the state’s ideology could still be reclaimed and saved, which consisted 
an essential part of Manchukuo’s national consciousness. Surely, the authorities 
commonly believed “ideological failures” to be the symptomatic remnants of the 
“backwardness” generated from the past environment, as though it was a type of 
social disease that could be eradicated if students followed the instructed guidelines. 
For more than three months, Gao thus led a simple yet repetitive life to gain his own 
redemption by studying ideological books and manuscripts in the mornings, 
labouring in the afternoons, and reporting his learning experience in the evenings. 
Eventually, in April 1942, after Gao finished studied the essence of the Japanese 
spirit, completing his daily routine, Sugo asked about his reading experience: 
“Should I tell you the truth?”, “Yes, speak your mind”, “I have understood that the 
essence of the Japanese spirit is ‘absolute’. The Japanese emperor is ‘absolute’”, 
                                                        
47 Gao Baicang, “Gaobaicang shijian qianqian houhou (The Cause of the Gao Baicang 
Incident),” in Liuwang (In exile), ed., Qi Hongshen, 36. 
48 Ibid., p. 39. 
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“Good, your understandings are close enough. I think it is time for you to resume 
your studies. I will vouch for you on my livelihood, so do not cause any trouble 
again.”49 Soon after, on 2 May 1942, Gao was officially re-admitted as a third-year 
university student. His re-introduction back to the university was preceded by a brief 
public speech, given by proctor Motegi in the school cafeteria, during which he 
announced how Gao had finally come to the realization of his own mistakes and 
misbehaviour, and how he had been redeemed by re-education. To some extent, 
Gao’s life returned back to normalcy. However, whenever he was asked about his 
understandings of Manchukuo and the associated national identity, Gao would 
simply respond with the textbook answer: “Manchukuo is a multi-ethnic nation, but 
the Yamato race has the rights to enjoy a special status.”50 
 
Overall, the example of Gao, accused of being an “anti-Manchukuo and 
Japan” criminal and his respective (mis-)fortunate experiences, show the contrast 
between speculative rumours spread among horrified students, and the reality for 
those personally affected by it. Moreover, the “Gao Baicang Incident” further sheds 
light on how it became a normalised necessity for ordinary Manchukuoan students 
to conceal their true thoughts during everyday school activities. This particular form 
of vigilance developed rapidly among the students as accusations of committing 
“ideological crimes” multiplied and gained in severity over time. “No one will think 
that you are dumb and sell you out if you talk less” was the type of friendly 
reminders exchanged between Manchukuoan students whenever they sensed a 
whiff of danger in the air.51 This also means that the students were most often living 
a double life of sorts –a life which involved the making of a public self, sycophantic 
to the Japanese authorities as well as towards the constructed ideologies; as 
opposed to an authentic private self, expressed in a careful and discreet manner 
beneath the radar of the school authorities. 
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Insomuch as the youths’ everyday behaviours were masked with outward 
obedience, it is therefore necessary to uncover their inward disobedience. For the 
most part, the spirits of resistance were articulated by clever inventions of roguish 
double entendre and rhyming jingles targeted against the state ideologies –a 
practice that became popular in the schoolyards of Manchukuo: 
 
“… After we finished singing Kimigayo (the Japanese anthem), our 
school principle would lead us to shout slogans such as ‘Long live 
(wan sui) the Empire of Japan!’, ‘Long live the Japanese Emperor!’ 
below we would shout ‘Long ‘lived’ (wan shi’er in Chinese) the 
Empire of Japan!’, ‘Move the thief! (banzai/ban zei in Chinese)’52 
instead to show our dissatisfactions. The Japanese never noticed it 
but have often blamed us for not shouting clearly.”53 
 
The above expressions shared by Sui Yongshu, a student in Dairen, were one 
of the many examples illustrative of the methods he and his schoolmates used to 
show their devotions and respects during assemblies and ceremonies. Dramatic in 
its own way, the clever play on words was a widespread phenomenon across 
schools state-wide, emerging in a variety of forms that included changing the 
propaganda terms “you bang (friendly ally)” and “wu di (invincible)” to “you bang’er 
(literally “have sides”)” and “wu di’er (literally “endless”)”, pronouncing “Showa” as 
“zhao huo (attracting disaster)” and reading “ri man (Manchukuo and Japan)” as “ri 
zi man le (the day is full)” or “man bu zai hu ([one that] does not care about)”.54 In 
the schoolyards, knowing how to the speak the lingo was a necessity, and in many 
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is hard to differentiate from wanshi’er (long lived), especially when spoken in a 
northeastern Chinese dialect and ambiguously. 
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circumstances, proficiency in this language was encouraged and required by fellow 
students. This was especially evident in Lüshun Public High School. In 
correspondence to the degradative term “xiao bi zi (small nose)” that was 
commonly used to refer to the Japanese, Manchukuoan students would mockingly 
address each other as “da guo ren (peoples of the great country)”, an esoteric joke 
systemically passed down as a tradition by final year students during the annual 
welcome meeting for new arrivals.55 
 
However, in most instances, the ironic homonyms and jingles used rarely 
went past their allegorical connotations. What seems to be an endless stream of 
creativity on the Manchukuoan students’ part was, in fact, a means for them to 
highlight their dissatisfactions accumulated in their everyday lives. The linguistic 
difference between Chinese and Japanese was used as a buffer zone, a safety net 
that cushioned such passive acts of resistance from escalating to open 
confrontations between the students and the Japanese school authorities. This also 
sheds light on the elasticity of the constructed national consciousness, with the 
school authorities knowing how and when to look beyond the Manchukuoan 
students’ ostentatious behaviours and gestures. Most of the time, this effectively 
gave the Japanese a sense of control, a less drastic way for the authorities to 
maintain the construction of Manchukuo’s identity without inviting too much 
unnecessary hostility and aggression. 
 
In its administrative form, this sense of control was executed via the role of 
the Japanese language module in the students’ curriculums. For instance, from the 
beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War onward, the importance given to the 
ability to speak and behave like the Japanese began to be apparent in school 
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textbooks, as early as during the first year of elementary education.56 Moreover, in 
order to cultivate and stimulate the students towards the appreciation of the state 
ideologies, the Japanese authorities allowed kept greater leeway to allocate hours 
to their preferred courses. As a result, the Japanese language module was delivered 
seven to eight times per week in elementary schools and no less than six times per 
week in high schools, whereas, by comparison, Chinese language modules were 
only given three times per week.57  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting the Japanese’s pragmatic efforts through, 
for example, the implementation of the Language Level Subsidy System (Yu yan 
deng ji jin tie zhi du) in 1936. In essence, the system introduced a series of Japanese 
language tests that rewarded monthly subsidies ranging from five to 20 yuan to 
Manchukuoan students after they found a job based on their test results.58 This 
means that Manchukuoan students who passed the test and obtained a specified 
level of proficiency were eligible to employment privileges, implying that they 
would receive better salaries, and be given priorities with future job opportunities, 
regardless of their overall academic performances at school.59 Additionally, schools 
attempted to encourage students to use Japanese by giving extra marks on their 
exams. This specific method was frequently used in modules taught in the Chinese 
language. Students who wrote down answers in Japanese instead of Chinese during 
the final tests would receive a perfect score as long as their mistakes remained 
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under five points.60 Most of those who had the slightest ambition of getting a good 
employment and succeeding in life after graduation saw these incentives as 
opportunities difficult to ignore. Often, traces of these exaggerated devotions could 
be found during the competitions organised by the schools, wherein participating 
students were to dictate ideological edicts and manuscripts. Competing for a 
generous number of prizes, students who took part in these events were required 
to recite a range of articles verbatim as fast as possible.61 Overlooking the recited 
contents, which was mostly regarded with disdain, the students competed fiercely, 
to a point where school authorities had to resort to giving retests at random 
moments to maintain the practical value of the competitions.62 This example shows 
how for the youths, the lines were often blurred between their imagined public and 
private selves. In a way, students preoccupied with material comfort in their 
projected future were occasionally motivated to become the public self that they 
normally alleged to be.   
 
Surely, the authorities’ practical implementations and rewards were alluring, 
and to some extent, represented enough of a promise of a better future for the 
Manchukuoan students to bear and comply with the harsh realities and terrors of 
the present. At its core, the delicate balance between the Manchukuoan students’ 
everyday lives and the school authorities was a compromise made by both sides, 
with the school providing enough pragmatic motivations for the youths to maintain 
their outward obedience. In such spirits of convenience, dissatisfactions were 
inevitably expressed on both sides. One way or another, the growing suspicion of 
the school authorities fomented the common acts of passive resistance in the 
schoolyards. Students who broke the character of their “public selves” were often, 
if not always, met with criminal accusations and violent punishments from their 
schools. Without a doubt, such deterrence was a necessity for the authorities to 
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enforce the successful indoctrination of a national consciousness deemed as crucial 
to the survival and longevity of Manchukuo. But for the Manchukuoan students, it 






2.3. Acclimatizing the Bushido spirit 
 
There was something about violence that was genuinely appealing to the 
school authorities as well as to the students when it comes to problems that 
needed solving. To begin with, the school authorities rationalised the use of 
violence during teaching as necessary methods for discipline. Ultimately aiming for 
the students to “bear the responsibility for their society and their country”,63 this 
was officially justified by arguing that absolute obedience was crucial for the 
students’ physical and mental development which they should cultivate and strive 
for to enhance their instincts to follow commands and adherence to orders.  
 
In classrooms, teachers also employed disciplinary methods to punish the 
students. Perhaps the most infamous one among students was the “harmony 
slapping (da xie he zui ba)”. Often regarded by teachers as a convenient collective 
punishment, the so-called “harmony slapping” required the entire class to be 
divided into two groups. Students had to form two rows, face one another at arm’s 
length, and slap one another repeatedly in the face until the teacher instructed 
otherwise.64 Although physical punishments in the schools of Manchukuo were not 
so different from acts of torture as perceived by today’s society, ironically, the 
authorities used to dub this practice as “wielding the fists of friendship”. In addition 
to the usual slapping and smacking with rulers, students were regularly subjected to 
more extreme measures such as having their head pinned against walls and blunt 
objects, being forced to kneel or crawl between the teacher’s legs, or even being on 
the receiving end of harsh thrashings.65 All in all, there was little room for debate 
vis-à-vis the justification of the use of violence in classroom, regardless of whether 
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these types of punishments really were effective or not to contribute to the 
cultivation of the students’ sense of responsibility towards the society, or whether 
they were in any way beneficial to their own mental and physical development. If 
physical punishments did not carry the effects of judicial penalties, they 
nonetheless had the same demand for obedience and submissiveness. 
 
On the other hand, it was popular among Manchukuoan students to engage 
in fights and brawls as a pastime outside their daily lessons and homework. 
Conflicts occurred in various forms, with acts of bullying being fairly common in the 
schools of Manchukuo. One of the reasons for such behaviour was related to the 
students’ perception of violence as a way to obtain respect and recognition from 
other students, especially from younger ones. This often translated into new 
students having to learn the ropes of survival in the schoolyards the hard way. Dong 
Qi, a new arrival at Huachuan National High School, recalled his bizarre encounters 
after he went back to his dormitory from strolling on the streets: 
 
“… as I was about to enter my room [to the dormitory], a student 
from the above grade stopped me and slapped me two times on the 
face. At first, I was shocked, as I did not understand why he was 
beating me senseless. After he finished, he started yelling at me: 
“You! Why didn’t you salute me in the streets? Why are you crying? 
Do you feel aggrieved? In that case, I will beat you some more!”66 
 
Although the reasons behind the assault were simple, Dong received a series 
of aggravated beatings that was only put to an end when a senior student from his 
hometown came to his rescue. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 
required Manchukuo to be more closely associated with the national symbols of 
Japan that had shaped the regime’s national identity towards becoming a military 
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fascist state.67 On a micro-level, this was further reflected in the design of school 
uniforms in the state. In general, high school students throughout Manchukuo 
could be easily identified by their combat caps, green military uniforms, and 
leggings. Bearing such strong resemblance to national soldiers, the school uniforms 
were designed for the Manchukuoan students to associate with their schools 
proudly and to inculcate responsibilities. This was shown for example in the school 
uniforms which had tags that indicated their names and classes as well as Roman 
numerals from one to four that classified their grades assigned to their left and 
right collars.68  
 
In the eyes of the students, the military-style uniforms were not only a 
representation of honour, but also an important indicator of their position within 
the social hierarchy in the schoolyard. Comparable to the ways in which teachers 
carried out punishments in response to misbehaviour and disobedience in 
classrooms, students had come up with an unwritten code of conduct, which 
stipulated absolute obedience from lower grade students. In a way, this can be 
understood as a smaller scale replica of the pattern they were made to become 
familiar with, which was supported and advocated by the school authorities. Dong’s 
above-mentioned encounter with his senior schoolmate was one of the many 
examples showcasing the consequences for younger students who did not follow 
these unspoken rules. If not for the intervention of his friend, Dong’s fate on that 
day would have been very different. 
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The mechanism behind these rules was plain and simple. In the schoolyard, 
senior students were given unconditional priorities, and younger students 
considered them to be like members of the “mafia” who in fact, operated like one 
most of the time. To enforce their “seniority” privileged status, brutal disciplinary 
methods were carried out, which frequently involved the use of metal objects such 
as bicycle chains or boiling water.69 Outside school, high school students could be 
found during the weekends, strolling boastfully on the streets in full uniform. 
However, the students’ attitudes were most often received negatively by 
whispering local residents and passersby who would mumble “er gui zi (secondary 
Japanese devils)” at the sight of the ignorant youths.70  
 
At the same time, along with the sense of pride associated with school 
emblems visible on their uniforms, the constant demand for respect often bred 
disputes among students from different areas, which ultimately degenerated into 
hostility and rivalry between schools. One of the most known feuds in Fengtian that 
lasted until the collapse of the regime was between South Manchurian High School 
and Fengtian No. 5 National High School. The feud originally started as a minor 
quarrel during a friendly ball game, but escalated rapidly as an established rivalry 
between the two schools as the conflict became an open secret to all. Being 
students in of the most prestigious institutions of the city (if not of the entire state), 
South Manchurian High School students often scornfully addressed their 
counterparts as “C-level donkeys (bing ji lü)”, an insult considered to be so offensive 
that students from No. 5 National High School actively sought after fights that 
worsened their conflictual relations despite the far geographical distance between 
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the two schools.71  As the clashes escalated, the annual citywide sports event 
became a crucial opportunity for the students from both sides to settle their 
grudges. Chen Shi, who attended South Manchurian High School in 1939, recalled 
participating in the event: 
 
“… both of the schools’ students were always ready for the fight, 
some prepared short iron bars, some hid daggers and knives in their 
waists, and some loosened their bicycle handlebars, so that they 
could quickly pull them out and use them as weapons… the games 
were fierce and brutal, and many students were injured every 
year.”72 
 
Based on the above examples, the education system in Manchukuo can be 
said to be one that advocated violence as the main disciplinary method, and which 
placed the safety of the school children at risk on a daily basis. The students’ almost 
lynch-mob-like mindsets and behaviour were the products of a constructed 
environment generated by the system in which the connivance of the school 
authorities and the various codes of honour demonstrate the preponderance of the 
use of violent means to achieve obedience and respect from others. Similar to the 
kominka process in Taiwan that embodied the concept of the “battlefield” into the 
“bodily practice of everyday life” of its colonial subjects, Manchukuoan students in 
Manchukuo were educated in ways resembling those of warriors.73 Praises and 
compliments from school authorities were given to students who were victorious in 
defending the “dignity and reputation” of their schools in fights. In contrast, those 
who lost against their opponents or failed to display their “Bushido spirits” were 
punished.  
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On the other hand, it should be noted that the violent disciplinary methods 
adopted by the schools were not newly introduced by the Japanese authorities, but 
had already existed for centuries, as corporal punishments were systematically 
used in China as a main disciplinary method. In a way, the Manchukuo educators’ 
systemic emphasis on cruelty can be seen as a crude and twisted parody of genuine 
traditional Chinese beliefs such as “yan shi chu gao tu (outstanding students come 
from strict teachers)”, the rough English equivalent of “spare the rod, spoil the 
child”, that also advocated that teachers should set themselves as good examples 
for their students to follow. Similarly, the occurrence of conflicts and bullying 
between students existed long before the establishment of the puppet state, but 
the normalization of a culture of violence in schoolyards was undeniably a feature 
of Japanese rule. 
 
This trend was further accentuated in 1940 with the official introduction of 
State Shintoism to replace the former traditional “kingly way” ideology with 
religious beliefs about the Japanese emperor. 74  To some extent, this can be 
understood as an attempt to have Manchukuoan students assimilate Japanese 
militaristic values, an effort parallel to the implementation of Soshi-kaimei in Korea 
between 1939 and 1940. In schools, this change of direction in state ideology 
resulted in an increased emphasis on physical training, which school authorities 
considered to be vital to “the formation of a national consciousness” and to the 
“revitalization of the national spirit”.75 With the official introduction of military 
training modules into the curriculum, the school playground activities, usually 
consisting of various sports activities, soon shifted drastically to foot drills, bayonet 
training and military workouts. 
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Most military training module instructors dispatched to the schools of 
Manchukuo were also members of the Empire Countryside Veterans Association 
(Teikoku Zaigo Gunjinkai), a long-standing organization founded in Tokyo in 
November 1910 by retired military personnel of the Japanese Army. Moreover, 
members of the Manchuria branch generally consisted of aggressive military 
personnel who had advocated for expansionism in China and were responsible for 
multiple incidents prior to the Mukden Incident.76 Violent approaches to discipline 
were hence further strengthened by the drill instructors, with students expectedly 
being on the receiving end of harsh beatings and punishments past their physical 
limits during the performance of certain exercises. 
 
As the majority of these army veterans had experienced combat in 
China proper before they were discharged to Manchukuo, war stories were often 
disturbingly voiced out to the students during the training sessions. For example, 
during his time in Jilin Shidao University in 1943, Oyama, a military drill instructor, 
would begin every class with a dreadful opening statement, “I have killed more 
than three thousand Chinese when I was fighting in China [proper], if you (students) 
do not behave well, I will kill you like I killed them”.77 In another instance, Zhu 
Guangrong, a student in Lüshun Public High School, recalled asking his military 
instructor Captain Matsuyama for advice for his practice, but only received in return 
an anecdote of a time when he lined up captive soldiers as “practice targets”, and 
shot them with a type 38 rifle to “become better”.78  
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Although the method is debatable, these types of anecdotes were used as 
motivational stories, in one hope of educating students about war and prompting 
them into becoming real warriors through militaristic training. Speculatively, drill 
instructors retold their experiences in great detail because Manchukuoan students 
often reacted with fear and kept silent –responses often mistaken as 
submissiveness and obedience. However, not all stories were disclosed with the 
intention to teach how to cultivate the spirit of Bushido. In many instances, the 
stories shared harboured a twisted humoristic undertone, accompanied with 
expressions of self-accomplishment that instructors misinterpreted as bragging 
rights. Looking back at his military training classes, Zhu remembered moments 
during which his instructor would occasionally show him and his classmates 
pictures of himself with two frightened and dishevelled Chinese women, boasting 
about how the two ladies had been “friendly” to him.79 Bai Jiaqi, a student who 
attended Liaoyang No. 2 National High School, also recounted episodes during 
which their instructor, Captain Mitsuharu, used to brag to them about his being 
“above the law” by showing them the medal he had earned during the war, 
boasting about it being an “immunity trophy” he could use if he ever were to 
commit a crime against a civilian.80 
 
The military instructors’ carelessness with regards to political differences 
between “Manchukuoans (man ren)” and “Chinese” often reminded the 
Manchukuoan students of their status as the “little peoples” in the presence of the 
Japanese. The youths’ daily interactions with the Japanese only brought further 
awareness of the fact that the creation of a national consciousness that emphasised 
the making of “superior” foreign elements was inevitably accompanied by the 
making of “inferior” domestic elements. Zhang Wenhan, a fourth-grade Tieling 
National High School student in 1942, remembered once finding himself in a 
difficult situation: 
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“… One day our school organised us on a trip to go pay homage in 
the shrine… when we were marching in a line, my classmate Jia 
Hongxiu went out [of the line] to tie his shoelaces and interrupted 
the formation. While Jia was getting back in line I overheard a 
Japanese student named Kumano Mido from the grade below 
cursed ‘baka’ at him. At that moment, I was outraged as Kumano 
was only a lower grade student, so I slapped him on his face for 
disrespecting a senior student.”81 
 
 However, what Zhang considered to be a normal act of discipline towards an 
irreverent junior was met with a formal warning from his teacher Otsuka Toshihide. 
The reason was simple. From the Japanese authorities’ point of view, a 
Manchukuoan reproaching anything to a member of the Yamato race –an ethnic 
group that was de facto the leading race of the regime, was tantamount to “anti-
Manchukuo and Japan” criminal activities.82 Inside the schoolyards, this form of 
discrimination often manifested itself in clear and explicit ways. For instance, during 
lunchtime at the school canteen, rice, as the main food staple, was served to the 
Japanese students while Manchukuoan students had to settle for watered-down 
porridge or sorghum. Moreover, Manchukuoan students were not allowed to sit on 
the same side of the table as their Japanese counterparts. Jokingly rebranded as the 
“founding-nation porridge (jian guo zhou)” by the students, food provided by the 
schools in Manchukuo were known to be lacking in flavour and quality. It was 
therefore common for Manchukuoan students looking back on the daily meals they 
were given to make open complaints against the obvious inequalities. “I always felt 
like I was being fed in a pig trough, the portion was far from being sufficient and I 
was always hungry”, “We only dare to drink but not to chew the food due to the 
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amount of sand at the bottom of our porridge”, “We always had to pick the shells 
out of the musty-smelling sorghum rice before we could even eat it”.83  
 
In addition, the quality (or the lack of it) of accommodations attributed to 
Manchukuoan students was another major source of complaints, most certainly 
because high school dormitories in Manchukuo were usually designed following a 
pattern similar to prison holding cells –sparsely furnished, solely equipped with 
narrow bunk beds made out of plywood. Dorm residents hence voiced repeated 
concerns about these lamentable conditions. “Our rooms nested so many fleas, bed 
bugs and ticks because the floor and our bunk beds were very moist all the time”, 
raised a student from Dudanjiang Provincial High School. “The bugs would often 
breed in the beddings, and in the cracks and gaps in the walls, and would 
sometimes crawl all over our trousers.” 84  However, whenever the students 
reported these issues to the school authorities, their complaints were usually 
quickly dismissed. In the case of Li Xiaoze, a student in Qiqihar No. 3 High School, 
the answer given was even more straightforward, “You Manchukuoans (Chinese) 
are not the same race as us (Japanese), and that is why there is a difference in life 
quality”.85 
 
Even though cases varied from one another, the Japanese in the schools of 
Manchukuo generally considered themselves to be entitled to establish and 
maintain a firm distance between themselves and the Manchukuoan students. In 
other words, this was an expression of the tense relationship existing between the 
colonizer and the colonized. This became more conspicuous as the growing war 
expenses started to weigh down on the society of Manchukuo, which in return, 
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demanded from the regime to be even more reliant on the militaristic identities of 
Japan.86 Embedded in the everyday activities all the way into the schoolyards, 
Manchukuoan students therefore experienced various forms of discrimination from 
the Japanese who evinced the intrinsic nature of colonial superiority. On the other 
hand, the experience of the students further points to the contradiction of Pan-
Asianism that advocated equality and harmony for all, as well as to the harsh race-
based everyday inequalities. Such “abnormalities” within the normality of daily life 
suggested that Manchukuo essentially functioned as a highly stratified society, 
evidencing the exploitative nature of Japanese imperialism on the people in the 
region. 
 
Moreover, during the entire fourteen years of Manchukuo, the education 
level of the students under the regime never improved enough to meet a 
reasonable academic standard, which is why Francis Clifford Jones unceremoniously 
criticized the schools in Manchukuo, adding that they could only be called “schools” 
out of politeness.87 Indeed, according to the Academic Structure Compendia (Xue 
zhi yao gang) implemented in 1933, school curriculums were compelled to put 
more emphasis on practical education to cultivate the students’ hardworking spirit 
to compensate for the various “drawbacks” of classroom education.88 In other 
words, the authorities considered the development of the students’ “labouring 
skills” as one of the fundamental requirements to become “loyal and honest 
nationals,” whereas the teaching of “common and general knowledge” was only 
regarded as a second priority.89 This shift of emphasis vis-à-vis the essence of 
education gained momentum after the implementation of the New Academic 
Structure (Xin xue zhi) in 11 October 1937, which formally specified the purpose of 
labour and practical education in the school curriculums.90 Besides, allegedly for the 
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sake of cultivating the students’ spirit of diligence and to further consolidate the 
national spirit, the duration of secondary education was shortened from a total of 
six years to a new four-year system that integrated junior and senior high school 
classes as a whole.91 
 
 With the objective to eliminate unemployment upon graduation, high 
schools operated with a system similar to vocational schools, and began focusing on 
different workforce skills. Bounded by each specific type of skilled trades, academic 
lectures were only concentrated in the first two years of high school whereas the 
latter two years focused extensively on the development of technical labour skills.92 
With a total of five years less compared to the education system in Japan, the 
shortened education system in Manchukuo was a reflection of the regime’s 
perceived wartime needs, and that was to generate usable labourers with a 
smattering of knowledge to aid in Japan’s cause. 
  
 Along with the pressures of war came acute shortages, and this signified 
that only a limited amount could be allocated to the schools from whatever 
resources that were still available to the regime.93 Consequently, authorities were 
often forced to make less than ideal decisions in the day-to-day operations of the 
schools. The most direct impact was on the availability of textbooks for the 
Manchukuoan students. “[Because of the war] we were only able to purchase less 
than half of the total amount of paper that we needed to print textbooks”, noted by 
Zhang Yaoxian, an editorial official in the Ministry of Education, “[with no other 
choice] by the orders of minister Lü Yuanshan, most of the papers were prioritised 
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to print Japanese language textbooks, whereas the number of other textbooks 
printed failed to even meet one third of the total demand.”94 
 
 In classrooms, the insufficient number of textbooks meant that the students 
often had to share, and in some cases, were only able to receive one semester’s 
textbook during the following semester. Curriculums were pushed around to 
accommodate the change, in which the redistribution of more teaching hours into 
military training and labouring exercises gradually became the norm.95 Xu Deyuan, a 
Jilin No. 2 National High School student in 1940 stated: 
 
“… our school never really cared about how the teachers gave the 
lectures or how well did the students understand the lectures… our 
physics module and chemistry module were all very superficial as 
our teacher would only cover one section out of the many parts in 
total. There was also a laboratory in our school but never once 
during my entire studies have we been allowed to go inside to do 
experiments except when we had to clean the room. Similarly, the 
level of our mathematics module was limited to basic algebra, 
geometry and trigonometric functions which we had already 
learned most of it in the past.”96 
 
In many ways, the implementation of the new academic structure that 
tightened control over education since 1937 and the enforcement of State 
Shintoism in 1940 could be seen as the definitive move away from the ideas of 
colonial gradualists such as Goto Shinpei, who advocated how the making of 
educational policies should be based upon comprehensive enquires on the 
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circumstances of the local society and the avoidance of swift changes.97 Instead of 
being presented as a centre showpiece of Japanese modernity like in the case of 
Taiwan, the Japanese viewed the role of education in Manchukuo with caution, as 
they were more concerned with the potential harm that a generation of well-
educated subjects might do to the legitimacy of the Japanese presence as well as 
their superior status.  
 
 Indeed, apart from the great emphasis on the teachings of moral and 
ideological values, the policymakers’ reluctant attitude towards the creation of an 
attractive education model for the new generation of Manchukuo was apparent. 
Without a doubt, the quality of education that was given to the Manchukuoan 
students was bad. Teachers would often hand out the answers prior to the exams, 
and the students would resort to rote memorization to deal with the questions and 
assessments.98 With an average university enrolment rate of less than two percent 
across the entire regime in 1940, pursuing tertiary education was not something 
that the high school students commonly had in the back of their minds.99 Looking 
back from a distance of a few decades, many Manchukuo high school students 
highlighted the constraints they experienced during their times. “If we wanted to 
study for university, the only feasible solution was to seek private tutoring”, “I could 
get good grades in school but I felt like I learned nothing at all”, “[After graduation] 
we could only become store clerks, primary school teachers or go back home to 
farming”.100 One further doubted the nature of his right to education: “I felt like I 
was being fooled the entire time, I enrolled in a full-time school but it could hardly 
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100 See Xu Deyuan, “wo jingli de nu hua jiaoyu (My experience of the enslaving 
education),” in Riben dui hua jiaoyu qinlue (Chinese education under the Japanese 
Invasion), ed., Qi Hongshen, 127; No. 1200 in Jianzheng riben qinhua zhimin jiaoyu 




pass as a part-time school. All we did was to work on the one hundred and fifty 
acres of the school’s farmland for each and every semester.”101 
 
As a matter of fact, the elementary attendance rates in Manchukuo never 
exceeded 40 percent whereas the drop-out rates were as high as 50 percent. High 
school students, on the other hand, were considered to be among the very lucky 
few that were able to receive secondary education.102  During a confession at 
Fushun war criminals’ management centre in July 1954, Ruan Zhenduo, the 
Minister of Education of Manchukuo wrote: 
 
“In 1936 the total number of elementary school pupils in 
Manchukuo merely recovered to 60 percent of the total number of 
pupils before the Mukden incident, which was approximately 
800,000. The amount of high school students in Manchukuo was 
around 50,000, whereas college and university students were less 
than 10,000. It was due to the lack of schools and facilities 
throughout Manchukuo that have caused a large number of school-
age Manchukuoans to be deprived of education.”103 
 
 For the Manchukuoan students, life in high school took a turn for the worse 
with the further introduction of the Dedication and Diligence Decree (Qin lao feng 
gong) by the Ministry of Civil Affairs under Issue No. 277 in 1942. Implemented to 
the schools by 1943, the decree demanded the participation of all students in a 
higher degree of national construction and defence “to achieve the true purpose of 
                                                        
101 No.0601 in Jianzheng riben qinhua zhimin jiaoyu (Witness Japanese Colonial 
Education), ed., Qi Hongshen, 327. 
102  Xie, Wei manzhouguo shi xinbian (New Edition of the History of Bogus 
Manchukuo), 599. 
103  “Ruan Zhenduo bi gong (Written confession of Ruan Zhenduo),” in 
Weimanzhouguo de tongzhi yu neimu (The inside Rule of Manchukuo), ed., 
Zhongyang dang’an guan, 139. 
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education”.104 Listed as a formal part of the curriculum, students were assigned to 
their corresponding “dedication teams (feng gong dui)” for at least 30 days per 
semester, whereas failure to attend or complete the course would result in 
expulsion. 105  The main thrust behind the promulgation of the Dedication and 
Diligence Decree was no other than economic. The school students’ mandatory 
participation in the regime’s national construction was a reflection of the declining 
availability of labour power from China proper, which numbers plummeting from 
1.3 million in 1940 to under 900,000 in 1941 following the social turbulence 
generated by the war. The deficiency in the workforce led to the introduction of the 
Labour Strategy Outline (Lao dong dui ce gang ling) and the New Labour System 
Outline (Lao wu xin ti zhi yao gang) in January and September 1941 respectively, 
which placed great emphasis on the utilization and exploitation of local manpower 
in order to reduce the regime’s reliance on North China.106 
 
 What this meant for the Manchukuoan students was to become actual 
labourers themselves, whereas more often than not, they also had to live and work 
under the daunting labouring conditions of Manchukuo. Zhang Lianxue, a student 
from Wangyemiao recalled the details of his labouring service in the forests of 
Xie’erhan in the Xing’an mountains in June 1945: 
 
“… There were no signs of human habitation here [in Xie’erhan], 
wild bears, tigers, and wolves would frequently visit the area. 
Snakes were very common as well; sometimes they would even 
crawl into our beds [that were made out of tree trunks and barks] 
during the nights. Not to mention the prevalent mosquitos and 
insects as we had to wave our hands constantly while labouring for 
                                                        
104  “Xuesheng qinlao fenggong ling (The Dedication and Diligence Decree to 
students),” in Dongbei jingji lueduo (Predatory of the Economy of the Northeast), 
eds., Zhongyang dang’an guan, Zhongguo di’er lishi dang’an guan and Jilin sheng 
shehui kexue yuan, 906. 
105 Ibid., p. 907. 




them to not fly into our mouths… The labour was onerous, our 
teacher Moriyama required us to harvest one hundred pounds of 
birch bark per person per day.”107 
 
For a sixteen year old child, stripping barks off tall and firm birches was not an easy 
task to complete. On top of having to work overtime, physical punishments were 
often given to those who failed to meet their quotas. “Every day was extremely 
exhausting and I always thought I would either die from the intense labour or get 
eaten by the wolves”, noted Zhang. “Sometimes I would think about running away, 
but then again, I had nowhere to run in such a desolated and uninhabited area, so I 
had no choice but to endure the sufferings.”108 
 
 Since the school authorities would only assume the role of supervisors and 
inspectors during labouring activities, the various workplace safety hazards were 
considered to be the students’ business and something that they should deal with 
themselves. But then again it was the Manchukuoan students who complained over 
and over about the lack of protection of their own safety, but to no avail. “A fourth-
grade student Kang Zhuang was electrocuted to death because the man-made fiber 
factory [that we were labouring in] refused to cut off the power when we were 
wiping the dust off the adapters in the substation”, recalled Jiang Kuichun from 
Andong No. 2 National High School in 1944. “My classmate Li Shichun’s finger was 
sliced off by one of the machines and my other classmate Huo Yudong had his toe 
shattered”.109 
                                                        
107 Zhang Lianxue, “huiyi wo shaonian shiqi de yiduan kunan jingli (Recalling my 
experience of sufferings during my teenager years),” in Kunan de suiyue: Kezuo 
zhongqi weiman shiqi shiliao (Times of miseries: Historical data of Kezuo zhongqi 
during Bogus Manchukuo period), Kezuo zhongqi wenshi ziliao, ed., Zhengxie 
Kezuozhongqi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao bianweihui (Kezuozhongqi: Internal Release, 
1991), p. 69. 
108 Ibid., p. 70. 
109 No. 0665 in Jianzheng riben qinhua zhimin jiaoyu (Witness Japanese Colonial 




 Nonetheless, the weight to fulfil daily quotas as well as the government’s 
instruction to exploit the available manpower was on the side of the school 
authorities. Instead of addressing the potential dangers and the increasing number 
of work-related incidents, further measures to enforce the success of the 
Dedication and Diligence Decree were put into effect. Precisely to avoid the hideous 
labouring assignments, the most common solution for the Manchukuoan students 
was to withdraw from their schools altogether. By 1945, this has become a crime, in 
which drop-outs would be reported directly to the Japanese gendarmerie for 
punishment. To prevent escapes, students were escorted to their workplace in the 
mornings and escorted back to their temporary dormitories fenced with barbed 
wire and metal gates during the evenings seven days a week. “I felt like I was a 
prisoner who paid school fees to become a labourer.”110 
 
 In many ways, the implementation of the Dedication and Diligence Decree in 
1943 and the resolute determination of the Japanese to make compromises served 
as the breaking point in the delicate balance between the Manchukuoan students 
and the school authorities. What used to be pragmatic incentives to maintain the 
outward obedience of the students were replaced with up to eleven hours long 
labouring schedules with little to no rest breaks in-between. The elastic elements 
that characterised the making of the youths’ national consciousness, on the other 
hand, were substituted by the inculcation of labouring habits as well as the various 
consequences if one failed to meet such demands. Indeed, from the regime’s 
standpoint, responding to the call of duty in its time of need was the only way for 
the youths to display their virtues as the new generation of Manchukuo that the 
Japanese tried so hard to cultivate. But for the Manchukuoan students, the 
breaking of the balance also meant the breaking of their submissive “public selves”. 
  




 In the same spirit as the creation of rhyming jingles in the schoolyard, the 
Manchukuoan students were equally diligent in exploring ways for resistance 
during their labouring tasks, but this time, in a much more straightforward manner. 
During his labour in the 261st Japanese Logistics Unit, Zhou Jinghuan, a student from 
Dudanjiang revealed: 
 
“…When we were repairing their shoes, we would cut corners 
deliberately and use the leather pieces to cobble our own ‘water 
socks (shui wa zi)’111, some of my classmates would also pick out 
large pieces of leather to make belts or shoe pads for themselves… 
later when we were required to pack and strap boxes in the 
warehouse, we would only work when Japanese are around and 
stop working immediately after they leave… my classmate Lin Fuben 
was the most scheming. He would replace the anti-icing fluid in the 
gas masks with urine and cut many small holes on the protective 
clothing for horses. Zhao Hui also came up with the idea to tear up 
the military bed sheets in half before packing it and put all left 
shoes in one box and all right shoes in another so that the Japanese 
would never get what they wanted.112 
 
Such common acts of sabotaging were expressions of the pent-up anger and 
dissatisfactions accumulated from the harsh treatments given to the youths. 
However, undermining the mandatory labour was certainly not a risk-free gamble. 
In the workplace, the Japanese continually kept the youths under close watch. 
However, this was most often reciprocated by the students, who took turns 
monitoring the Japanese discretely. In a way, it can be said that the Manchukuoan 
students were practising their own surveillance activities on the school authorities, 
reflecting their attachment for the play on words: 
 
                                                        
111  Manchuria slang for a type of Japanese-style canvas rubber shoe which 
separates the big toe and the other toes when wearing. 
112 Zhou Jinghuan, “huiyi zhong zhiyou ji’e he hanleng (Memories of Cold and 
Hunger),” in Mosha bule de zuizheng (Undeniable Evidence), ed., Qi Hongshen, 444. 
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“Every time one of us would work near the gate to serve as a 
lookout. Whenever the Japanese come, that person would pass 
down the cypher ‘two, six’ to the rest of us so everybody could start 
pretending to labour.”113 
 
 The cypher “two, six” came from “re” and “la” in sheet music, which was 
also homophonic for “lai la (coming)” in Chinese. For the school authorities, this 
meant that they were kept on their toes and constantly on the hunt for signs of 
resistance expressed between the students, as well as trying to catch the small 
changes in the same type of schoolyard lingo that they made no effort to 
comprehend in the first place. Indeed, the breaking of the students’ obedient 
“public selves” was not isolated outbursts of anger, but a result of the 
dissatisfaction and tensions built up over time in their everyday lives. The various 










Mirrored by the progress of the war, the Japanese ultimately failed in their 
attempt to cultivate an entire new generation of Manchukuoan students to further 
the goals of the Japanese empire. Perhaps in the same spirit, the strong emphasis 
on militaristic training, ideological values, labouring habits and the neglect of 
academic studies all resembled Nazi Germany’s making of the Hitler Youth, but 
without its success.114 As much as the Japanese wanted the Manchukuoan students 
to see themselves as an essential part of an important struggle that called for the 
racial unity of Asia to strife against the imperial west, they also made little effort to 
adapt to the Pan-Asianism framework that they had created themselves. For the 
most part, the Manchukuoan students, as well as the remaining population of 
Manchukuo, were viewed as second-class subjects living in their own “country”. 
The construction of the youths’ national consciousness greatly emphasised the 
need for one to devote oneself and contribute to the state building project and the 
militaristic symbols of the emperor, but seldom about the civic rights and freedom 
that a modern Manchukuo citizen should be allowed to enjoy. 
 
Although the national identity of Manchukuo was expressed as an 
independent modern state but weak in its territorial sense, the educational policies 
implemented after 1943 had all went towards the direction of Japanisation. 
However, unlike the cases of Taiwan and Korea, the new generation of Manchukuo 
was not considered to be imperial subjects, but a large submissive workforce with 
its own identity that the Japanese could manipulate to its own will. This also 
supports the idea that even though Japan recognised that Manchukuo was 
                                                        
114 For the attractive use of methods such as sports and films in the making of youth 
organizations in Nazi Germany see Sheila Fitzpatrick and Alf Ludtke, “Energizing the 
Everyday: On the Breaking and Making of Social Bonds in Nazism and Stalinism” in 
Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, eds., Michael Geyer and 
Sheila Fitzpatrick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 266-301.  
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nominally independent, the Japanese undeniably retained strong, yet 
inconspicuous imperialistic claims over the region. This is particularly evident at the 
examination of Manchukuo’s educational structure that grew similar to the case of 
Korea and Taiwan, especially in the later years, as it shows that Manchukuo was 
indeed ran like a formal colony within the empire, left with little if any authority to 
resist the exploitative policies imposed by the Japanese. 
 
These were the reasons why the school authorities failed to cultivate the 
sense of loyalty and dedication to Manchukuo and the empire of Japan to the 
youths. Instead, what the Manchukuo students fought for was an abstract sense of 
equality. It was abstract in a way that real equality was something that they had 
never experienced before, but had only learned about in school lectures and the 
indoctrinations of Pan-Asianism. When looking back, many former Manchukuo 
residents preferred the term “enslaving education” to summarise their experiences 








 In Manchukuo, ordinary people’s everyday life was characterised by the 
constant struggle to find the means of sustenance necessary for their daily survival. 
The multiplication of lengthy crises spared no one in the regime, and affected every 
social layer, from the poorest villagers in the countryside, to the wealthiest 
urbanites. The Manchukuoans’ daily routines were thus guided by the anxiety of 
having to find a solution to meet the day’s most basic needs in order to survive until 
the morrow. Even though exploring the ways in which ordinary people had to fend 
for themselves to obtain goods and foodstuffs might not be considered as 
extraordinary historical events, their stories nonetheless reveal how complex it was 
for them simply to live in Manchukuo through the 1930s and 1940s. For many, the 
sole process of obtaining goods was a challenging task, since shortages and inflation 
repeatedly plagued the society throughout the different stages of the regime. In 
retrospect, it is now possible to conclude that the root cause behind the instances 
of shortages in Manchukuo was the result of the imbalance between supply and 
demand, where the latter largely exceeded the former. However, none such 
information or explanation was relevant or of interest to the Manchukuoans living 
in such times. When shortages occurred, the people were primarily driven by 
uncertainty and fear, whether they be triggered by social disturbances, financial 
turmoil, imminent threats of war, or simply by the overwhelming pressure that 




 This chapter aims to examine the lives of ordinary people living in 
Manchukuo by focusing on the various forms of hardships they experienced, and 
the ways in which Manchukuoans responded to such difficulties. In essence, this 
chapter reveals how the repeated waves of scarcities impacted people’s everyday 
life, and how shortages and economic crises led them to develop different 
strategies for survival. 
 
 Building on Rana Mitter’s research on how the Japanese managed to ensure 
the stability of the new regime through a number of macro-scale efforts including 
reforms or the preservation of local social structures, this chapter sheds light 
instead on the micro-level impacts of such operations, and begins with an overview 
of the various circumstances from which further social instabilities and financial 
turmoil emerged in both rural and urban regions of Manchukuo during the early 
days of the regime.1 The chapter then relays the many events that occurred in the 
year 1937, particularly significant with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, which caused a severe disruption to the regime’s already frail balance and 
failed attempts to fully enforce its first Five-Year Industrial Development Plan. This 
inevitably resulted in further dramatic changes in the everyday routines of the 
Manchukuo people, whose only constant was the vital learning to adapt to sudden 
changes. 
 
Following the successive implementation of distribution and rationing 
policies by the Manchukuo government, the chapter then focuses more particularly 
on how “friendships”, or the establishment of personal connections, gained in 
importance for people to gain access to goods that were in small quantities due to 
the ongoing shortages, and how such practices bore consequences for the 
hierarchical structure of Manchukuo society. This was especially evident in the case 
study of the failed holiday rationings of 1940 that led the government of 
                                                        
1 Mitter, The Manchurian Myth, 101-129. 
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Manchukuo to take more radical measures to deal with a worsening shortage 
situation. Finally, the focus reverts to the countryside, and provides details on the 
various outcomes of Manchukuo’s grain procurement policies and how the lives of 
the peasants were affected by those. By assessing the impacts of shortages on the 
lives of ordinary Manchukuoans, this chapter aims at enhancing our understanding 
of the circumstances under which the people were forced to adopt new survival 
strategies to fulfil their most basic needs in a framework of superficial compliance 
with the regime’s agenda. By looking at the trials and errors of the Japanese’s 
economic management efforts, this chapter hence captures the essence of the 
human responses of ordinary people, adding to our understanding of the nature of 





3.2. Times of Hardship 
 
“If you think life is hard in the city, then I bet you never experienced 
the life of hardship in the countryside.”2  
 
It all started with grain. Shortly after the Mukden incident, rumours of 
Manchuria becoming “the second Korea” began to circulate among the people. 
Panic began to spread like wildfire across the regime, and interminable queues of 
famished faces started to appear to obtain their share of food as a result of the 
shortages.3 Indeed, the shortage of grain was mainly a side effect of the Japanese 
military actions in Manchuria, which caused the emergence of severe disturbances 
to the local social order as bandits multiplied, beginning to grow rampant all over 
the countryside.4 Regardless of whether these acts of banditry were executed as a 
form of political dissidence or not, large-scale banditry was nonetheless perceived 
as a scourge by the self-proclaimed new-born regime. Sabotaging the routines of 
the Manchukuoans, banditry thus caused inevitable impacts on their daily lives. For 
the greater portion of the rural population, life revolved around the continuous 
struggle for basic means to survive in the early years of Manchukuo.  
 
Because banditry had become such a common phenomenon, living 
standards in the rural areas dropped sharply while robberies and relentless 
harassment from local bandits became part of the peasants’ new normal. In the 
earlier days of 1932, bandits were known to have set up camp in remote areas in 
the mountains. They would regularly come down from their hiding spots and pay “a 
courtesy visit” to the nearby villages to demand monies and all sorts of supplies, 
ranging from grain to cotton-padded clothing from local peasants. Even though 
                                                        
2 Shengjing Shibao (hereinafter “SJSB”), 3 April 1937. 
3  Zhongguo guojia tushuguan (ed.), Zheng Xiaoxu Riji (Diary of Zheng Xiaoxu), 
Zhongguo jindai renwu riji congshu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993), p. 2728. 
4 Mitter, The Manchurian Myth, 102. 
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bandits called for “donations” from the villagers, these were unquestionably 
extortions.5 A complex “taxation” system that could rival the formal governmental 
puncture scheme thus emerged in the process, and stipulated that every month, 
based on the size of the land that they owned, villagers were to pay a specific sum 
of money per acre to the bandits.6 However, surrendering to the bandits’ pressures 
and “donating items” or paying “taxes” were not enough to appease their 
continuous harassment, which largely contributed to the local peasant’s days being 
filled with terror. No matter how much the villagers struggled to meet their 
increasing demands, bandits incessantly visited their victims to extort money and 
goods. Resorting to blackmailing was usually the step that followed for them to 
ensure that peasants would do their best to meet their demands.  
 
Ransomed kidnappings were another source of distress among peasants 
established in the Manchurian countryside, as these were all too common a 
practice carried out by bandits aiming to get rich easily. The most profitable targets 
were members of families who owned carriages and livestock, or who farmed their 
own land rather than renting a plot of land. Low profile scouts, or “string pullers (la 
xian ren)” and “chatterboxes (hua she zi)” – as the bandits used to call them – were 
usually sent to the villages to gather information prior to each extortion. 
Threatening letters, commonly known as “fei hai ye zi (literally “flying the sea 
page”), were subsequently delivered by these middlemen to the wealthiest 
households, indicating deadlines to hand over a designated amount of goods and 
money in exchange for safety. In such times of desperation, the psychological strain 
alone was often enough for the targeted villagers to turn over the demanded goods 
without attempting to resist, or even to abandon their farms and flee altogether if 
they did not to have enough to meet their requirements.7  
                                                        
5 SJSB, 25 October 1935. 
6 SJSB, 26 August 1932 
7 Chen Huanbiao, “Jiyi zhongde Liaonan Hufei (My memories of bandits in southern 
Liaoning),” in Liaoyang Wenshi Ziliao (Liaoyang Historical Data), ed., Liaoyang shi 




Like a chronic illness slowly eating the countryside away, the bandits’ 
repeated blackmailing, extortions, and violent harassment against peasants created 
a fearsome environment that inevitably degenerated and began impacting areas far 
beyond the Manchukuo countryside. Most of the wealthier families in rural 
Manchukuo were landowners, and fleeing from their villages to avoid banditry also 
meant that they had to abandon the countless acres of farmland they owned, 
which directly resulted in severe disturbances to grain supplies throughout the 
state.8 On 19 January, 1932, it was reported around the areas where bandits were 
the most rampant near Shenyang County, that over 50,000 peasants had 
abandoned their native farmlands to take refuge in neighbouring towns and cities, 
which they considered to be safer places to go on with their lives.9  
 
Only perceived as a temporary concern, the Manchukuo authorities 
remained blindly confident that banditry in the countryside was only a passing issue 
when in truth, bandits in Manchuria was a long-lasting problem that had been 
crippling the region long before Manchukuo was even founded. Due to the fact that 
bandits often had military backgrounds, the authorities hastened to make a 
statement at the beginning of 1932 with regards to the impending improvements 
the new regime was to bring to this chaos. “[Unlike the old warlord regime], 
Manchoukuo is paying its defence forces, and soldiers will have no reason to 
become bandits [anymore].” 10  Without the approval from Hsinking, local 
authorities attempted to uphold the supply of grain by subletting left-behind 
farmlands that they considered to be “deserted”. Local agricultural branch offices 
thus took over, and demanded new occupiers to pay a total of 30 percent of their 
                                                        
8 SJSB, 25 December 1932. 
9 SJSB, 29 January 1932; The issue of banditry impacted the daily lives of the 
ordinary rural population in many ways. As this chapter focuses on shortages, other 
impacts will be examined in Chapter Four. 
10 “Residents’ View of the new Manchukuo,” in The History of Manchuria 1840-
1948: A Sino-Russo-Japanese Triangle, by Ian Nish (Kent: Renaissance Books, 2016), 
vol. 2 select primary sources, p. 114. 
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next harvest as land rent. 11  Local vigilantes were also mobilized to quell the 
disturbed areas and to restore social order at the villagers’ expense, with the 
compulsory contribution of up to five yuan per month for each household, 
depending on whether the villagers were owners of the occupied lands and 
properties.12 Unlike most people living in the rural areas of Manchukuo, the local 
officials were appeased by the implementation of these temporary solutions which 
they thought were suitable to problems they also regarded as temporary, since 
they were still blinded by the belief that banditry in the countryside was going to 
solve itself over time.  
 
 However, it is important to note that on such improvised methods were the 
products of local initiatives, and were not representative of the decisions made by 
the central government, the consequences of which manifested in multiple ways. 
The majority of the abandoned farmlands were redistributed to idle loafers and 
inexperienced peasants who did not possess the skills required to farm efficiently. 
And if by chance, they had the knowledge required to cultivate the lands, they did 
not have any of the seeds needed to plant the crops. 13  On the other hand, 
experienced landowners who had previously taken refuge in the cities were not 
allowed to return to their own farms until the year-long sublease contract came to 
an end. What the local magistrates thought to be the most direct and efficient 
method to combat the supply problem caused by peasants fleeing en masse, in fact, 
rapidly turned into a crisis that paralyzed the economy of the rural society. Living 
conditions had deteriorated to a point that even the wealthier households were 
affected, despite owning abundant land and being known for having “deep 
pockets”. 
 
                                                        
11 SJSB, 31 May 1932. 
12 SJSB, 31 March 1932. 
13 SJSB, 31 March 1932. 
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As soon as the spring plowing season arrived in 1932, increasing numbers of 
uprisings and riots were reported as more and more landowners and farmers across 
the regime were no longer able to afford the seeds indispensable to cultivate the 
farmlands.14 Despite the local officials’ efforts to mediate with the peasants, the 
repeated failures to find a fitting agreement between the two parties led to the 
number of famished peasants to multiply exponentially, too numerous for the 
provincial governments to ignore. By March, it was reported that all over the 
countryside, mobs of starving peasants gathered to rob food and grain from the 
local wealthy families. In the village of Wazigou near Haicheng County, more than 
two hundred destitute peasants stormed into the home of local figure Zhang Wanju, 
grabbing and fighting over anything they could lay their hands on. By the time the 
mob left, Zhang’s home was completely ransacked, with nothing left behind the 
empty disaster, not even firewood nor straws.15 Such trends were quick to spread 
to the neighbouring villages. A few weeks later, another much larger mob was 
formed with over two thousand famished peasants reported to be found going 
door to door, looting for grain and food along the eastern ridge of Shitouzhai.16 In 
the nearby province of Jilin, more cases of desperate peasants foraging for foods 
around the Hamitang area were reported, which left the village head no choice but 
to temporarily borrow grain from the Tonghua County magistrate to ease the 
problem.17 
 
Insofar as the authorities responded to the problem with such short-sighted 
improvisations, it was not surprising that their handling of the crisis eventually 
backfired. At a time of social instability, the officials’ plan was implemented without 
carefully considering longer-term consequences, also causing the malfunction of 
the regime’s shortages to escalate. However, the local officials were quick to find 
scapegoats. With no other choice than to request financial support from the central 
                                                        
14 SJSB, 14 May 1932. 
15 SJSB, 22 March 1932. 
16 SJSB, 27 April 1932. 
17 SJSB, 27 April 1932. 
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government, supply and logistic issues were often exaggerated by the local officials; 
while on the other hand, they justified the central government’s assistance by 
concealing their own lack of discernment behind fabricated lies. Indeed, 
downplaying their own responsibility and misjudgement, the official reason for 
seeking the central government’s help was that a large number of peasants had 
effectively “strayed into the paths of banditry”, instigating various acts of uprisings 
caused by hunger.18  
 
Thus convinced that this would be the only solution to bail out its local 
governments, Hsinking decided that financial aid in the forms of relief stamps and 
interest-free plowing loans were to be assigned to each region.19 For instance, in 
the province of Fengtian, the Ministry of Civil Affairs distributed a total sum of 
600,000 yuan to local counties. Depending on the extent of the damage caused by 
the bandits in each village, landowners and their tenants could apply for up to one 
yuan or fifteen kilograms of grain per acre. Moreover, they were offered the 
possibility to repay their dues at the end of the year of 1932.20 In Jilin province, a 
total amount of 300,000 yuan was granted by Governor Hsi-Hsia, of which 200,000 
yuan was loaned out, interest-free for the farmers in need of funds on the security 
of real estate. The remaining 100,000 yuan was given away to the indigent, based 
on the losses sustained.21  Furthermore, in regions that were reportedly more 
devastated, such as Songshan County and Xi’an County, previous arrears of land 
taxes were exempted, and new land taxes were cut in half.22  
 
                                                        
18 South Manchuria Railway Company, Answering Questions on Manchuria (Tokyo: 
Hibiya Park, 1936), p. 60; See also Toa-Keizai Chosakyoku, The Manchuoukuo Year 
Book (Tokyo: Kyoku, 1934), p. 114. 
19 SJSB, 30 June 1932; See also SJSB, 18 February 1932; In the Manchukuo currency 
system, ten fen equals to one jiao and ten jiao equals to one yuan. 
20 Zhongguo guojia tushuguan ed., Zheng Xiaoxu Riji (Diary of Zheng Xiaoxu), 2736; 
See also SJSB, 23 March 1932. 
21 The Manchuria Daily News (Monthly Supplement), 1 April 1932. 
22 SJSB, 17 April 1932; See also SJSB, 3 September 1932. 
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In addition, based on the reports from local governments, dispossessed 
peasants who were living in abject poverty were considered as the newest threat to 
the stability of the regime. As a result, local officials decided that as precaution 
against future potential “uprisings”, several preventive measures had to be 
implemented. In an effort to control the situation, the authorities announced the 
prohibition to cultivate tall crops such as sorghums or corns within the respective 
ranges of 200 and 500 meters of roads and railways. The ban was put into effect in 
April 1933 to prevent “collusion with bandits”. Tall crops were thought to facilitate 
bandits’ criminal activities since they could easily hide between the crops while 
waiting to ambush potential victims, from passers-by to merchants refuelling 
supplies. Subsequently, cultivated crops within the designated areas were ordered 
to be removed immediately by the military.23 Being the most important foodstuffs 
for the large majority of the rural population, the banning order not only 
exacerbated the already grave food shortages, but also provoked a sharp decrease 
in the peasants’ income and food supply. In spite of the thousands of petitions filed 
by the peasants requesting more moderate solutions, few actually received a 
response from the local authorities. As for the ones who did get a reply, the answer 
would be all the more antipathetic, as they were told that “a few small sacrifices” 
were inevitable, and that they should comply therewith without any complaint.24 
 
Since in reality, the exacerbated shortages were rooted in the local officials’ 
own failures, the financial support provided by the central government did little to 
put an end to the problems of grain distribution. Even though the sums allocated to 
each region were significant, the core of the issue remained unsolved. Surely, for 
the officials to shield themselves from reprimands for their mistakes, local peasants 
inevitably had to take the brunt. However, this does not necessarily imply that the 
inner circle of the Manchukuo government was completely fooled by their local 
counterparts’ deceitfulness. As accounts of villagers having to resort to eating 
                                                        
23  Manzhouguo zhi’anbu jingwusi, Manzhouguo Jingcha Shi (The History of 
Manchukuo Police) (Keizyo: Korea Printing Co., Ltd., 1942), p. 238. 
24 Ibid., p. 238. 
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grassroots, tree bark, and domestic farm animals were still reported back to 
Hsinking on daily basis, officials operating at the central level began questioning the 
veracity of their local counterparts’ reports.25 For instance, whilst blaming the 
legacy of officialdom from the warlord government, Minister of Finance Hsi-Hsia 
repeatedly expressed his concerns, both in public and in private, with regards to his 
suspicions towards the nature of the local governments’ funding requests. Seeing 
how little had progressed, support aid was eventually placed on hold. Additionally, 
to ensure that no funds or supplies were embezzled and to have an accurate 
estimation of the damages, Hsinking representatives were dispatched to each 
locality, assigned to investigate and re-evaluate the local distribution of grain.26 
These newly adopted precautions eventually allowed the government to reshuffle 
its resources to better use, but also significantly delayed the distribution of much-
needed subsidies to the people in their time of need. 
  
But the worst is yet to come. Surely, the local officials were largely optimistic 
about the resolution of social issues and the turbulence that occurred in the first 
half of 1932, believing that it could be sorted out in a timely manner. However, 
when the autumn harvest season arrived, few of them displayed the same level of 
confidence anymore. Indeed, since autumn harvesting was considered to be the 
most “profitable” season of the year, bandits, who were still running rampant, 
completely cut off the roads that connected villages to the counties, making it 
practically impossible to transport grain without the escort and protection of the 
military: 
 
“… Peasants throughout the country, whether poor or wealthy, are 
sleeping in humble shelters and experiencing unprecedented 
starvation… the cities were blessed with the strict protections 
provided by military and civilian forces, but not the countryside. The 
time of harvest has come, but peasants living in the midst of this 
                                                        
25 Zhongguo guojia tushuguan ed., Zheng Xiaoxu Riji (Diary of Zheng Xiaoxu), 2573. 
26 Ibid., p. 2968. 
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chaos do not dare to go one step beyond the limit to even reap their 
hard-earned grain, as they are trapped in the claws of the tigers and 
wolves27… For the millions of people who viewed the harvest as their 
hope and lifeline, would now have to look themselves in despair and 
be disappointed…”28 
 
 When the new regime was founded, the Manchukuo authorities 
undoubtedly gave priority to all issues that would potentially affect national 
security. In return, the distribution and supplement of grain were regarded as a 
matter of secondary importance only. Although financial supports was allocated to 
the countryside, the larger share of the government’s resources was dedicated to 
the complete annihilation of banditry in the rural regions. Not only did the 
Manchukuo government want to bring back a sense of security to its population, it 
was also undeniable that the authorities wanted to enhance the people’s trust in 
the new regime, to eventually justify the legitimacy of its presence. However, when 
the government’s efforts were thwarted, the consequences went beyond the 
countryside. Surely, the failed harvest shattered the hopes of the peasants whose 
only wish was to live a stable life with a full stomach, but the damage also extended 
to the urban regions, resulting in food prices soaring, and in growing disparities in 
the supply of grain between cities.  
 
As a result of the social turmoil that shook the rural communities, the sense 
of fear and panic that had already begun to spread beyond the countryside was 
already well established among the urban residents throughout Manchukuo by the 
end of 1932. In some popular areas such as Sujiatun, the prices of husked sorghum 
and soybean per dou skyrocketed from nine jiao and one yuan to one yuan one jiao 
and one yuan five jiao respectively.29 Other regions in Manchukuo such as Songshan 
and Taonan also witnessed a similarly dramatic price increase for basic foodstuffs, 
                                                        
27 A metaphor to bandits. 
28 SJSB, 7 September 1932. 
29 SJSB, 12 December 1932. 
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where the price of sorghum went up by two jiao five fen per dou in Songshan and 
three jiao per dou in Taonan.30 To put this into perspective, the average income of 
the working class Manchukuoan was nine yuan per month in 1934, two-thirds of 
which were to be spent on food, condiments and other basic subsistence necessary 
for survival. Since residents also had to allocate a portion of their salary to pay rent 
and other unavoidable miscellaneous expenses, no money was left at the end of 
the month for them to add to their already meagre savings.31 Kosone Masahiko, a 
Japanese official operating in Benxi County, detailed the hardships of the county’s 
residents in his report:  
 
“The clothing that the prefectural citizens wear is very simple and 
plain, and they do not dare to pursue luxuriant food and housing. 
They cover themselves with ridden cotton, eat sorghum for all their 
meals and live in grass tile houses built from soil and paper walls. 
Only the most upper-class citizens have access to decent clothing and 
food, but still all within a humble limit… Anyone who enters 
Manchuria for the first time will immediately experience the scarcity 
of goods and supplies and see how valuable they are.”32 
 
At the same time, Manchukuoans living in urban areas were preoccupied by 
an additional scourge caused by the financial turmoil which resulted in the inflation 
of goods and shortages. After the Mukden incident occurred, the currency in 
circulation in Manchuria was disrupted by the unexpected Japanese military 
occupation. Official bank notes,33 along with account books from local banks in 
                                                        
30 SJSB, 16 December 1932; See also SJSB, 26 December 1932. 
31 Kosone Masahiko, Benxi xian shiqing (The situation in Benxi County) (Hsinking: 
Xiu ying she, 1934), p. 11. 
32 Ibid., p. 13. 
33  Prior to the Mukden incident, the official bank notes in Manchuria varied 
between regions, with Feng da yang piao and Harbin Da yang juan being the most 
widely recognised currency in Manchuria during the warlord regime. Over time, the 
value of the Feng piao plummeted as a result of Zhang Zuolin’s increasing military 
expenditure, leaving only the Harbin juan as the sole de facto currency used in 
north Manchuria. See Ha’erbin shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Ha’erbin Shizhi 
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major cities were confiscated by the Kwantung army as soon as the occupation 
began. 34  To be exact, 80,000 kilograms of bullion were seized from the 
Northeastern Finance Co. along with bulk assets, gold bars and antique paintings 
“owned” by the previous warlord regime in Bianye Bank.35 Indeed, under the 
instructions given by Deputy Director-General Kani Sakaniya during the 16th State 
Council Meeting, warlord Zhang Xueliang and most of his government members 
were formally accused of conducting “rebellious acts against the state”, resulting in 
a significant number of properties and large amounts of capital being expropriated 
without any objections.36 The state-wide raids on financial institutions triggered 
movements of collective panic in the urban regions. Every day, city residents 
desperate to protect their entire life’s savings were found lining up in endless 
queues outside bank branches, waiting their turn to withdraw all their savings away 
from the turmoil. As a result, the currency exchange rate of local government bills 
(guan tie)37 to Harbin da yang in some regions slumped from 150 to 1 to as low as 
350 to 1 in only a few days’ time. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that 
even the wealthiest urban families soon discovered that from then on, they would 
only be able to afford the most basic subsistence.38 
 
Due to the underdeveloped nature of the commodity economy in 
Manchuria, a large variety of banknotes and coupons including foreign currencies 
from Russia and Japan were used in the region. The four main banks (The 
                                                                                                                                                            
(The Chronicle of Harbin) (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chuban she, 1993) for more 
details on the monetary system in Manchuria prior to 1931. 
34 Li Chong, Wei Manzhouguo Huobi Yanjiu (Bogus Manchukuo Monetary Studies) 
(Changchun: Jilin shying chuban she, 2002), p. 4. 
35 He Zhian, He Weian, “Riwei Shiqi de Dongbei Jinrong (The Northeastern Economy 
under Japanese Occupation),” in Jingji Lueduo (Economic Exploitation), Wei 
manzhouguo shiliao congshu, ed., Sun Bang (Changchun: Jilin renmin chuban she, 
1993), p. 551. 
36 Zhongguo guojia tushuguan ed., Zheng Xiaoxu Riji (Diary of Zheng Xiaoxu), 2808. 
37 Local government bills (guan tie) were issued from 1898 to 1932 in certain areas 
of Manchuria by each province as a main supplement of the official silver and 
copper currency.  
38 SJSB, 26 January 1932. 
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Northeastern Finance Co., Bianye Bank, Jilin Yongheng Finance Co. and Heilongjiang 
Finance Co.) in Manchuria alone issued a total of 15 different currencies and 136 
different securities and coupons. On the other hand, larger-scale commercial stores 
and public entities increased the circulation of their own currency and private 
banknotes (si tie).39 In the midst of the artificially created chaos, a vast amount of 
provisional currency notes and certificates were issued by local chambers of 
commerce in each county in order to compensate for the official bank notes that 
were forcefully withdrawn from the market by the Japanese military.40 Although 
equivalent in value on paper, the citizens of Manchukuo often found themselves 
having to pay more than twice as much for foods and other essential commodities 
whilst using the new currency notes, which in return aggravated the inflation of 
commodities due to the endemic nature of such provisional currencies.  
 
Referring to urban life in Manchukuo in the early 1930s as a messy 
ensemble rapidly disintegrating would not be an understatement. The messiness 
was linked to the fact that normally simple activities had become unnecessarily 
difficult for ordinary Manchukuoans to conduct. For instance, having money no 
longer meant that one had the ability to afford food anymore. For the most part, 
the new locally-issued banknotes were only good to use locally and attempting to 
use them in shops outside the locality would result in unpleasant interactions with 
shops owners. “I went to eat in a restaurant, but the owner refused to accept the 
notes I used to pay for my bill,” shared one indignant citizen. “The restaurant was 
only 15 to 20 kilometres away from where I live. After a big argument, I was 
allowed to leave with the promise of bringing back the required amount in the 
owner’s specified currency.”41 For those reasons, many urban Manchuokans ended 
up pinning their miseries on the financial disarray caused by the regime. At some 
point, it was even reported that citizens trying to be more economical chose to 
                                                        
39 Zhang Qingwen, Zhang Congxian and Liu Wanshan, “Weiman Zhongyang Yinhang 
Jianjie (An introduction to the Manchurian Central Bank),” in Jingji Lueduo 
(Economic Exploitation), ed., Sun Bang, 585. 
40 SJSB, 28 January 1932; See also SJSB, 2 March 1932. 
41 SJSB, 13 July 1932. 
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travel longer distances and purchase the same type of food and commodities from 
Japan-occupied Korea for half the price found in Manchukuo instead. 42 
Nevertheless, although the majority of Manchukuoans experienced the great 
financial turmoil as an urban nightmare, some also found that period to be a now-
or-never opportunity to make fortunes.  
 
The issues of local currency liquidity were accompanied by yet another 
scourge and soon enough, counterfeit banknotes made their way into the market, 
circulating extensively and further aggravating the regime’s hyperinflation. Since 
greed and dishonesty can reach people from any societal strata, individuals known 
to be behind the making of such scams ranged from destitute citizens, businessmen, 
to even sworn officials in the government whose only common trait was their 
avarice and their taking advantage of the chaos to enrich themselves at the expense 
of others. Most of the time, perpetrators were ill-considered and short-sighted, and 
such was the case of Vasili, an impoverished 32-year-old Russian exile who resided 
in the Yuchunyang hotel in Hsinking. Living in the city and with no means left to 
support himself, Vasili hit upon the idea to manufacture counterfeit banknotes. In 
the process, he managed to convince a shoemaker who was living across his room, 
and dragged the man into his ambitious plan to become rich. Shortly afterwards, 
the shoemaker introduced Vasili to Li Yingzhou, a merchant whom he had the 
pleasure of meeting once. The plan was clear and straightforward. Each of them 
had a specific role to play in the scheme, and profits were to be divided equally. 
Vasili took charge of the manufacturing process and Li Yingzhou along with the 
shoemaker had to provide materials and a safe place to work. After the first batch 
was made, Vasili and his crew went to test their freshly made fake five-yuan 
banknotes. However, when they took out the fraudulent banknotes to pay for their 
meal at a restaurant in the city’s old market, their luck immediately ran out. While 
                                                        
42 SJSB, 13 March 1932. 
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Vasili ended up in handcuffs and faced prosecution, his partners in crime had 
managed to flee the scene, and vanished away from the city.43       
 
Vasili’s story was only one of the many reported stories of petty con artists 
emerging throughout the cities, who tried to take advantage of the financial turmoil 
in any possible way to sustain themselves during times of hardship. Even though 
their enrichment was achieved at the expense of their peers’ miseries, in reality, 
only a handful of them succeeded in the process, so very few actually suffered from 
the consequences of their deeds. In contrast, the damages caused by the big 
“hustlers” to the already malfunctioning society were much more extensive in 
comparison. 
 
One of the most infamous examples that were known to all, was the case of 
Chang Yonglin, the Chairman of the Agricultural Association in Xi’an County. 
Utilizing his position in office, Chang and his accomplices managed to convince local 
citizens and peasants from nearby villages alike to trade in their “expired” 
currencies with fake provisional banknotes under the pretence of an impending 
“financial reform”. Fake monies were therefore distributed in the number of tens of 
thousands, with the local residents of Xi’an unknowingly wasting their entire life 
savings away, and trading their earnings for a handful of useless papers. It was only 
when Chang fled from his office that a banning order on the circulation of the fake 
banknotes was announced by county magistrate Dai. 44 Late in realizing the large-
scale fraud, the damage was already done to the wrongfully depleted people of 
Xi’an County. 
 
                                                        
43 SJSB, 21 October 1935. 
44 SJSB, 29 December 1932. 
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The most interesting parts regarding the cases of Vasili and Chang are not so 
much related to their immoral aspects or to the extent to which such instances had 
impacted on the Manchukuoans’ lives. Instead, they show how some people’s 
behaviours were largely influenced and shaped by the hardships that occurred in 
the early years of Manchukuo. For instance, it could be interpreted that the 
abovementioned shoemaker and merchant, who both had steady sources of 
income, were convinced by Vasili, and succumbed to greed mostly because of the 
circumstantial financial turmoil that occurred in the early 1930s, and that took the 
ordinary people by surprise. However, had the financial crisis not occurred, Vasili 
might not have been able to convince the two men. Similarly, it could be said that 
Chang, a prestigious local government official, may not have put his entire career, 
reputation, and family at risk for some quick extra money. Although these may be 
speculations that have no way to confirm with certainty, they nonetheless show 
how some Manchukuoans’ behaviour was influenced by the overwhelming 
hardships. However, although many saw these as opportunities to take in order to 
survive, the regime clearly condemned these actions as crimes.  
 
In the midst of the financial mess, the central government of Manchukuo 
revealed its ambitious plan to unify and reorganize the disintegrated currency 
system with the introduction of the new Monetary Law in June 1932, and the 
establishment of the Manchurian Central Bank (Manshu Chuo Ginko) the following 
month. First tackling the issue of “reformed coupons (gai zao juan)” made from old 
bank notes, the government released a set of new Manchukuo notes with the face 
value of five jiao, one yuan, five yuan and 100 yuan, to be issued in succession until 
April 1933.45 To many, the government’s proactive implementation of a unified 
                                                        
45 Jilin sheng jinrong yanjiu suo, Weiman Zhongyang Yinhang Shiliao (Historical Data 
of the Bogus Manchurian Central Bank) (Changchun: Jilin renmin chuban she, 1984); 
See also Zhongguo dongbei diqu huobi bianji zu, Zhongguo Dongbei Diqu Huobi 
(The Monetary System of Northeast China) (Beijing: Zhongguo jinrong chuban she, 
1989) for a more comprehensive discussion; Ian Nish, The History of Manchuria 
1840-1948: A Sino-Russo-Japanese Triangle (Kent: Renaissance Books, 2016), vol. 1 
Historical Narrative, p. 176. 
120 
 
currency was indicative of the authorities’ way to reassure the population. Surely, 
the officials did not shy away from making it known to the public that the 
Manchukuo government had duly performed its stabilizing duties. An 
announcement addressed to the residents of Manchukuo on 14 July 1932 stated: 
 
“One of the foulest blows ever struck at a hard-working people by 
men of its own blood was the circulation of millions of dollars’ worth 
of valueless paper in return for their labour and produce. The State is 
now busily reorganizing its currency, and when plans are completed 
(they are already well advanced) Manchoukuo will be the only part of 
this continent with an honest monetary system. Moreover, we intend 
to recall, and pay for, the worthless paper of the old dictators. This 
reform alone is worth all the suffering that Manchuria has endured 
since last September.”46 
 
The statement was supported by detailed plans discussed and finalized by 
the general executive during the 12th Meeting of the State Council on 11 April 1932. 
The discussions concluded with an official agreement to borrow twenty million yen 
from the Japanese Business Chambers in advance, stipulating that two million were 
to be repaid each year with an interest rate of five percent. It was also agreed in the 
official contract between Manchukuo and Japan that as part of the repayment plan, 
20 percent were to be taken out of Manchukuo’s monthly salt tax income.47 Soon 
after the funding was transferred into Manchukuo through the Bank of Joseon on 
22 June, the Ministry of Finance immediately placed Monetary Order No. 25 into 
effect in the following week, which formally banned any currency other than the 
official unified one from circulating in the market.48 Even though in hindsight, the 
Manchukuo government eventually achieved tremendous success in unifying its 
unstable and broken monetary system which allowed for its integration into the 
                                                        
46 “Residents’ View of the new Manchukuo,” in The History of Manchuria 1840-
1948: A Sino-Russo-Japanese Triangle, by Ian Nish (Kent: Renaissance Books, 2016), 
vol. 2 select primary sources, p. 114. 
47 Zhongguo guojia tushuguan ed., Zheng Xiaoxu Riji (Diary of Zheng Xiaoxu), 2721; 
See also SJSB, 17 December 1932. 
48 Ibid., p. 2585. 
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“yen bloc”, in 1932, many considered this decision to be a bold move. Such 
pessimism could be explained by the fact that the redemption of currencies was a 
task so hideous that it never went through successfully throughout the relatively 
short history of modern Manchuria. However, impeded by the lack of sufficient 
political capital, the hasty implementation of the currency reform by the 
Manchukuo government was inevitably met with great difficulties during the 
process, which again, impacted on the people’s daily activites.  
 
By the beginning of November, a report from the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
Police Division indicated that while one-third of the total 10.5 billion guan tie in Jilin 
Province had already been recovered, only 15 million new banknotes were issued 
into the market. The drastic reduction in the active circulation of currencies meant 
that small transactions that used to be made on a daily basis became practically 
impossible. Since it was extremely difficult for Manchukuoans to get their hands on 
liquid currencies, when they did manage to obtain monies, they would save them 
for essential purchases, which caused small businesses and local commerce to 
suffer tremendous losses. On top of the inflation that disrupted the means for 
wholesale distribution, the cost of businesses rapidly escalated, often leaving 
merchants unable to repay the loans that had been previously made from banks.49 
For business owners, this also meant that keeping their doors open became an 
increasingly difficult challenge, as the usual customers and big spenders who kept 
them afloat were replaced with the struggle to maintain the day-to-day operations. 
 
Another significant source of burden came from the taxation system. Being 
the third largest source of income after agricultural taxes and vehicle taxes in 1933, 
the government of Manchukuo had long regarded its commercial tax base to be 
one of the most reliable sources of revenue to make up for its financial imbalance in 
                                                        
49  Liu Shouchun, “Shenyang Zhicheng Yinhang Shimo (A summary of Bank of 
Zhicheng),” in Jingji Lueduo (Economic Exploitation), ed., Sun Bang, 611. 
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such turbulent times.50 Indeed, according to the taxation system in place, it was 
stipulated that street vendors were to pay one yuan per month for peddlers’ taxes, 
with an additional one yuan of monthly “obligation taxes”. Merchants, on the other 
hand, were required to pay up to 50 yuan per month for operation taxes (ying ye 
juan) alone, depending on the capitals that were registered. In addition, 
commercial taxes (shang juan) equivalent to four yuan per employee were to be 
paid on a quarterly basis along with shop sales taxes (ying ye shang juan) of a 
monthly four thousandths of the total capital registered. On top of the above 
mentioned, shop taxes (pu juan) were considered by all to be the most damaging to 
businesses. Based on the registered capitals, up to 700 yuan per month were to be 
claimed by the local bureaus of finance.51 To the vast majority of merchants who 
could not make ends meet due to the lack of business activities, it was no different 
from extortion and blackmail on a monthly basis except that it came from the 
authorities. 
 
Indeed, business owners who could not afford to pay the requested amount 
of their taxes were being racketeered by the officials who managed to collect 
money in one way or another. For instance, street vendors who peddled goods 
along the streets were regularly pulled off by the local authorities under the 
pretence that they were “obstructing the traffic” or simply because they were 
“causing an eyesore”. The only effective way to get out of such situations was to 
pay their duties or to have their merchandise pawned as “illegal goods”. 52 
Additionally, shop owners faced constant harassment from taxation inspectors who 
visited all too frequently. Minor faults and mistakes were nitpicked from account 
books, which would often result in shop owners being accused of “tax evasion” 
                                                        
50 Minzhengbu difang si, Datong er niandu difang caizheng gaiyao (Local Financial 
Summary in Year Two of Datong) (Datong: Minzhengbu difang si, 1934), p. 52. 
51 Minzhengbu difang si, Xianshi difangshui yilan (List of Local taxes in Cities and 
Counties) (n.p.: Minzhengbu difang si, 1934), pp. 7-44. 
52 SJSB, 18 July 1935. 
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against which a certain amount of “protection fee” could be paid to the visiting 
inspector.53  
 
At the same time, ever since the beginning of 1932, merchants and 
businessmen across Manchukuo had been sparing no efforts to implore the 
government to reduce the commercial taxes, if not to exempt them from paying 
them completely. On 20 May, it was reported in Fengtian that a joint request from 
various sectors in the commercial industries in the city was filed to the local 
authorities, stating the assorted burdens and difficulties of staying in business 
under such harsh financial circumstances.54 After the request was ignored and 
disregarded by the city government, a second request was filed the next day 
stressing the importance of the matter, and the urgency of exempting such levies, 
though in vain again.55 It was not until after a few months in August that a formal 
decision was released by the Fengtian Municipal Office, announcing the complete 
abolition of shop taxes, as well as a limitation to the maximum amount of taxes of 
all types to 18 yuan from the first of September of the same year.56 This was only 
the beginning of a series of reforms the government designed and implemented to 
simplify the lives of its subjects. After the unified currencies thus came a new 
reform attempting to unify tax laws on a national level. In this respect, the central 
government invested unprecedented efforts into the reformation of the tax system 
in Manchukuo, and for the first time since the establishment of the new state, the 
authorities announced that businesses with insufficient profit could be exempted 
from paying taxes. Moreover, the authorities designed separate taxation grids for 
corporate businesses and individual businesses.57 In line with Mitter’s observation, 
it can thus be said that the reform of the taxation system served the function of 
improving the credibility of the government to justify the legitimacy of the 
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54 SJSB, 21 May 1932. 
55 SJSB, 24 June 1932. 
56 SJSB, 28 August 1932. 
57 Hsinking Special Issue, SJSB, 29 June 1935. 
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regime. 58  However, insofar as the commercial sector's taxes represented a 
significant portion of state resources, government officials were very much aware 
that the new reforms of the tax system would result in a significant shortfall of their 
source of income. Clearly reluctant to fully enforce the new taxation system, the 
Manchukuo authorities prioritized the unification of the currencies instead, 
claiming it to be the most effective way to keep the financial disorder under control. 
Inevitably, the authorities’ decision to focus on currencies rather than on alleviating 
the commercial sector’s fiscal burden caused a number of pitfalls for merchants and 
business owners.  
 
As a consequence, unable to keep up with the high taxes while struggling 
with their day-to-day operations, countless shops and businesses across the state 
were forced to cease their activities and shut down completely. For instance, in the 
County of Shuangcheng, hundreds of shops were compelled to close down. 
Throughout the county, not a single pawnshop or jewellery store could be found 
anymore as they were all forced out of business.59 Night markets that used to be 
lively and packed with people and merchandise under the glow of street lights had 
become lifeless, with only a few roaming customers and peddlers, even during 
traditional rush hours. Not only did the merchants not make any profit from their 
activities, they also started cumulating losses throughout the seasons. 60 
Xieshengyong clothing and fabric store, for example, was one of the countless cases 
affected. After failing to make any profit for an entire year, the store announced its 
closure after dismissing all of its employees.61 However, being the commercial pillar 
in the Andong region, the collapse of the business magnate set off a chain reaction 
among peddlers and retailers all around. Subsequently, within a day’s time, it was 
reported that five more businesses were to close down shortly afterwards.62 
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59 SJSB, 15 June 1932. 
60 SJSB, 14 February 1932. 
61 SJSB, 19 March 1932. 




Like an epidemic, merchants were forced out of business everywhere in 
Manchukuo. One by one, shops and stalls were disappearing so quickly and in such 
numbers that it had become increasingly strenuous for urban dwellers to find a 
place to purchase their daily necessities. Starvation took its toll in the cities, reaping 
people exponentially. Dead bodies started appearing on the streets on a daily basis, 
becoming a common sight, as if corpses had merged with the urban landscape. In 
July 1935, famished citizens in Tonghua were to be found lingering near the 
marketplace, wrenching to leave even after closing hours, in which as reported: 
 
“… Every day in the market there were only a handful of sellers, 
maybe three or four, and they were always surrounded by an 
overwhelming crowd of hungry citizens. The stubbed corns, sorghum, 
and millets that the merchants were selling were all always mixed 
with lots of inedible bran and grain husks, yet they are still in very 
short supply… moaning and groaning can be heard everywhere in the 
market, as the majority of buyers in the market cannot keep their 
pots boiling and will have to go hungry for another day.”63 
 
Hence, alongside the sinister transformations of the urban landscape in 
Manchukuo, the cities witnessed a significant increase of beggars roaming the 
streets, who gradually begged for food instead of money, as if the value of human 
life was reduced to a few bites: 
 
“… In such times, many people could not find work to do and a lot of 
them have become beggars. The city government tried to help them 
by giving them copper coins, but they often disregard such kind 
gestures and request for a steamed bun instead. Such are the 
hardships of life and the miseries of inflation.”64 
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In the city of Jiyuan, deprived dwellers could be found begging their way 
along the most prosperous streets of the city, knocking from door to door asking for 
food and also on the off chance, if anyone was hiring. One concerned resident 
reported to the local press that “every five minutes, [he would] find at least one 
beggar standing by [his] door, begging for food, or even scraps of food.” Cities soon 
became invaded by mendicants whose miserable appearance did not go unnoticed 
by the inhabitants who still had a roof over their heads. According to the same 
resident, “[beggars] do not have any proper clothes or anything to eat; they beg for 
food during the day with their families and sleep in the dirty alleyways at night, 
their living conditions are quite miserable.” 65  The scarcity of goods inevitably 
generated social tensions and a vicious cycle of hostilities within the urban regions, 
leading to the rate of thefts and robberies in the cities to reach a high mark. 
Burglaries regularly occurred so often that marketplaces, for instance, were looted 
on a daily basis. Of all goods that were reported as stolen, thieves targeted mainly 
staple foods. Unsurprisingly, most offenders of such crimes were not high profile 
criminals, but were in fact described as “desperate and reckless citizens”.66 
 
With the upsurge in crime, it was dangerous to wander the streets alone in 
many cities in the first half of the 1930s. “What are you carrying in the bag?”, “Five 
litres of sorghum that I just borrowed from my relatives.”, “Let me eat some first, or 
I will scream that you raped me.”, such was the unfortunate encounter between a 
raggedly dressed man in his early forties and local resident Miss Zhang in a 
desolated alleyway near her home. When summoned to the local police station the 
following day for questioning, Zhang reluctantly confessed her wrongdoings and 
shared her side of the story: “I knew I broke the law and committed a crime. But I 
have not eaten a single meal in three days, what else could I possibly do?”67 The 
dramatic decrease in obtainable goods and purchasing power had indeed triggered 
the survival instincts of many, who resorted to robbing and threatening their own 
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peers in hope of living through another day. Even the normally most law-abiding 
citizens had to sharpen these “skills” to survive. Like most offenders, Zhang was not 
a hard-hearted criminal, but her story reflects the ordinary people' common 
behaviour and mindsets, misshaped by their need to survive. 
  
 Since the surge in crime was a matter of public concern, the government 
responded by launching a new “re-education” program in an attempt to reduce 
criminality and clean up its cities. A restrictive banning order on “loitering” was 
issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and homeless beggars along with unemployed 
citizens of working age were all evicted off the streets to be sent off to detainment 
camps to learn to become “useful citizens”.68 Known to the people as “workhouses 
for the homeless (You min xi yi suo)” and “correctional factories (Jiao yang gong 
chang)”, detainees in such camps were to be held for at least one year. Completely 
imprisoned within the facility, no permission was given even to see their families or 
to communicate with the outside world. Detainees were thus assigned to repetitive 
labour such as woodworking, dyeing, printing, spinning and tailoring. Even though 
the detained were supposedly obliged to undertake such tasks until their sentences 
expired, in practice however, labour sentences were often extended indefinitely. 
Indeed, such facilities were empowered to postpone the release of their detainees 
if “false attitudes” and reluctance to change were discovered.69 Overall resembling 
the labour camp system established by the People’s Republic of China after 1957, 
the “re-education” program proved to be an effective counter-measure to the 
soaring levels of street crime, but the contribution to the actual improvement of 
the living standards of the population was minute compared to the energy and 
resources deployed to enroll forced work in re-education camps. 
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Certainly, in spite of the many official promises of reforms aimed at 
resolving the financial disorder that caused the regime to further dysfunction, the 
real progress made by the Manchukuo government was minimal in the first half of 
the 1930s. Wondering if their situation could be any worse than it was already, the 
ordinary Manchukuoans were far from thinking that the years lying ahead would be 




3.3. Empty Showcases and Personal Connections 
 
To many, the year 1937 got off to a good start. The reform of commercial 
taxes was in full effect, and the currencies in circulation were finally stabilized.70 
Triumphant news of successful military operations against banditry continued to 
pour in from the countryside. At the same time, the rural population’s welfare 
significantly improved thanks to the soybean trade agreement worth over one 
million yen per year initiated between Manchukuo and Germany.71  This resulted in 
a substantial boom in trading volumes, which in return contributed to a significant 
improvement of the peasantry’s quality of life. During this period, their profits 
increased, which allowed them to gain access to the consumption of goods which 
they previously could not afford. This ricocheted in urban vendors’ daily activities as 
well. While they used to struggle to make ends meet, this new wave brought them 
an influx of rural customers ready to enjoy their newfound riches. 
 
Indeed, the beginning of 1937 was often referred to as the most prosperous 
time since Manchukuo had been founded. With merchants having to run around in 
circles in their shop to handle all the queries of their customers, it was hard not to 
capture the sense of enthusiasm. Official news reports during this period included 
testimonies and analyses indicating that “Peasants now are either spending their 
hard-earned monies on commodities or saving them at home, the bad financial 
situations in the countryside are finally behind them now.”72 Owing to the shopping 
boom, big businesses in the cities also began to recover. At last, in March, the city 
of Harbin recorded a surge of 103 new business openings while only 73 closed 
down, making it the first time in the city that the number of store openings 
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exceeded the number of store closings since the establishment of the regime.73 
Branded department stores such as Hongshuncheng, Xingtaihao, and 
Zhongshungong that were once on the edge of bankruptcy, could now finally boast 
of an average revenue of 7,000 yuan on a daily basis, with local peasants consuming 
enough to contribute to the largest portion of the daily turnover.74 As it was 
reflected in the regime’s propaganda, the modest economic recovery that occurred 
in early 1937 injected a tremendous confidence boost in the state authorities who 
deployed unremitting efforts to disseminate a sense of optimism to the 
Manchukuoans via news stories that emphasised on the sharp contrast between 
the past hardships and the present fortunes. 
 
However, the reality of life of the majority of urban residents in the puppet 
state during the beginning of 1937 was a completely different story, and other 
reports suggest that reporting of the economic “boom” were, at best, selective. The 
living standards remained low as they were severely impacted by the increasing 
prices of sorghum, which peaked at over two yuan per dou when it used to be no 
more than one yuan five jiao at the end of 1936.75 Moreover, the unemployment 
rates were still high. In the city of Jinzhou alone, it was reported that over 30 
percent of the population was living below the poverty line.76 During this period of 
time, welfare facilities and soup factories also witnessed a peak of famished visitors, 
forcing them to stretch well beyond their capacities to provide the proper help to 
the needy.77 To put a temporary end to starvation, some even resorted to selling 
their children. The average price for a young 18-year-old girl was 20 yuan, or the 
equivalent of five pecks of millets in face of the staggering grain prices.78 Picking 
wild plants growing along the streets was also one of the more common ways to 
alleviate hunger. And more often than not, this was part of the lower-class 
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Manchukuoan’s diet, which on a good day, consisted of wild plants as their staple 
food, accompanied by expired meat or fish. In June 1937, a sinister portrayal of 
such miseries of urban life was presented in the newspapers: 
 
“… From a dilapidated mud wall stood three very low thatched rooms. 
Sounds of anguish and depressive souls coming from inside 
propagated across the neighbourhood and into the ears of passers-by. 
Inside, the rooms were very dark, and everything was covered with a 
thick layer of dust. On one side of the brick bed laid a plain-looking 
man in his early forties with his eyes firmly shut. Next to him was an 
emaciated woman his age, constantly panting and painfully gasping 
to breathe. It was obvious from glancing at them that undernutrition 
could not be the only cause for such deteriorated physical conditions. 
Between the couple reclined a naked three to four-year-old child. The 
rickety boy had nothing more than skin and bones. His two small 
hands were tightly grasped across his chest as his body shivered, 
expressing dreadful pain, tears stained his face. After noticing that all 
his neighbours came to his home to visit his family, the man, Li 
Yanqing, struggled to get out of bed to welcome them, but was 
stopped by his neighbours after failing repeatedly. Li’s lips started to 
tremble, trying to utter something to the group, but instead, only 
green foam flew out of his mouth.”79  
 
 Whilst attempting to make sense of the awful scene presented in front of 
them, some of Li’s neighbours guessed that the family was probably suffering from 
starvation. “His family did not have any food in the past five days. I remember Li 
coming to my home to borrow some grain, but we had been out of food for over 
two days as well.” Others, on the other hand, insisted that it was a suicide attempt. 
“If they were just hungry, then why they couldn’t they speak? Maybe Li and his 
family poisoned themselves and tried to commit suicide because they were unable 
to find food.” The speculations ended when a big pot of half-eaten wild plants was 
subsequently discovered in the Li household kitchen cupboards, suggesting that his 
family was indeed suffering from food poisonings aggravated by their starved 
                                                        
79 Hsinking Special Issue, SJSB, 10 June 1937. 
132 
 
state.80 Without a doubt, what happened to the Li family was not an isolated 
tragedy. With hindsight, the calamities and countless stories of misery associated to 
urban poverty at the beginning of 1937 were very similar in gravity to the ones 
occurring in the first half of the 1930s when the everyday lives of the people were 
severely disrupted by the tremendous hardships that overwhelmed their lives. 
However, a closer examination of the evolution of the ordinary Manchukuoans’ 
everyday lives reveals the complexities that enable distinguishing the different 
scourges that plagued them from the earlier years of the regime to the present 
chaos. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the publication of such tragic stories in Manchukuo’s 
cities local press, the authorities still believed the overall trajectory to point upward 
in the beginning of 1937. Although the previous warlord era had certainly left traces 
of turmoil, the arrival of the Japanese and the birth of Manchukuo added another 
layer of social instability and financial disorder to the existing chaos. Yet, almost 
downplaying their part of the responsibility in provoking such turbulence, the 
authorities deliberately put a stronger emphasis on the failures of the previous era 
that resulted in a crippled society where members’ daily routines were to be 
salvaged by their leadership. Hence, after the various reforms, the authorities 
considered these issues to be solved, and classified social and financial crises to be 
a thing of the past. Moreover, in an attempt to instill a spirit of optimism into the 
Manchukuoans, the authorities insisted on the successes of their previous reforms, 
emphasizing more particularly the positive effects such reforms were to have on 
the people’s quality of life, and further stressing the lasting benefits the peoples 
would be able to experience in the future: 
 
“The people were [once] burdened with over-taxation to the point 
where they faced ruin and starvation. The currency system was 
completely ruined. The business of the country became stagnant and 




finally collapsed… Robbery, arson and massacre by the lawless 
elements (banditry) terrified the entire population, who, bereft of 
protection, were exposed to outrage and hunger in all parts of the 
country… To-day peace reigns all over the land; internal security is no 
longer the question … The unified currency system and the 
centralized credit system are outstanding examples of [our] 
successive achievements… [and] the standard of living of the 
Manchoukuo people will rise day by day.”81 
 
Enthusiasm among the authorities and Manchukuoans was indeed 
burgeoning insofar as the government leaders harboured grand visions for the 
future of Manchukuo. An ambitious Five-Year Industrial Development Plan (Manshu 
sangyo kaihatsu 5-ke-nen keikaku) that was already in the making since 1936 was 
officially announced in April 1937. Detailed arrangements were laid out as part of 
the goal to completely overhaul the single agriculture-led commodity economy at 
the enormous expense of nearly three billion yen. With the influx of Japanese 
investments, the rigorous control of the regime’s economy came to an end. Instead, 
the government of Manchukuo gave way to the active participation of private 
capitals in its state-building project, with the ultimate aim of achieving speedy 
economic development.82 Initiated by Ishiwara Kanji and Miyazaki Masayoshi, the 
Five-Year Industrial Development Plan was clearly inspired from the Soviet 
development model. At the same time, the large sum of financial investments from 
the home islands also granted Japan a legitimate reason to assign Japanese 
personnel to every important position in Manchukuo’s key industries.83 Indeed, 
while the strategic consideration to integrate the region’s economy reflected 
Japan’s perceived needs to exploit the rich natural resources of Manchukuo, it also 
further blurs the boundaries between informal and formal empire, fundamentally 
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transcending Japanese imperialism to an entire new level and reinforcing the status 
of Manchukuo as a colony in everything but name. However, for the ordinary 
people, the preoccupations were different. What mattered to them was not so 
much the news about foreign capital pouring in large sums of money to invest into 
the regime, but rather the impact it would have on their daily lives, and the creation 
of long-awaited and much-needed job opportunities, as well as the promises of 
better wages to improve their living standards. Even though the average 
Manchukuoan might or might not have shared the same intensity of optimism with 
regards to the government’s visions, they could not simply ignore the promises 
given to them at hand. Without a doubt, for the time being, it was still very difficult 
for Manchukuoans to get by every day. However, hopes for a brighter, more 
abundant future no longer seemed to be an unreachable dream, which made their 
present lives easier to bear.  
 
Nevertheless, during the same year, the overwhelming desires for future 
abundance and the government’s plans of rejuvenation were abruptly disrupted by 
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July and the outbreak of the battle of Shanghai in 
August. With the Kuomintang leadership refusing to succumb to Japan’s demands, 
the regional conflicts between the two countries escalated. Soon enough, the 
second Sino-Japanese War was in full swing. In order to finance the new war, a 
series of patriotic bonds were subsequently issued in Japan, along with the 
implementation of an economic drive policy and nation-wide mobilization. 84 
Manchukuo, on the other hand, was also forced to undergo a series of adjustments 
in order to accommodate the new political climate and the directives that ensued. 
The comprehensive Five-Year Development Plan for Manchukuo hence redirected 
its original purpose to achieve self-sufficiency, and began focusing on the 
exportation of raw materials and on the production of munitions to support the 
war economy.85 In addition, as Japan was virtually Manchukuo’s sole supplier for 
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finished industrial and commercial products insofar as in 1937, nearly 80 percent of 
Manchukuo’s total import volume came from Japan,86 the imminent threat of the 
war triggered a state-wide increase in commodity prices, which inevitably affected 
the ordinary people who began experiencing a dramatic surge in the costs of living.  
 
 Henceforth replacing the short-lived promises of abundance, this sudden 
shift in priorities was clearly reflected in the authorities’ calls for their subjects to 
live frugally, strongly encouraging them to save money and avoid unnecessary 
expenses. Certainly, frugal living and economization were omnipresent in the 
regime’s everyday rhetoric. “We all know that we cannot avoid purchasing essential 
items, but we also need to be prepared for the rise in prices and its impacts. In such 
times of emergency, we will all need to live humbly, and this is the only way to tide 
over the difficulties of life together (with Japan).”87 Such types of statements were 
made to instil faith and confidence into the citizens, and although they were 
intended to reassure them, they had the exact opposite effect more often than not. 
After all, rather than impalpable long-term political visions perceived as impractical 
or even irrelevant solutions to remedy their miserable conditions, or improve their 
quality of life, the reason why the peoples could harbour such spirits of optimism 
was because they believed in a foreseeable future that was to become a reality 
before long. With the promises of abundance shattered to pieces, all there was left 
for Manchukuoans were the hardships and miseries of the present, with no 
incentives for them to form future projects any longer.  
 
 In addition to shattering the people’s hopes for the future, the changes in 
the political climate caused Manchukuoans to grow increasingly insecure vis-à-vis 
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their chances to acquire goods in times of potential crisis. Everyday products and 
goods that were still available for purchase were perceived differently and took on 
a new sense of importance. Indeed, goods mattered not because of the fact that 
they were in short supply, but rather because of the anticipation that they might be 
in even shorter supply in the near future. Being able to buy something was no 
longer relevant. Instead, having the chance and ability to acquire an item when 
needed became the new dominant form of concern, whether the item in question 
be a daily necessity or more specific goods. Long queues in front of stores and 
merchants’ stalls could be seen across the cities on a regular basis, with urban 
residents carrying large shopping bags around to make purchases of whatever they 
could get their hands on, “just in case”. Indeed, people were becoming increasingly 
sensitive to even the smallest fluctuation of prices. These widespread everyday 
anxieties took on such magnitude that in January 1940, it was reported that all the 
shops in the city of Tieling had been fully cleared out of kerosene, and that during 
the cold wintry season, not even a single match could be found in any of the retail 
shops of the city.88 Shortages of everyday items aggravated to the point that even 
the most basic condiments such as salt became all but impossible to acquire 
through regular channels.89 At the same time, in Hsinking, a slight increase in the 
price of tobacco did not go unnoticed by consumers on the lookout, which sparked 
a wave of cigarette shortages that swept all shops throughout the city.90  
  
Although panic purchases and customers raiding the stores one after the 
other on a daily basis would normally suggest that merchants across the regime 
enjoyed a lucrative amount of profits, the reality was otherwise. In fact, since 
December 1937, the government had allocated all private businesses operating 
throughout the regime to respective unions (zu he) which was designed to 
empower the authorities to become the sole distributor of unprocessed raw 
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materials and commodities to each store prior to retail.91 The idea behind such 
organization was simple. It is in human nature to speculate on resources in the 
event of crisis. Thus, the control over the distribution of materials was not only 
meant to prevent merchants from taking advantage of the shortages and inflation 
by retailing goods at too high a price at the consumers’ expense. The goal was also 
to reduce the costs linked to business operations, and therefore required 
merchants to retail goods at low prices regulated by the government.   
 
However, the establishment of such unions neither solved the costs of 
operating businesses nor the price inflations. Under the system, many merchants 
were left with no choice but to join several unions at the same time. For instance, a 
store normally specializing in fabric dyeing would have to be a member of the coal 
and cotton unions in addition to being a part of the expected dyestuff union. 
Certainly, for the shop to maintain its normal operation, simultaneous membership 
to multiple unions was indispensable insofar as failure to do so was likely to result 
in the near impossibility of obtaining the needed raw materials and goods to display 
for retail.92 Additionally, because the unions kept strict control over the sourcing 
and supply of all such commodities, it became increasingly difficult for retailers to 
make any of these products available to the ordinary Manchukuoan who fell victim 
to shortages rapidly taking over most supplies.93 Consequently, by April 1938, 
nearly all basic foodstuffs and essential daily commodities had fallen under the 
category of regulated products. These included corn, sorghum, wheat, millets, 
charcoal and cotton clothes, all of which were to be sold within a specifically 
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designated price range. As such, not only had it become increasingly difficult for 
merchants to get their hands on the necessary materials for retail, all such 
regulated prices also meant that the profit margins made over the few items 
displayed in their shop were close to negligible. In practice, as expected, it was 
barely manageable for merchants and vendors across the regime to keep their 
businesses going while following the directives, and selling products at the 
regulated retail price. On 11 June 1939, 55-year-old Quan Jifu who was then the 
owner of Fushuncheng, sent a letter to the police commissioner in Xingnong, on 
behalf of eight other butcher shops in the county: 
 
“… As per the County’s regulations, the selling price of pork is three 
jiao two fen per 500 grams. However, the cost price of pigs including 
transportation fees from Hailun County and the nearby villages have 
already exceeded the predetermined sale price of pork … if we cannot 
increase our prices we will not only be unprofitable, but we will also 
lose money and be driven out of business. With no other choice, 
please consider our earnestly request to increase the price of pork to 
three jiao six fen to aid and cultivate the development of businesses 
in our county.”94 
 
 To prevent their businesses from going under, merchants had to circumvent 
the limitations introduced by the unstable unions over the acquisition of materials 
needed for retail. As a possible alternative, many of them thus resorted to finding 
more stable suppliers to source materials outside their respective unions. Well 
aware that the risks were not to be underestimated, many merchants strove to 
purchase supplies from other distributors without being caught by the authorities, 
since they knew they would be liable to a fine of up to 300 yuan, and possibly a 
prison term of up to six months.95 The other option for them was to resort to 
stockpiling their supplies, and to refrain from putting them for sale unless they 
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estimated that a favourable profit could be made. But this too became illegal. The 
Manchukuo government therewith referred to any merchants they considered to 
be “hoarding merchandise with the intention of gaining profits” as “dishonest and 
evil traders (jian shang)”. In the meantime, an even bigger penalty of up to 6,000 
yuan was introduced to further dissuade merchants from trying their luck in these 
behaviours regarded as vile.96 Indeed, it was becoming increasingly clear that under 
the amended Five-Year Industrialization Plan, the priorities of the regime had been 
redesigned to focus even more on heavy industry. The government’s heavy 
penalties and inflexibility towards merchants’ activities eventually left them with 
little to no wiggle room. This also suggests that the authorities were confident in 
their own distribution scheme wherein unions were to be the sole suppliers for 
most commodities, believing that such system would minimize risks of inflation, 
and keep shortage issues under check. Unfortunately, when the authorities 
designed and implemented the monopolized distribution scheme, little foresight 
seems to have been taken into consideration with regards to mid to long-term 
consequences affecting the relationships and hierarchical structure within the 
society. 
 
In these troubled times, having "friends" took on a crucial importance when 
navigating in Manchukuo society. It was essential for Manchukuoans to have the 
right “friends” at the right time insofar as such “friends” could often make almost 
any type of inconvenience go away. Many therefore sought after their “friends” for 
help whenever they encountered a problematic situation that needed to be solved, 
and the Manchukuo shop owners who were struggling to turn a profit were no 
exception. In this specific context, “making friends” refers more particularly to the 
process whereby two parties engage in a reciprocally instrumental relationship that 
involves the constant exchange of bribes and favours. For example, in Changbai 
County, Lü Ziying, an employee working in Decheng soy sauce shop, retold his 
experiences when serving the shop owner’s “friends”: 
                                                        




“Because all of the materials needed to make soy sauce (soybeans, 
salt, etc.) are all distributed and supplied by the union and the 
Monopoly Bureau, the officials were always treated as guests of 
honour whenever they came to the shop. During special occasions, 
holidays and new year’s, my employer would always send me to the 
officials’ home to deliver specially crafted premium soy sauce and 
pickles that could not be bought anywhere else. The chief of the 
Monopoly Bureau, Wang Hanmin would come by every day to the 
shop to play mahjong and pai gow poker. He would stay here to eat 
and drink all day long and sometimes even ask for money from the 
shop. But still, my employer always treated him as a distinguished 
guest. As long as Wang and his friends were here, we would always 
serve them very cautiously, in fear of offending them. When they 
played mahjong, we stood next to them to light their cigarettes, pour 
water and cater them with fruits. Our shop owner always greeted 
them with a humble smile and welcomed them, as well as seeing 
them off outside the shop. Every time [when they leave] they would 
be given bottles of soy sauce free of charge as well.”97 
 
And as much as “friends” are supposed to help each other out in times of need, in 
return, the officials would turn a blind eye to the shop’s everyday operations. These 
instances were all the more outraging since they could not even be compared to 
the mediocre products sold to the average customers. In contrast, inferior or even 
defective soy sauce that had been excessively diluted with water was served to the 
ordinary masses who would walk through the door. From time to time, some of the 
produce sold in the store had made their way onto the shelves posing as soy sauce, 
even though all that the bottles really contained was a horrid mixture of leftover 
soup, peppercorns, aniseeds and coloured sugar. “I do not know how much money 
the shop was making every month,” as Lü stated, “But once, I overheard my shop 
owner in a conversation: ‘How can I not make money if my business is collaborating 
with the local bosses? If there was any less money to make, I would not even be 
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doing this.”98 Indeed, the example of Lü’s employer and his “friendly” relationships 
with officials occupying seats in the higher spheres was characteristic of the not-so-
hidden mechanisms of Manchukuo society operating in the context of monopolized 
distribution. Although in a way, the distribution scheme was created to combat 
shortages and price inflations, such a system ended up worsening the existing social 
inequalities among Manchukuoans. Surely, in the event of shortages, access to 
whatever goods were available for purchase depended almost exclusively on the 
type of connections one had. For the unprivileged ordinary masses, gaining access 
to goods was a much more complicated story.  
 
 Manchukuoans incessantly grumbled to express their discontentment vis-à-
vis the mediocrity of the few goods merchants would make available for them to 
purchase. This was especially evident after the official introduction of the rationing 
system in 1939, which operated as follows. The authorities appointed a number of 
merchants and retailers across the regime who were to distribute rationed goods 
obtained from the abovementioned unions, to eligible Manchukuoans. Undeniably, 
this newly imposed distribution system further worsened the shortages situation, 
wherein the already scarce goods could only be obtained upon proof of cash and of 
rationing documents (pei ji tong zhang). On top of that, the majority of the rationed 
goods distributed to the public were, in fact, an ensemble of rejects and defective 
products which the light industries in Japan exported for distribution to the 
Manchukuo market. Products deemed unfit for sale to the Japanese consumer 
market thus made their way to become highly-prized goods among the toiling 
masses of Manchukuo who struggled to get hold of regular commodities. Such 
commodities were regarded as highly-prized, not because of their quality or 
because of the high price that they fetched, but because it was so difficult to even 
obtain them due to their scarcity, that possession of such goods was already a semi-
victory. Another possible reason why the products made available to the people by 
rationing were lacking in so many respects was because merchants prioritized the 




better ones to their “friends” in hope of staying on their good side. Practically all 
types of commodities were affected. Shoes, for instance, were so poorly 
manufactured that they were reputed not to last longer than seven or eight days 
before the soles completely broke off and the threads came off loose. Watches 
were not very functional either, and were commonly ridiculed for their uselessness, 
rebranded as the “three diligent watches (san qin biao)”, simply because it required 
the owner to align, dial and tighten the watch all the time for it to function as it 
should.99 On the other hand, with regards to foodstuffs, merchants in charge of 
distributing food staple ration purposely contaminated the rations with 
inconsumable impurities. In Fengtian, citizens had reportedly discovered that in 
their portion of millets, nearly half consisted of sickening mixtures of sand and 
rocks.100 Without a doubt, it can be said that amoral and unscrupulous merchants 
took advantage of their fellow Manchukuoans since they were confident that given 
the shortages situation, they would rather purchase subpar rationed goods than 
have nothing at all. When they saw the opportunity to maintain a profit from their 
fellow peers, they therefore willingly took their chances, to the loss of the ordinary 
people. Unfortunately, as time went by, the shortages situation continued 
regressing, affecting all strata of society.   
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3.4. Holiday Rationing and the Year 1940 
 
The authorities’ initiative to implement the rationing system in 1939 could 
be understood as a way for them to acknowledge the severe supply and 
distribution problems that were plaguing the regime. Nevertheless, the authorities 
put together a number of special rationing arrangements in order to accommodate 
the upcoming holiday seasons in 1940. On the one hand, for the ordinary people of 
Manchukuo, holidays were important, not only because they considered holidays to 
be a festive break from their daily miseries and routines, but also because holidays 
were regarded as a symbolic vestige representative of their traditional practices 
and values. On the other hand, and precisely for those same reasons, holidays were 
judged to be dangerous but necessary by the Manchukuo authorities. They were 
deemed to be dangerous since they temporarily overthrew the constructed societal 
structures and hierarchy which the authorities imposed on its subjects. And yet, 
holidays were also regarded as necessary because they allowed for the 
Manchukuoans to blow off the steam built up by the hardships accumulated 
throughout the years, but within a limited and predetermined period of time which 
the authorities could anticipate. In other words, it can be said that holiday periods 
were brief but powerful outbursts of repressed cultural values during which the 
oppressed generated such energy that it could bridge the established hierarchical 
distance between the subjugator and the subjugated.101 As such, for the ordinary 
people in Manchukuo, holidays represented a long- awaited, and indispensable 
portion of their everyday life. However, the extraordinariness experienced during 
the holiday seasons was so far-fetched and unlikely to happen on regular days that 
it could barely be considered normal, or part of their everyday life. Finally, 
inasmuch as holiday celebrations were traditionally associated with abundance and 
fortune, the Manchukuo government had to take extra precautions to transition 
smoothly into and out of the festive periods in order to maintain its stability and 
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legitimacy102, especially with the overwhelming backdrop of shortages affecting all 
the layers of the society.  
 
The first round of holiday rationing was announced to the public early in the 
beginning of 1940. In preparation for the Lunar New Year, the minister of Economic 
Affairs issued a statement on 10 January wherein he made promises to deliver 
special rationing of wheat flour to every household in Manchukuo for the upcoming 
celebration: 
 
“The rationing of general necessities is our utmost concern, especially 
during important traditional holidays such as the upcoming Lunar 
New Year … We have heard about the baseless rumours [regarding 
hoarding and the shortage of goods] before, but that was because 
there were only a few appointed ration shops [in each area]. Due to 
their own financial problems, they were not able to receive the 
predetermined amount of goods for distribution [to the residents]. In 
fact, the government has already taken notice of such problems, thus 
this time we have prepared over three million bags of flour to ensure 
that everyone will be able to obtain their special rations.”103 
 
 Interestingly, the minister’s statement stresses on the authorities’ 
awareness and understanding of the shortages situation that caused 
Manchukuoans to have difficulty accessing goods. Nevertheless, it also specifies 
that the merchants’ own failures are to blame for the situation, and denies any 
responsibility. However, to alleviate the people’s burdens, the statement further 
emphasizes the authorities’ generosity towards its subjects in such troubled times. 
A disproportionate amount of effort was thus put towards the promotion of the 
authorities’ sagacious decisions and benevolence, which prompted the local 
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governments to circulate rationing tickets of up to three kilograms of wheat flour 
per person. 104  For the ordinary people, the authorities’ message overall was 
without doubt an encouraging one, as wheat flour, along with other staple 
foodstuffs such as white sugar and rice, were considered to be a luxury largely 
inaccessible to the average Manchukuoans on a normal basis. 
 
 However, far from fulfilling their promises, the authorities failed to meet the 
expectations they had themselves given to the people, and the Lunar New Year 
rations turned into a complete disaster. In the space of a few days only, the 
ambitious “rationing for every household” slogan evolved into “rationing as much 
as possible”, to eventually become “until stocks last”. The rationing tickets issued in 
large quantities to urban residents grew into nothing more than bitter scraps of 
paper. City residents who stood in line in the cold for hours holding onto their 
ration tickets felt all the more deceived when they discovered that all along, there 
had been no flour at all.105 On the other hand, the authorities were once again 
quick to push the blame onto the “unscrupulous” merchants, “Although there are 
different theories (regarding the issue of rationings), the speculators and the 
profiteers are the ones to blame”, noted one official, “… we have urged the police 
department to handle the issues in a timely manner and to stabilize the prices, as it 
is the only way to soothe the hardships in people’s lives.”106 Certainly, the delivery 
of these types of statements to the public resembled more to mere formalities 
which the authorities went through not because they meant the declarations made 
in the statements, but rather chose to go through the motions for the sake of it, 
because of the fact that they were facing growing popular criticisms. Nevertheless, 
this does not necessarily imply that the Manchukuo authorities were completely 
unaware of what the real cause was behind the failure of the rationing of these 
luxurious goods. 
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In a society plagued by shortages causing its members to heavily depend on 
establishing and maintaining personal connections with relevant “friends” so that 
they could secure goods, it became natural for members withholding privileges to 
prioritize themselves over others. At the same time, such practices had become so 
common that none of those with privileges even considered themselves to be in an 
advantaged position anymore. The special rationing intended for the holidays did 
not escape the persistence of the shortages, and were thus in extremely limited 
quantities. Even the most influential individuals in the Manchukuo society needed 
to act quickly in order to get their hands on any such rations. In Dairen, before the 
distribution of the rations for the Dragon Boat Festival (Duan wu jie) was even 
announced to the public, connected individuals had already begun to activate their 
“friendships” with various ration shop owners throughout the city. Name cards 
were thus circulating among “friends” who also received phone calls that saturated 
the lines, just so that they could secure their specified amount of wheat flour 
before it ran out. Consequently, ordinary customers who had been queuing for long 
hours in anticipation, even before the shops’ opening times, were faced with yet 
another disappointment. Insistent on being “out of stock”, shop owners hence 
mechanically told disbelieved customers that they had come “too late”, or that the 
day’s rationings were all “out of stock”. The situation was all the more ironic and 
hard to accept for ordinary customers because piles of wheat flour bags in the back 
room were clearly visible for all to see.107 Surely, such blatant excuses were clearly 
made up to brush off customers, but often, such implausibility concealed much 
more complex mechanisms.  
 
 As a rule of thumb, the authorities allowed the ration shops to work out the 
details of the distribution process in whichever way they saw fit. However, granting 
them carte blanche on the rationing operations would inevitably cause negative 
repercussions on the ordinary people who could not secure goods with “friends”. In 
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practice, this often equated to shop owners using tricks to hide their real intentions, 
for instance by resorting to promises to deliver the special rationings to the people 
while in reality, they never intended to do so. For example, in Dairen, a ration shop 
owner dispatched his employees to the nearby neighbourhoods prior to the day of 
the distribution to announce that one bag of flour to be divided between four 
households, was to be “distributed” for the festivities, as long as residents showed 
proof of their rationing tickets. In view of their previous experiences of having to 
beseech in vain to obtain their rations, the neighbourhood residents felt dubious at 
such sudden lavish decisions coming from the ration shops. Oddly, at the same time, 
they were grateful for –though hesitant towards– the generosity displayed for the 
festivities. It was not until the day of the festival that the residents discovered that 
the rationing branch intended to sell one bag of flour to groupings of four 
households, with demands to pay for the bag up front. “There was actually no clear 
way to divide the flour”, shared one dispirited person. “When the average 
household in the city cannot even come up with enough money to buy four 
kilograms of flour for themselves, how do they expect us to raise enough money to 
purchase an entire bag?”108 In another rationing branch, customers who were 
queuing outside the store were urged to hand in their tickets, and to return the 
next day to collect their share. Promising them there was “more than enough for 
everybody”, many did so and came back the second day only to find out that their 
portion had been sold out, and had become “out of stock”. Being deprived of their 
rationing tickets, some tried their luck again the day after, and repeated the process 
until their patience grew thin. Disheartened, they decided that they would rather 
not have the flour any more than having to face the prevarications and lies from the 
shop.109 
  
For those reasons, when walking pass ration shops in Manchukuo, it was not 
uncommon to witness conflicts, heated arguments, or see desperate and angry 
citizens pushing and shoving one another after having wasted their time waiting in 
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line for nothing. On some occasions, riots even broke out. On one cold morning in 
Dairen, an angry crowd took a ration branch by storm as soon as the owner opened 
his shop for business:  
 
“… Young men with good physical fitness in the back of the crowd 
violently shoved their way into the front and started to grab the 
rations from [shop owner] Wang’s hands, leaving the more senior 
people vulnerable, who had been here since six in the morning 
eagerly standing by and waiting for their turn.  Some women started 
to curse and yell as the crowd quickly turned into a chaotic mess. By 
nine o’clock, passers-by and onlookers all started to gather and joined 
in the chaos even if they were not eligible for the rations. Half an 
hour later, all rations were gone, snatched away by the crowd. It was 
impossible to tell who had taken what and in what quantities, nor 
how much damage was caused in total.”110  
 
When such events occurred, law enforcement patrolmen were generally 
quickly dispatched to the scene. In Harbin, police officers were reportedly beating 
and battering their way into Xinbin street as they were called to intervene onsite 
following an argument that went sour, degenerating into a large brawl between the 
Yiyuansheng branch and the residents who were turned down from their rations. It 
was reported that on this occasion, a 60-year-old lady who suffered from poor 
eyesight and deafness was caught in the process, and was violently pushed down 
into a roadside ditch that was several meters deep. As the police was undoubtedly 
siding with the rationing branch owner’s interests, nobody in the crowd dared to 
lend a helping hand to the lady who was suffering from a broken leg and cried in 
agony.111  
 
Nevertheless, these official reactions do not necessarily suggest that the 
Manchukuo government was completely unaware of the ordinary people’s 
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complaints of the all-too-common recourse to privileges, and the consequences 
they entailed. Surely, no matter how much the authorities considered the 
participation in speculation, and acts of hoarding as criminal activities punishable by 
the law, in contrast, making use of personal connections, or rather, relying on 
“friendships” to obtain goods was not regarded as legally reprehensible, especially 
since many of the beneficiaries were officials. The most important aspect when 
establishing and maintaining those “friendships” lay primarily in the human and 
relational aspects which these personal connections consisted of. Rather than 
relying on one-time large sums of money to bribe someone, it was considered to be 
much more worthwhile to make “friends” to gain regular access to goods in the 
long run. As illustrated in the cases above, accessing goods through connections 
was far more fruitful than attempting to claim them legitimately with rationing 
tickets. Although the special holiday rationings in 1940 were introduced by the 
central government with good faith, the local officials and the ration branches 
carried out their tasks half-heartedly to downright fraudulently. Later on, after the 
collapse of the regime, Wang Xianwei who formerly exercised the role of the mayor 
of Fengtian, admitted that in reality, the so-called special rationings were “merely 
acts to pay lip service to the public.”112 These confessions relayed the fact that 
saying that in the Manchukuo society, influential people had privileges was simply 
redundant, an unnecessary specification. However, for the faceless and nameless 
ordinary masses, daily survival was for the best-connected. 
 
Hence, from 1940, as a direct consequence of those lies and accumulated 
frustrations, the few days following each holiday season were marked by a sharp 
increase of violence and criminal activities characteristic of the period. In the city of 
Dairen alone, a total of one murder case, 412 cases of thefts, 462 cases of robberies 
and 753 cases of fraudulent extortions were reported in the short period of time 
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following the failed holiday rationings supposedly initiated for the Dragon Boat 
Festival.113 Ironically, among the fraudsters targeting ration branches, those who 
succeeded in their scams managed to do so by dressing up in suits, or by wearing 
uniforms. In full disguise, they would be seen walking around in broad daylight, 
carrying around a stick and imitating local officials or police officers. On a macro-
level, as indicated by the Manchurian Central Bank, the state-wide cost of living 
index from July to August saw another sharp 97 percent increase.114 In addition, the 
regime witnessed a major 4,295 percent increase in the cost of living compared to 
1939, and an alarming 11,542 percent increase prior to the Macro Polo Bridge 
Incident in 1937.115 This shows clearly that the introduction of the distribution 
scheme and the rationing system did not solve the shortages and price inflation 
crises. This also indicates that the failed holiday rationings further aggravated the 
crises, which showed no sign of alleviating in the foreseeable future.  
 
 The multiple failed attempts to keep the shortages crisis under control 
prompted the Manchukuo government to resort to more radical decisions to 
stabilize the turmoil that weigh down its citizens. First of all, to put their plan into 
effect, the authorities decided that after 1940, statutory holidays and special 
rations were to be revoked. Additionally, traditional Chinese celebrations officially 
became “empty formalities”, and deemed to be “outdated conventions” that no 
longer justified special celebrations nor considerations. As such, the authorities 
called for the complete abolishment of any of such holidays.116 Nevertheless, in the 
very context of shortages, this had a substantial impact on the peoples’ morale. 
Regardless of how small or temporary the improvement would have been, the 
suppression of traditional holidays annihilated the chances for ordinary people to 
live out of their daily miseries and experience for the slightly better lifestyle which 
they longed for. By denying the holiday celebrations, Manchukuoans could no 
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longer taste a glimpse of what the life of the privileged was and bridge the social 
gap, even temporarily. Moreover, by taking control over the people’s tradition to 
celebrate the holidays and by downplaying the symbolic significance of their 
cultural values, the authorities not only trampled on the people’s heritage and 
identities, but they also reinforced the hierarchical structures in the society, where 
the privileged increased the distance from the poor who became even more 
marginalized. On the one hand, it could be interpreted that the Manchukuo 
authorities chose to annul the traditional Chinese festival in order to ensure that 
they could maintain a complete exploitative and oppressive hold on the 
Manchukuoan’s every aspect of life. However, on the other hand, the decision itself 





3.5. The Downward Spiral 
 
The government’s decision to abolish the celebration of all Chinese 
traditional festivities was a manifestation of its own failures, symptomatic of the 
officials’ incapability to combat the state-wide shortage crisis and poverty. As a 
form of compromise, the authorities began to increase their tolerance levels with 
regards to illegal activities related to the black markets established across the 
regime. In effect, the black market was often the only reliable option for the 
ordinary people to obtain daily necessities as well as luxurious goods. This was 
reflected in unofficial discussions between members of the Manchukuo 
government, in which Shokemuri Nobuyoshi for instance, who acted as the chief of 
the Secret Service department in Fengtian, once repeatedly urged the director of 
the city’s police department that “it would be best to stop the ban on illegal open-
air markets and refrain from suppressing the transactions occurring in these 
places.”117 However, despite making adjustments and adopting a softer stance, the 
authorities’ fight against “unscrupulous” merchants still went on relentlessly on an 
official level. As such, the authorities ordered all retailers to freeze their commodity 
prices (Wu jia ting zhi ling) on 25 July 1941. The official notice thus prohibited all 
merchants to make any changes to the prices or indices of their retailed 
commodities, regardless of the fluctuations of the costs related to transportation, 
maintenance, or storage.118  
 
The new ordinance was broken down to four subcategories: (1) “public 
(gong)”, (2) “assist (xie)”, (3) “stop (ting)” and (4) “self (zi)”. As stated by the new 
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regulation, all industrial and commercial entities operating throughout the regime 
were required to reorganize their commodities and prices, and post up clear 
identifiers and price tags according to these four categories.119 Firstly, “public” 
commodities consisted primarily of basic life necessities, which included grain, coal, 
oil, salt, or fabric. As the name indicates, “public” commodities were controlled by 
the authorities, who were in charge of allocating the finished products to 
merchants at the final stages of distribution. Second was the goods pertaining to 
the “assist” category, which included general groceries, farming tools, and small 
handicraft products. With regards to distribution to merchants for retail, the 
responsibility remained under the various unions in all relevant sectors. Thirdly, all 
the other small and miscellaneous groceries fell under the “stop” order. Prices of 
any such commodities were strictly controlled, and merchants were formally 
forbidden from inflating them any further. Fourthly, the “self” category applied to 
all the products purchased or manufactured after the 25 July for which merchants 
were required to report detailed costs and price listings to their local economic 
services branch, as well as to the local Police department. Products were allowed to 
be displayed on shelves under the label “self” only after the officials had formally 
approved the merchants’ requests. Additionally, products that had made it onto the 
shelves were to be priced according to the authorities’ “advised” retail price.120 The 
Manchukuo government’ decision to freeze prices can be interpreted as a final 
desperate attempt to keep goods circulating in a society which, in face of the acute 
shortages, was heavily affected by the abuse of personal connections to obtain 
practically anything. The officials’ determination to put an end to the disorder 
resulted in the multiplication of crackdowns and raids carried out in succession, 
with the aim to bring down profiteers and hoarders. Unfortunately for the 
authorities, whenever a new rule was initiated, it was followed by individuals 
coming up with new ways to bypass the restrictions as well. 
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Indeed, despite being subjected to frequent inspections, merchants who 
were well-connected were often tipped off by their “friends” prior to each official 
visit. Consequently, two sets of account books were prepared in advance: one that 
recorded all the real prices and transactions, and one tweaked version, made in 
anticipation for the inspections.121 Shop owners also began resorting to coding the 
elements surrounding them, using complicated ciphering to hide messages 
embedded into their everyday decorative objects in the shops. Yushengxiang, a 
grocery ration store located in Linjiang County, is an illustration of such widely used 
practices. The popular ration store thus rearranged its ten-character shop couplet 
“yu fa lin jiang di, sheng cai si hai tong (shop originated in Linjiang, makes money 
from over the four seas)” to represent numbers from one to ten. When employees 
combined “fa” and “di” for example, this would equate to a sum of 25 yuan, 
whereas “lin sheng” could indicate a sum of three yuan six jiao. In most cases, such 
codes were exchanged among shop employees verbally to determine which illicit 
sale prices were suitable to use and display for the day’s unwitting potential 
customers. However, these codes were most often meant to determine the amount 
of bribe needed to pay off government inspectors.122 In contrast, merchants who 
carried on with their businesses more honestly were unlikely to catch the wind in 
advance of the government’s crackdowns, and therefore often faced a completely 
different outcome. 
 
 Liu Yukun, the heir to a canned food factory operated by his father Liu 
Ziming in Harbin was one of the unlucky ones. One morning in July 1942, four police 
officers arrived at his home and demanded to audit his account books. After 
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skimming through a few pages symbolically, the police officers hastened to 
announce that Liu was accused of being a “profiteer”, and placed him in custody to 
await trial. During his time under arrest, Liu was repeatedly interrogated by Huang 
Xinan, the deputy director of economic security. Huang “the skin peeler”, as 
popularly nicknamed by Liu’s fellow cellmates, was thus in charge of making Liu 
confess his wrongdoings and admit his economic crimes. Believing in his own 
innocence and refusing to succumb to the fabricated accusations, Liu was severely 
beaten on a daily basis until he finally came to the realization that it was all in fact 
just an act of extortion.123 Reluctantly, Liu eventually pleaded guilty to profiteering 
when he was arraigned by Huang again. “Give me a number”, “2,000 yuan” 
whispered Liu. “2,000 yuan? It is good to know that you still have some sense”, 
concluded Huang as he left with a self-satisfied smile on the face. In the end, Liu 
was ultimately sentenced to prison for six months, and received an additional 
penalty fee of 2,000 yuan which in all likelihood, made their way into the pockets of 
the police officers who interrogated him.124 Regardless of whether Liu had actually 
conducted acts of profiteering or not, his experience is an apt illustration of how 
the lockup quotas were fulfilled by law enforcers. Even though it is difficult to tell 
exactly how many people were affected by the authorities’ commitment to clear up 
economic crimes in the 1940s, it can nonetheless be said with certainty that the 
number of those who were impacted was far too high to overlook their experiences.  
 
By 1943, the authorities began to hunt down “profiteers” even more 
relentlessly than they already were. People suspected of committing such criminal 
acts faced even greater penalties than before as the meaning behind the 
accusations of “profiteering” reached a new level of gravity in the eyes of the 
government. Police checkpoints were set up along the main roads, and random 
searches were conducted on passers-by on a frequent basis. For instance, in the 
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Harbin railway station, more than 100 people were arrested on a daily average by 
the local police officers. Then again, because the bar was set very low, individuals 
caught carrying as little as one kilogram of food would be immediately convicted of 
economic crimes.125 The fact that people were being thrown in jail with no real 
charges can be understood as the Manchukuo government’s own realization that 
its efficiency was close to nil with regards to the shortage crisis that took over the 
regime. Indeed, to the authorities, in order to maintain some level of stability and 
to prevent state-wide uprisings from the populace tired of the aggravating 
shortages, having recourse to mass arrests was seen as their only option.  
 
So not only did the authorities implant fear in the daily lives of ordinary 
citizens, they were also exploiting and relying on the peoples’ anxieties to organize 
society and make it function in the ways the Manchukuo government had decided. 
This inevitably destroyed whatever was left of the public’s trust in the authorities. 
By 1945, lootings and raids had become such a commonplace occurrence that 
government buildings and police checkpoints were frequently targeted and 
assaulted by droves of hungry mobs that had passed the point where they could no 
longer afford to eat.126 But then again, as mentioned above, receiving help from 
“friends”, or making use of personal connections was not legally reprehensible. 
Ironically, it was the authorities’ tolerance and involvement in the abusive recourse 
to “friendships” that led to the subversion of the rationing scheme and distribution 
system which they had originally designed to improve the lives of the 
Manchukuoans during times of hardship.  
 
Overall, on the state level, and in line with Mitter’s observations, it can be 
said that the main motive behind the political elites’ decision to collaborate with 
the “Japanese devils (gui zi)” was principally linked to their desire to minimize the 
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Japanese’s disruptions to their lives by securing a certain amount of continuity to 
their economic and social statuses.127 In this regard, similarities can be drawn out 
when going down a level – from state to local level. To some extent, it can be said 
that the ordinary people of Manchukuo also exercised a form of “collaboration”. 
Although the people were not directly “collaborating” with the Japanese by keeping 
their distance, they certainly were with the privileged elites, or the “secondary 
Japanese devils (er gui zi)” at the local level. Negotiating their own terms, the 
people’s greatest concern largely remained about food and commodities, and just 
as importantly, their possibility to access those, and secure procurement when 
needed. The above examples demonstrated the mechanisms and consequences of 
mutually beneficial relationships between the various ration shop owners and local 
influential members by shedding light onto the ways in which a number of ordinary 
people managed to secure non negligible economic and social privileges for their 
own. At the same time, rowdy grumbling against the practice of personal 
connections was widespread among the unconnected masses while criminality 
witnessed a sharp surge. This may suggest that left-out Manchukuoans affected by 
the crises who failed to procure goods by means of complying with the merchants, 
and thus contributing to the system, resorted to alternative strategies to 
compensate for their lack of connections. If the ordinary people of Manchukuo can 
be regarded as passive in their response to the various economic policies forced 
onto them over time (all they really did was grumble), in contrast, they were much 
more proactive when demonstrating resistance, expressing dissatisfactions against 
the hardships caused by the shortages. On a larger scale, the different behaviour of 
ordinary people further points to the co-existence of compliance and resistance 
within the same context of occupation, as well as to the behaviour moulded by the 
different circumstances Manchukuoans encountered in their everyday lives. 
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3.6. The Compulsory Grain Sale Policy and Rural Society 
 
 Insofar as the implementation of the rationing of general goods and daily 
necessities largely remained an urban initiative, one may wonder how the rural 
society of Manchukuo operated during these times of economic crises, and in what 
ways peasants were affected by the shortages. To begin with, the outbreak of the 
second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 instantly triggered a dramatic increase in the 
production and exportation of agricultural products, which in turn put significant 
pressure on the production capacity of the already worn out Manchukuoan 
peasants. However, considering that at the same time, the Manchukuo government 
was focusing primarily on heavy industry, the total amounts invested in the 
regime’s agricultural sector witnessed an inevitable decrease of nearly nine percent 
under the amended Five-Year Development Plan.128 Under such circumstances, 
peasants across the countryside were given no choice but to produce more with 
fewer resources, which expectedly caused their profits and personal income to 
worsen every year. Hence, in an attempt to ensure sufficient agricultural yield in 
the following years, the authorities gradually introduced a series of agricultural 
policies leading up to the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy (Liang gu chu he) in 1940. 
 
Serving as a complement to the introduction of the rationing system in 
urban regions, private intermediary agencies such as wholesale grain stores in the 
countryside were abolished altogether, and peasants throughout the regime were 
required to sell their grain at designated governmental trading posts under the 
supervision of their respective grain depot unions.129 Certainly, the Manchukuo 
government sought complete control over the allocation and distribution processes 
as a way to contain inflation and guarantee the circulation of grain within the 
regime. However, as time went by, the shortage crisis in the regime showed no 
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signs of relief, and grain procurement targets were often unrealistic and 
systematically overestimated, leaving the peasants having to bear the cost. 
 
It is worth specifying that the vast majority of the rural population in 
Manchukuo consisted primarily of land cultivators rather than landowners. Surely, 
during the founding of the regime, the Japanese preserved the existing societal 
structure in the countryside as a compromise to appease the big landowners, 
allowing them to retain their properties in return for their acceptance and support 
towards the new administration.130 Therefore, land cultivators were under the 
increasing pressure to meet demanding grain quotas on top of having to pay land 
rent and compound interest to their landowners. This meant that however much 
was left for them to keep would be unlikely to last long enough to survive until the 
next harvest season. To elaborate, after 1940, the annual production of grain in the 
regime averaged approximately 18 million tons, 12 million of which would be 
needed to circulate within the countryside to maintain the minimum standard of 
living. 131  However, the grain procurement targets each year stood at roughly 
seven million tons,132 meaning that it was virtually impossible for cultivators to 
achieve, if no one were to be left starving to death. 
 
From the rural population’s perspective, the practice of the Compulsory 
Grain Sale Policy was hardly distinguishable from acts of daylight robbery and 
extortion. This is not only because of the fact that peasants were demanded to turn 
in more grain than they were willing to, but also because of how little the grain 
depot unions were paying for the amount of grain that they expropriated. In line 
with the efforts to maintain low selling prices in the cities, the acquisition of grain 
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was also regulated at low prices, for which farmers were compensated as little as 
2.5 yuan for 50 kilograms of corn. Compared to the previous years during which the 
market selling price was on average 12 yuan for 50 kilograms of corn, farmers had 
no choice but to count their inevitable losses.133 Aware of the peasants’ frustrations 
and lack of enthusiasm in contributing to the implemented system, grain 
procurement enforcers began using public humiliations and violence against the 
peasants as methods of persuasion.134 For instance, the police commissioner of 
Chaoyang County organized an admonitory meeting gathering land cultivators from 
the neighbouring villages, during which each household received specific grain 
imposition tasks following the harvest period. 
 
 Summoned early in the morning, peasants who arrived late were subjected 
to harsh punishments, and in addition to receiving beatings and slaps on the face, 
latecomers were to kneel through the entire meeting.135 Given the unrealistic 
obligations to turn in grain, some protested by stating the obvious facts related to 
the already tough situation: “My family could not even harvest 5,000 kilograms of 
grain this year, how can you assign us to hand in 2,500 kilograms of grain? We 
cannot afford this, if you do not believe me then you are welcome to search in my 
home.” However, despite being aware of the harsh circumstances of rural life, the 
local authorities responded to the peasant’s remarks by carrying out severe 
thrashings, accusing him of having a “negative attitude” towards the procurement 
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of grain, and also of course, for talking back.136 However, this does not mean that 
the authorities systematically dismissed all the objections voiced by the peasants 
with regards to the procurement targets. Nevertheless, in a context where severe 
scarcities affected the regime, it was also in the peasants’ interests to emphasize 
the peculiarities of local difficulties as a tactic to protect themselves from the 
burdens of grain requisition. Unfortunately, the local officials could easily see 
through such strategies since they had been holding similar discourses and 
arguments when reporting to the central government.  
 
On top of the pressures produced by the ongoing war, one could understand 
why the grain procurement targets set by the central authorities were largely 
perceived to be impractical on the regional level. In fact, quotas were calculated 
based on estimations from previous harvests, without taking into account the 
seasonal specificities potentially damaging the upcoming yield. However, since the 
provincial administrators were familiar with the local circumstances affecting their 
respective regions, the central authorities’ assignment to have them collect such 
large quantities of grain following each harvest was perceived as an improbable 
directive to accomplish successfully. This meant that for once, both the peasants 
and the local officials commonly agreed that the central government’s grain targets 
were unrealistically high. As such, it inevitably brings out the issue of what were the 
“realistic” targets, as well as how they could be determined.  
 
To be sure, regional officials tried their hardest to test out the waters, often 
by using the miserable status quo and the regional hardships as leverage in their 
attempts to “barter” with the central authorities. In March 1943, during a Governor 
Conference organized by the Ministry of Agriculture to announce the annual grain 
quota, Chancellor Huang Fujun, who attended the meeting, recalled: 
 




“… During the meeting, when I announced the year’s target of grain 
assignments, a few governors instantly stood up and expressed their 
opposition to the number I had just announced and proceeded to 
detail all the various hardships in the rural areas in their respective 
provinces before they requested a reduction of the total amount. In 
order to quell their discontent, I made a brief speech to encourage 
them, albeit I could tell that they were not satisfied with my answer. 
As the governors continued to press on the issue, [Minister of 
Agriculture] Inahara, who was sitting next to me, suddenly stood up 
and instructed them in a stern tone about the importance of assisting 
the Imperial Army in the Holy War, reminding them that 
Manchukuoans had a duty to contribute to the cause. By the end of 
his speech, Inahara euphemistically assured the governors that the 
central government had made sufficient preparations, and that the 
stated goal was achievable if everybody worked hard, also implying 
that for their own good, governors should not deliberately make 
things more difficult”.137 
 
 Indeed, apart from emphasizing the Manchukuoans’ responsibility to devote 
themselves to the war, it can be said that Inahara’s confidence reflects the extent 
to which the Manchukuo government had thought about the implementation of 
the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy. Whilst recognizing the fact that high grain quotas 
would inflict tremendous strain upon the peasants, the central authorities also 
clearly knew that its rural population could never be in a position to actively resist 
against it either. Surely, under the system of monopolized distribution, if anyone 
refused to hand in the designated amount of grain, the authorities could also refuse 
to provide them with the seeds necessary to cultivate the lands in the future. 
Because of the distribution system imposed on them, peasants were on the 
disadvantageous end of the “blackmail”. As such, complete resistance against the 
Compulsory Grain Sale Policy would equate to having no crops and no source of 
income at all, something that the peasants could certainly not afford. 
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 This was especially evident when Huang visited Sanjiang province, as a 
follow-up to the earlier conference. The meeting was intended to instil motivation 
and confidence within the peasants which was thought was needed to stimulate 
agricultural production. Organized by provincial governor Sun Bofang, 30 peasants 
were gathered from the villages near Huachuan and Boli Counties to express their 
thoughts towards grain production. In the end, the motivational encounter lasted 
three hours, gradually turning into a way for the regional authorities to collect 
messages and complaints from the peasants to be relayed to the Chancellor. “After 
the implementation of the compulsory sales, the remaining grain were not even 
enough for us to save some for ourselves, let alone to feed the livestock”, “We also 
never got the chance to obtain any basic commodities”, “We were only given ten 
yuan after each harvest. How could we cultivate the farmlands with only ten yuan? 
It is barely enough to buy five packs of cigarettes.” 138  Even though all such 
complaints had been expressed countless times before the meeting, peasants did 
not fail to voice out their concerns. Whether this time, their voices had been heard 
or not, these messages and grumbles really were all that the peasants could say to 
the authorities. In return, the villagers received no more than the usual 
standardized answers. “I knew that the peasants were all exhausted,” stated Huang, 
“But what was I supposed to do? Nobody could break the rules and disobey the 
policies.”139 
 
On the other hand, since the peasants rarely resorted to violence to resist to 
the policies implemented by the government, they began considering alternative 
ways to circumvent the law. One of the most used solutions was to hide the grain 
needed to survive in advance and hope not to be found out by the procurement 
officers. Trying to save themselves, desperate peasants thus resorted to burying 
stacks of grain in the yards, hiding handfuls under the pillows, firewood piles, and in 





some cases, in outhouses, or even under animal manure and graveyards.140 The 
development of such practices became so common that they transformed each 
procurement visit to the villages into a cat and mouse game. But just as the villagers 
grew more and more desperate to save themselves, so were the procurement 
authorities who were tasked to collect the required amount of grain.  
 
Special teams composed of procurement supervision members (du li ban) 
and search members (sou he ban) were hence assembled by local officials and 
police departments to assist in the collection of grain. Equipped with shovels and 
wooden sticks, the procurement teams would go from house to house, poking 
around and searching for any suspicious corners and rummaging through any 
potential hiding spots until late in the evenings. In the case of an unsuccessful 
search, a beating would be given to whoever remained in the household and had 
failed to flee from the sights of the search teams, for having “wasted their time”, or 
for having hidden the grain too well.141 On the other hand, if anything was found, 
peasants would automatically receive a severe beating as well, mainly as a 
punishment for disobeying the procurement policies, and also to “reward” the 
inspectors for defeating the peasants at their own game.142  
 
In some other instances, local officials would simply refuse to play the game 
at all. Rather than dedicating manpower only to the hunt for grain, procurement 
teams had decided instead that peasants who fell short of their quotas were to be 
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taken away by the authorities as “hostages”, with the only condition for release, to 
have their “ransoms” paid in full.  Villager Li Fu, who lived with his family near 
Huachuan County in 1941, was once the unfortunate victim of such dreadful 
experiences. Growing up in a poor family, Li became a swineherd for the local 
landlord Wei Guofeng in the neighbouring village of Wengang after his father, a 
farm labourer, lost his job due to his illness and inability to work effectively in the 
fields. Even though Li’s family had no land registered under their names nor were 
they the proprietaries of any crops, procurement officers still made their way to Li’s 
household doorsteps, giving them an ultimatum. Either they handed in the 
specified amount of grain within the next two days, or their son would be taken 
away as “mortgage”. Fearing for their son’s safety, Li’s parents instructed him to go 
away and hide for a few days, until the heat died down. However, three days later, 
when the officials returned and discovered that Li was not home, they took the 
family’s youngest son instead, without any explanation. “I do not have any solution 
for you,” one of the officials said to the parents as they were about to leave, “the 
orders came from above, I will give you five more days to collect the necessary 
grain to trade for your son, otherwise we will send him away for labour duties.” 
After the authorities left, Li’s parents cried and wailed desperately as they knew it 
would be impossible for them to get the required grain in time. Not bearing to lose 
their youngest son, Li’s mother proposed to his father to sell her and use the money 
to redeem her son back. “If you do not sell me, our entire family will starve to death 
anyway”, cried his mother as his father ultimately agreed to her suggestion. The 
following day, Li’s father found a buyer through a trustee in the county. With the 
intention of purchasing a wife for his mute brother to marry back in Shandong 
province, the buyer, who was the owner of an oil mill, agreed to pay a sum of 350 
yuan and took the woman away. After receiving the money, Li’s father quickly 
headed back to town and purchased the required amount of grain, and managed to 
get his son back before it was all too late.143 Surely, to the Li household, such 
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extreme measures taken by the local officials were barely distinguishable from the 
acts of banditry that plundered the countryside in the early years of Manchukuo. In 
a way, both exploited the peasants to great lengths, and both had a “justifiable” 
reason for doing so. The main difference between the two tormenters was that the 
Manchukuo authorities systematically “pillaged” the villages, seized everything they 
could, and demanded more every time. In contrast, bandits were more likely to 
limit their pillaging and demands to the things they needed for their survival. 
 
If from a distance, such appalling stories about grain procurement in the 
rural regions seem like unfortunate and isolated incidents, the cruel realities of the 
countryside suggested otherwise. In the villages surrounding Wangkui County, 
more than 30 cases of suicide were recorded within five days, right after the 
imposition of grain procurement. In 1943, it was noted in Fengtian province that a 
large proportion of the peasants living in the jurisdiction of Fushun County had 
already starved to death, while the situation in many villages adjacent to the 
northwest of Shenyang County was no better.144 Indeed, the dreadful situation was 
so alarming that even the Japanese gendarmerie commanders garrisoned across 
the regime began to worry about the potential damage such demands forced onto 
the peasants would cause to the long-term stability of the state. In May 1942, it was 
reported in Harbin that “The peasants [were] having doubts and also expressed 
their hatred towards the [Compulsory Grain Sale] policies. Some [had] already given 
up on themselves and chose beggary instead. The most essential element in the 
agricultural sector is the peasants. But now they have all lost motivation towards 
agricultural production.”145 Two days after, a similar concern was evoked by the 
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commander in Qiqihar, with great emphasis on the consequences of the 
procurement methods carried out by the local counties: “The local administrators 
completely disregarded the bad harvest of last year and forced the peasants to turn 
in grain that they do not have… [As a result] the lives of the peasants have been 
trampled down and now a countless number of them have died due to starvation 
and sicknesses.”146 In May 1943, an anonymous letter addressed to Qu Bingshang, 
the governor of Siping Province, incriminated the man, cursing him: “Ever since you 
became governor, the grain output target increased every year. Tell me how can we 
survive an entire year on just 15 kilograms of grain? You made old people, young 
children, and our livestock starve to death. Their spirits will haunt you. We wish we 
could sleep on your corpse and eat your flesh.”147  
 
Indeed, it was evident that many within the government clearly understood 
that the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy was incoherent. However, under the 
tremendous pressures generated by the urban shortage crisis as well as the war, 
one could also understand the reasons behind why the Manchukuo government 
was making incoherent decisions. But at the same time, what the Manchukuo 
authorities failed to comprehend was that even if the shortage crisis continued, its 
urban residents could still, to a certain extent, rely on their earnings or established 
connections to obtain daily necessities for survival. But if the villagers were 
completely stripped of their crops, there would be nothing else left for them to 
depend on. 
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 The enormous hardships that the grain procurement quotas inflicted upon 
the villagers brought about dramatic changes to the social dynamics in the 
Manchukuo countryside. For the impoverished peasants, one of the few remaining 
options to survive was to flee from their villages altogether and try their luck in the 
cities, which some did.148 For those who could not afford to leave everything behind, 
another possible solution was to seek help and relief from the local wealthy 
landowners. Unfortunately, help did not come around cheaply. As discussed further 
above in this chapter, personal connections in urban regions presume a form of 
reciprocity that required each party to receive personal favours from the other in 
exchange for something else, may this be goods, services, or access to anything. As 
for the countryside, this suggests that for poverty-stricken peasants who had 
nothing to offer, to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with the big 
landowners meant that they would have to tweak the terms of their agreement. 
 
 For the most part, what the peasants wanted was nothing more than a full 
stomach, and what they were required to do in exchange was to serve as the 
landowner’s “farm helps”. In the modern sense, becoming a farm help would 
normally suggest the employment in a contractual job regulated by standard 
working hours and salaries, but this definition was far from the case in the 
Manchukuo countryside. To minimize work delays and disruptions, landowners 
implemented a work routine which the “farm helpers” had to stick to. The typical 
day of a Manchukuo farm helper usually started early in the morning before 
daybreak. When they returned in the afternoon, further work was awaiting them, 
varying from digging trenches, shovelling manures, painting walls to layering 
paddocks. Unsurprisingly, farm helpers were seldom allowed any time to take a 
break. Sick leave was also strictly prohibited, and taking time off during the 
weekends was, out of the question. Most farm helpers were required to work seven 
days a week, for eleven months a year. As a matter of fact, disgruntled peasants 
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working as farm helpers who contemplated quitting halfway would be immediately 
reminded by the landowners of the reasons why they originally sought after them 
in the first place. “Go to work or return my money now, the grain that I lent you 
were for emergency purposes only”, “If you quit and go back home in the morning 
then I will have you arrested by the time you finish lunch”.149 On top of being 
deprived of personal freedom, most hired farm helpers would actually end up 
owing money to the landowners because of the accumulation of trivial favours they 
received from the landowners, and also because of “insufficient” working hours.150 
Hence, apart from not officially being the legal property of the landowners, 
“serfdom” would be appropriate to describe the relationship between farm helpers 
and landowners. 
 
 On the other hand, this sense of exploitation that existed between 
landowners and peasants could also be reflected in the customary practices of 
personal connections between landowners and local officials. To begin with, Mitter 
has illustrated how county-level elites were empowered by the Japanese to 
preserve and uphold the existing social order and stratum in the early years of 
Manchukuo. 151  This argument could be further extended down to the 
empowerment of influential rural landowners in their respective villages. Despite 
the great burden that the procurement of grain had placed on the rural regions, 
wealthy landowners were regularly filtered by the local authorities who lowered 
the quotas for them so that they would not have to turn in their full share. When 
procurement brigades arrived in the villages, they were also habitually hosted by 
the landowners who entertained the officers with good food as well as opium in 
exchange for the “guests” to discharge the landowners from heavy grain 
impositions.152 Under such circumstances, the social discrepancies in the rural parts 
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of Manchukuo between the rich and poor grew even further as ordinary peasants 
were reduced to having to beg for food, while the wealthy remained wealthy, if not 
growing wealthier.  
 
The way such favours were returned could be seen through the role of 
wealthy landowners in the grain procurement process. This was especially evident 
in the ways in which landowners made use of their position to motivate peasants to 
contribute towards the procurement targets. In Fengtian village, the local 
landowner Li Xianting could be heard making declarations to encourage the 
peasants to work harder to reach the procurement targets. Sounding like the 
authorities’ spokesperson delivering a message to the peasants, he reminded the 
peasants how “the Japanese took good care of us, it is our duty to repay them by 
turning in more grain. There will be further rewards later on”. To some extent, local 
peasants who were chained to the landowners because of outstanding debts had 
few options and most often, would comply with those demands.153 Given their low 
status, ordinary peasants were never in a position to turn down “favours” when 
they were asked for one, even if it meant putting themselves in a worse situation. 
Additionally, in times when ordinary peasants ran out of food to survive, they could 
always go back to the big landowners and borrow some more if they maintained a 
good “relationship” with the latter. This, however, also means that they would 
enter into a vicious cycle wherein they had to borrow not only to eat, but also to 
pay back previous debts.  
 
Outsiders visiting any village in Manchukuo in the 1940s would easily be 
able to distinguish the wealthy landowners from the rest of the peasantry. Certainly, 
with the help of their connections, the wealthy ones were able to maintain a 
relatively “civilized” way of living. Being high above the others in terms of social 
status, and therefore in an advantageous position to fulfil the procurement targets, 




wealthy landowners were also often the beneficiaries of grain procurement prizes 
that were rewarded to peasants who managed to meet their quotas early on. Such 
prizes included yards of fabric, soap, hand towels and wash basins. In Fengtian 
village, scraps of fabric and poor-quality commodities that were undesirable to the 
landowner were distributed to the peasants. According to the “benefactor’s 
charity”, scraps was all the peasants deserved insofar as “the quality of grain you 
[the peasants] sold to the authorities were poor to begin with, and that makes you 
a dishonest person. The grain that I sold were much more superior in quality, and 
that is why I deserved the good quality ones”.154  
 
In contrast, common peasants could be easily identified by their lack of 
proper clothing, pale and thin faces, as well as their ability to handcraft makeshift 
goods. He Shanshui, a peasant living in Tongbei village in the province of 
Heilongjiang province in 1940 recalled: 
 
“… Like most other families in my village, we always heard about the 
distribution of commodities, but we never received anything. That all 
went to the wealthy households because they were well connected. 
At best we were given some large chunks of salt that reeked to 
marinate soybean paste with. Missing meals were not uncommon, 
and we did not have any proper clothes to wear. In fact, we never 
had any soap, so we could never really wash our clothes. If we 
wanted to wash our face, we would go to whoever that was 
slaughtering pigs to borrow some trotters, and then mix it with 
alkaline and soil to break it in smaller pieces to use as soap. 
Otherwise, my family would take the ashes of incinerated yellow 
soybeans and rub that up to use to clean ourselves …”155 
 
 On top of having to develop their improvisation skills, peasants had to be 
able to make use of the limited resources at hand. When asked about his 
                                                        
154 Ibid. 
155 He, Shanshui. Personal Interview with Qiunan Li. Benxi, 29 October 2015. 
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experiences in the 1940s, Liang Guangshan from Liangjia village near Benxi County 
stated: 
  
“…My family would always have dinner by the time the sun set, and 
my father would light up the oil lamp. However, in order to preserve 
oil, the lamp would only be lit for five minutes at the most, just 
enough for my family to lay out the mats on the brick bed as well as 
getting ready to sleep. There are 18 people in my family, and we all 
sleep on the same bed. There was no sleepwear, not even shirts so 
we all had to sleep naked. I had only one pair of shoes that my 
mother made for me. Whenever I went outside, I would always take 
them off and carry the shoes in my hands in fear of wearing them out 
because I would have to wear them for at least two or three years. In 
the winter I would wear shoes made out of wula grass that was 
stuffed with corn leaves inside and tied together with a rope. It 
always ground my foot, but we had to make do with it because we 
could not afford to buy socks.”156 
 
 All in all, the fact that the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy resulted in 
catastrophic effects in the countryside is unquestionable. Even though the 
procurement of grain was a procedure promulgated by the central government, 
the regime’s decision makers were not the only ones to blame for the hardships in 
the rural regions. Indeed, for the most part, the everyday life of the peasants 
revolved around an endless struggle to obtain grain which drastically worsened 
when the establishment of personal connections became an inescapable norm in 
the rural society. Different from how connections, or “friendships” were 
maintained between shop owners and influential figures in the cities, the 
connections that existed between wealthy landowners and peasants in rural 
societies were far more one-sided, and the exploitative nature of such relations 
was comparable to serfdom. However, at the same time, although these relations 
were initiated by poorer peasants who knew very well that they had nothing to 
offer in return to balance the relationship with the landowners; very often, the 
choice of “serfdom” was the only option they had if they wanted to survive.   
                                                        





 On the whole, it was not surprising that Manchukuo was on the verge of 
economic collapse by 1945. During its fourteen years of existence, the daily 
routines of its citizens repeatedly underwent dramatic changes. While some people 
experienced slight improvements, the vast majority suffered from the degradation 
of their already mediocre quality of life. Indeed, following the creation of the 
regime in late 1931, both rural and urban regions witnessed a sharp decrease in 
living standards, accompanied by the upsurge of banditry and financial turmoil. 
Uncertainty and instability characterized the early years of the regime, during which 
a sizable part of the population suffered tremendous losses. In contrast, some 
others turned the people’s hardships and turmoil into opportunities to make 
fortunes, and attempted to enrich themselves, often through dishonest means at 
the expense of their peers. To some extent, the ambient sense of uncertainty was 
slowly dispelled for a short while by the successful unification of the dishevelled 
currency system, as well as with the implementation of taxation reforms. With 
businesses brought back to life, the defeated Manchukuoans began developing 
optimism. 
 
As the years progressed, the various discomforts of the Manchukuoans’ 
everyday lives were gradually replaced by visions of future abundance, only to be 
prematurely interrupted by the sudden outbreak of war in 1937. Later on, the 
authorities implemented a new distribution and rationing systems to ensure the 
circulation of goods in the regime. Although such schemes were designed to 
provide a fair distribution of goods to the population, the average Manchukuoan 
soon discovered that standing in line for hours to claim their rations would not give 
them access to any of the retailed goods unless they had the right “friends” to help 
them procure those. In a way, it can be said that by taking control over the 
circulation of commodities and general goods, as well as how those should be 
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allocated, the Manchukuo government assumed the complete responsibility for the 
general well-being of its subjects. At the same time, the fact that in order for the 
society to function, the authorities regularly had to intervene and deploy efforts to 
empower its regional officials also indicated that the regime was not yet operating 
in the ways that the Manchukuo government had initially planned. The seemingly 
never-ending hardships experienced by the ordinary people during the early days of 
Manchukuo were a clear example of the extent to which daily activities could be 
disrupted during times of crises. The weight of life in Manchukuo, therefore, caused 
people living under the regime to prioritize themselves at all times in order to 
ensure survival. This included local officials, as well as influential members in the 
society, who naturally prioritized their own skin first, which caused further 
hardships for ordinary Manchukuoans. 
 
Traces of privilege and the practice of personal connections can be found in 
all kinds of societies. One of the most comparable parallel to the case of 
Manchukuo could be the case of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, since both regimes 
witnessed the introduction of similar distribution and rationing systems, and 
wherein the daily routines of the peoples were subjected to drastic disruptions and 
changes under the development of each regime’s respective Five-Year Plan.157 
However, this thesis also argues that the experiences of ordinary people in 
Manchukuo stand out from the common war-time experiences of other countries 
not only because the regime was the sole allocator for all things commodities, but 
also because of the puppet state’s heavy reliance on Japan for all trade 
procurements, which inevitably exacerbated the scarcity of goods as the war 
progressed. As a distinct feature of Japanese occupation, this was also evident in 
the case of Shanghai, where comparable shortages occurred due to the Japanese 
military operations.158 With shortages crises settling and taking on various forms, 
                                                        
157 See Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism. 
158 For the case of Shanghai see Christian Henriot and Wen-Hsin Yeh eds., In the 
Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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the importance for people to continually secure access to goods became crucial. 
Subsequently, different types of “friendships” gravitating around goods were 
established, at the cost of the unprivileged ordinary masses whose every day was 
made increasingly unbearable by the severity of the shortages. In the countryside, 
the peasants’ living standards also continued to decline after the implementation of 
the Compulsory Grain Sale Policy. In an attempt to uphold the supply of staple 
foods, unrealistic procurement targets were assigned by the central government, 
which the local authorities ensued to carry out, usually using brute force. Starvation 
eventually became a common state of being, which triggered some peoples’ 
survival instincts to seek relief from wealthy landowners, who in return exploited 
the lives of the ordinary peasants even further. 
 
Overall, the rationing and distribution systems that the Manchukuo 
government painstakingly implemented were undermined by its own unwillingness 
to face the consequences that emerged from the prevalence of abusive use of 
personal connections. For the central authorities, the ability to determine who 
could be entitled to anything within the regime, and how they were to use it 
efficiently, was not an easy task, especially since there was no experience to draw 
on. When things went wrong, it was a matter of readjustment for the government, 
but it was very often a matter of life and death for the ordinary masses. 
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To begin with, housing can refer to a building structure wherein individuals 
reside safely, a roof under which people can settle for generations, a hearth 
wherein people live their daily routines, and an everyday private space that 
provides a sense of security. However, for Manchukuoans, none of those 
characteristics could be vouched for. Safe housing structures were a luxury the 
ordinary Manchukuoan could not afford, settling down under a roof was impossible 
for most people who were either at the mercy of bandits, government policies, or 
greedy landlords, daily routines were constantly disrupted by endless relocations, 
and private space was an unimaginable comfort that vanished as overcrowded 
spaces became a norm. In the midst of uncertain tomorrows, the daily lives of 
ordinary people in Manchukuo were characterized by a miserable living 
environment, a grave lack of the most basic amenities, and by overcrowding. Such 
were the elements that characterized the routine life for many, and it meant that 
being able to have a roof over their heads was not a given as Manchukuoans had to 
juggle between unreasonable rent prices and homelessness amid a housing crisis. 
Although the majority of Manchukuoans detailed in this chapter were not homeless, 
their inability to secure adequate housing throughout the different stages of the 
regime inevitably called for a sense of “homelessness”, which was not an unfamiliar 
feeling for the ordinary people of Manchukuo. 
  
To understand the sense of “homelessness” among the Manchukuoans, it is 
necessary to examine the reasons behind the occurrence of the housing crisis as 
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well as how such issues impacted on the daily life of the people. This chapter begins 
with an overview of the social disturbances in the countryside that resulted in the 
abnormal flow of rural refugees to the cities. Following the various efforts made by 
the government to restore peace in the rural areas, this chapter then details how a 
big portion of Manchukuo’s rural population was forced to abandon their homes 
and relocate to newly established collective villages that resulted in a sharp 
decrease in the people’s living conditions. Next, this chapter turns to examine the 
impact of rapid modernization, and how the exceptional growth of Manchukuo’s 
urban population exacerbated housing shortages, showing how, in contrast to 
incontestable improvements in the infrastructures of the modernized cities, the 
living conditions of many Manchukuoans were marked by discomforts that had 
become the new normal. Finally, this chapter looks into the conflictual relationships 
between landlords and tenants, and the failed attempt made by the government to 
control and regulate rent prices in the cities. Overall, this chapter reflects on the 
impact of Japanese-induced modernity on ordinary people in Manchukuo, and 
discussed how under the “self-sacrificial” efforts of the Japanese to construct the 
puppet state, the livelihoods of ordinary Manchukuoans were sacrificed instead 




4.2. Displacements of Peoples and Forced Migrations 
 
Without a doubt, the early years of Manchukuo were severely marked by 
the damages caused by the rise of banditry that wreaked havoc in all corners of the 
regime. And as raids and attacks on villages multiplied, the political turmoil which 
the Mukden Incident had generated soon paralyzed the normal operationality of 
the rural society. The previous chapter provided extensive details on the 
subsequent economic damage extended by the social unrest in the countryside, 
and explained how the financial turmoil affected the routines of the people. 
Unfortunately, this was only a portion of what the Manchukuoans had to suffer 
through. And the more the bandits proliferated in the countryside, the more the 
rural population’s feeling of insecurity increased, along with uneasiness and fear. As 
the Kwantung Army reported on 27 October 1931, “the sudden surge of bandits 
and deserting soldiers from the old warlord regime has run rampant everywhere”.1 
And in addition to this, “they hurt and kill people, conduct arson, rape, kidnappings 
and robberies regardless of where they are, there is no evil deed that they have not 
already committed.”2 For many Manchukuoans living under the pressures of being 
the bandits’ next targets, the message that such reports conveyed by the 
Government meant that they could not rely on the new authorities to protect their 
livelihoods, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
 
In contrast, since urban areas were guarded by Japanese troops and local 
garrison regiments, living in towns and cities was relatively safe compared to living 
in the countryside. As a result, cities began witnessing a considerable number of 
peasant-refugees roaming in in waves and occupying its streets. In urban Panshi 
County, for instance, flows of helpless peasants were transported in regularly from 
the nearby villages several times per day. As could be read in daily reports, refugees 
                                                        
1  Manzhouguo zhi’anbu jingwusi, Manzhouguo Jingcha Shi (The History of 




arrived “while holding the old by the arms and the young by the hands; they came 
with all of their possessions or whatever they [had] left with them in hope of safety.” 
When asked “Why would you abandon your livelihoods and come here?”, they 
would often answer, wearily, that “the harassments from bandits [had become] 
unbearable”, leaving them no other choice but to leave, even though they had “no 
savings nor means to support themselves in the county”.3 Such occurrences were 
not isolated. In fact, it was reported that the urban County of Lujiatun saw a wave 
of refugees from the countryside swarming into the town. Within a few days only, 
panic-stricken refugees had rented away all the vacant rooms and houses in the 
county, which resulted in a new form of shortages, this time of housing.4 In the 
provincial capital of Heilongjiang, asylum seekers became a serious issue as they 
came flocking in masses, also renting out all the vacant accommodation, leaving 
hotels and hostels overcrowded by desperate villagers looking for a place to settle 
down in the city.5 In Fengtian, the former capital of the warlord administration, as 
well as the biggest city in the region, it was reported that a total number of 14,713 
new residents had settled in the city in just under a month, increasing its population 
with an additional 3,554 new families who all sought a more stable life, or at least, a 
semblance thereof.6 Indeed, for the peasants used to making a living out of working 
in the fields, leaving the countryside to resettle in urban areas implied having to 
start everything from scratch. With no means to make a living in the cities, 
relocating was not the ideal choice, but was nonetheless a decision they each had 
to make in order to survive. For long-time urban dwellers, on the other hand, the 
continuous and abnormal surge of rural migrants was inevitably unwelcomed, 
which once again, generated new problems and tensions on top of the already 
harsh situation. 
 
                                                        
3 SJSB, 5 May 1932. 
4 SJSB, 3 June 1932. 
5 SJSB, 20 January 1932. 
6 SJSB, 17 February 1932. 
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The seemingly unending waves of villagers fleeing the countryside placed 
tremendous stress on the receptive capacities of the cities, thus resulting in the 
fluctuation of housing prices. For example, in Tieling, the average rent prices 
skyrocketed from a mere three to four yuan per month to over 30 yuan per month 
due to the high demand.7 In the newly established capital of Manchukuo, rent 
prices tripled, affecting all accommodations available in the city, regardless of their 
standing or quality. By August 1932, it was reported that even the wealthiest 
tenants residing in the city were having difficulties meeting the rent due dates. At 
the same time, average families who were already struggling to make a living in the 
midst of financial hardships were also faced with eviction orders when they failed 
to pay their rents.8 Since the authorities did not formally prohibit landlords from 
freely setting prices on their rented properties, countless greedy property owners 
were reported to increase their monthly rents. More than three times a month on 
average, and without giving proper notice or explanation for their decisions, 
landlords would just appear on their tenants’ doorsteps to collect the inflated rents. 
“It is impossible for the average tenant with their old and young waiting to be fed at 
home to sustain a living anymore, we have nowhere else to go and nobody cares 
about our situation,” protested Yu Dehai, a tenant residing in Yanji. “If there are no 
restrictions [on the landlords], the long-term effect will be devastating, the poor 
will all either starve to death in their home, or freeze on the streets and the 
roadside ditches.” 9  And yet, in spite of such overwhelming price surges, the 
demand for vacant rooms remained strong, though in short supply, if available at all.  
 
As rents prices increased persistently, tensions between devastated tenants 
and their landlords inevitably began to rise throughout the regime. On the one 
hand, rent-seekers and tenants alike multiplied attempts to haggle down prices as 
much as possible with only a lucky few of them managing to come to a reasonable 
agreement with the property owners who generally refused to budge even a bit in 
                                                        
7 SJSB, 1 March 1932. 
8 SJSB, 24 August 1932. 
9 SJSB, 3 November 1932. 
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face of the strong housing demands. From time to time, some tenants fed up with 
the intransigent attitudes of their landlords would take the issue to the authorities, 
which resulted in local police departments being deluged every day with letters 
asking for interventions in their favour.10  Nevertheless, despite the impending 
housing crisis, local officials disregarded the people's complaints, and however 
frequent or widespread they were, showed little concern towards the tenants' calls. 
Indeed, compared to the financial turmoil that was overwhelming the lives of all, 
the chaos caused by the turbulence in the housing market was considered to be 
minor collateral damage. Moreover, as a way to evade responsibility for the 
misbehaviour of urban landlords which were at the centre of the people’s 
complaints, the authorities pushed the blame onto the remnants of the legacy of 
“old and bad habits” cultivated during the old warlord regime.11  However, in 
contrast to the attitudes of the authorities avoiding the issue, landlords were much 
more active in responding to the complaints of their tenants. Unfortunately for the 
latter, the formers’ strategies to settle disputes often involved the use of physical 
violence. 
 
Landlord Wang was one example. He was the owner of several properties 
located in the northern outskirts (Xiao bei men) of Fengtian. On a cold night in 
October 1932, Wang decided to pay his tenants a visit after uninvited police officers 
had shown up at his door and asked him questions following a complaint filed 
against him: 
 
“…without any prior notice, Wang went to [tenant] Shi’s home and 
demanded for his pending rents to be paid immediately. Although 
Shi attempted to reason and discuss the issue with him, Wang 
refused to listen to any his excuses. Conflict began to break out as 
Shi refused to comply to Wang’s unreasonable request.”12 
                                                        
10 SJSB, 30 March 1932.  
11 Ibid.  




It was only when concerned neighbours started to cluster outside Shi’s house that 
the ruckus was finally brought to an end –though too late. Shi and his wife were 
both severely wounded during the nightly brawl in which Shi suffered from severe 
bleeding all over his face while his wife sustained injuries from trying to dissuade 
the two parties from fighting. And even so, after hours of dramatic supplications, 
yelling, and fighting, the argument ended with Shi succumbing to Wang’s 
unreasonable demands. The former paid his rent early as initially commanded, and 
the latter returned to his home with a pocket full of cash.13 Indeed, much of what 
happened that night reflects the power imbalance that commonly existed between 
tenants and landlords all over the regime. Despite landlords’ unethical behaviour, 
tenants often had little choice other than to meet their demands out of fear. This 
was further reinforced by the landlords’ given rights to evict tenants at their own 
discretions, especially if they were considered to be “problematic”. Tenants’ fates 
were at the mercy of landlords who profited from the housing crisis. Indeed, 
property owners were well-aware of their power and therefore took advantage of 
the state-wide crisis, knowing that few tenants would dare move out of their own 
accord or refuse to pay the increased rents since they would be unlikely to find 
alternative housing anywhere else given that the crisis affected the entire regime.  
Being thrown out at the whim of their landlords was one of most urban residents’ 
worst fears, as it equated to becoming homeless and having to live on the streets.  
 
However, this was not all. Because of the uncontainable influx of asylum 
seekers in the cities, the local police departments in all provincial capitals, second-
tier cities and counties were tasked with conducting an initial household census 
with the purpose of ferreting out “illegal individuals and lurking bandits” in 
residential quarters with a concentration of rural migrants. Moreover, a “household 
master (hu zhang or yuan zheng)”, usually an individual with good connections to 
the local officials, was appointed in each neighbourhood. Household masters were 




responsible for the monitoring of residents and were instructed to report any 
“illegal behaviour and suspicious conducts” that occurred under their jurisdiction.14 
In parallel to the appointments of new household masters, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs introduced a new unique identification system. The Temporary Certificate of 
Identity consisted of the only proof of identity for the Manchukuoans to 
differentiate themselves from bandits and political dissidents, and was required to 
be carried at all times in case of random inspections.15 Empowered with such 
authority, household masters had the permission to dislodge and report to the 
police any tenants who failed to provide the necessary documents to prove their 
identity and place of origin. Tenants would then either be convicted as bandits, or 
be repatriated to the countryside.16 Overall, it can be said that the Manchukuo 
government implemented such measures across the regime as a way to solve the 
housing crisis that had spread in urban areas in the early 1930s. The authorities’ 
efforts to inhibit and regulate the migratory flows to the urban regions instead of 
relieving the tensions between property owners and their tenants suggested that 
the government believed the root cause of the housing problems in the cities to 
stem primarily from the countryside. This further supposes that by getting rid of the 
disturbances troubling the rural regions, the housing crisis in the cities would sort 
itself out and come to end. This reasoning was applied through the different 
policies and interventions carried out by the Manchukuo authorities. 
 
In an attempt to patch up the damage in the rural regions, the State Council 
formally announced on 31 October 1932, under Order No. 62, the creation of a 
new Countryside Rectification Committee (Qing xiang wei yuan hui). The 
reorganization of the Committee included new subdivisions where all established 
Provincial Committees were subordinated to one Central Committee. The Central 
Committee consisted of the Minister of State Affairs acting as the Chairman, senior 
                                                        
14 SJSB, 2 July 1932; See also SJSB, 22 December 1932; Heihe sheng gongshu, Diyihui 
xianzhang huiyi yishilu (The proceedings of the first county council meeting) (Heihe: 
Heihe sheng gongshu, 1935), p. 63. 
15 SJSB, 19 October 1932. 
16 SJSB, 2 July 1932; See also SJSB, 22 December 1932. 
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advisors from the Military and Political departments, the General Director of the 
State Council, as well as Ministers from various departments acting as members. 
Provincial Committees on the other hand, was composed of provincial governors 
acting as heads, and local garrison commanders, military advisors and chiefs of 
police departments as members of the committee.17 The fact that all levels of the 
Committee included both government officers and military members suggest that 
the authorities were aware that restoring order in the countryside was such 
colossal task that it would require more than implementing new administrative 
rules. Even though political concerns prioritized bringing back peace and order in 
the rural regions without turning them into ruins and minimizing collateral damages, 
the military component of the Committee believed otherwise. 
 
While the Manchukuo government was still exploring options to offer 
amnesty and enlistment possibilities to appease the bandits, the Kwantung Army 
was more than determined to conduct large-scale military actions instead.18 As such, 
during a meeting held on 13 June 1933, the Kwantung Army’s Chief of Staff 
expressed with resolution that the only means to restore law and order in the 
countryside was to resort to “force, and nothing else”. 19  In the face of such 
stubbornness, the Manchukuo government eventually agreed to allocate one 
million yuan every month, as per the demand of the Kwantung Army, to the 
operations, and for maintaining the costs stemming from all such plans. Moreover, 
county-level police forces and self-defence groups were further mobilized and 
                                                        
17 Ha’erbin shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Haerbin Shizhi (The Chronicle of 
Harbin) (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chuban she, 1993), p. 59; See also 
Manzhouguo zhi’anbu jingwusi, Manzhouguo Jingcha Shi (The History of 
Manchukuo Police), 188. 
18  For an overview of the banditry issue in Manchuria see Yaqin Li, “”Bandit 
Suppression” in Manchukuo (1932-45)” (PhD diss, Princeton University, 2012). 
19 “Guandongjun shishi de ‘saofei’ shouduan gaiyao (A summary of the Kwantung 
Army’s tactics of military operations to eliminate banditry),” in Dongbei ‘dataofa’ 
(The great ‘crusade’ in the northeast), Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian, eds., Zhongyang dang’an guan, Zhongguo di’er lishi dang’an guan, Jilin 
sheng shehui kexue yuan and Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua dang’an ziliao xuanbian 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991), p. 5. 
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trained by the Kwantung Army to participate directly in the counterinsurgency 
battles. 20  Nevertheless, despite the confidence expressed above and the 
tremendous sums invested to run the operation, limited progress was achieved 
during the initial phase of the campaign. In one of the reports compiled by the 
Kwantung Army staff, military deployment in the countryside was described as 
efforts that “had only cured the symptoms, but not the disease itself”. As stated in 
the report overview:  
 
“The largest group of bandits retreated to mountainous areas north of 
the South Manchuria Railway, and south of the Songhua River. The 
terrain is rough and rugged, and is largely covered by dense forests 
propitious to their settlement. These conditions created a good hideout 
for bandits to avoid our pursuits and attacks. The rich natural resources 
there also made it suitable for them to cultivate opium, trading it for 
weapons and ammunition and entrench their bases… Most of the bandit 
groups have now fled to remote mountainous zones, making it very 
difficult for us to conduct further operations.”21 
 
One of the main factors that contributed to the repeated failures of the 
military operations was linked to the peasants’ alleged “support” of certain bandit 
groups. The idea that peasants supported bandits may seem paradoxical since this 
suggests that the victims aided their tormentors, for bandits frequently raided 
villages, extorting grain from peasants, and more generally, because they were the 
main culprits behind rural disturbances. However, the peasants’ “support” was 
usually forced by bandits who often used coercive means to push local villages into 
submission in the face of the military operations conducted against them. In effect, 
bandits levied “protection taxes”, and expropriated so much local manpower for 
logistics supplies that they were able to establish various facilities that included 
                                                        
20  “Guandongjun guanyu Zhaohe shinian qiuji zhian suzheng dui manzhouguo 
fangmian de yaoqiu (Kwantung Army on the requirements of law and security to 
the Manchukuo government),” in ibid., p. 11. 
21 “Guandongjun canmoubu guanyu Zhaohe shi niandu qiuji zhian suzheng gongzuo 
gaikuang (A summary report by the Kwantung Army’s Staff on the public order work 
in autumn season),” in ibid., p. 13. 
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factories to finance their running battles against the Japanese military. When 
discovered by the Kwantung Army, military officials often expressed their 
astonishment vis-à-vis the bandits’ comprehensive organization. “Everything, from 
uniforms to blankets, is produced self-sufficiently.”22 Peng Shilu, a newly recruited 
fighter for the New Fourth Anti-Japanese Army (Xin si jun) in Manchuria even 
qualified life with the rebels as being “surprisingly comfortable”. Formerly a high 
school student from Zhiwu County, Peng had prepared himself to face hardships 
when he joined the rebels. On the contrary, he was taken aback when he found out 
that rebels kept a stockpile of supplies. One day, Peng discovered an abundance of 
provisions in the secret camp located near Fangzheng County in Heilongjiang 
Province: 
 
“…I asked someone in the group, where does all this food come from? 
Did you farm those yourselves? ‘No’, he replied as he glanced at me with 
surprise, ‘we never need to do any farming around here, we always rely 
on the peasants to deliver food for us.’”23 
 
Peng soon learned how rebel groups were organized and how the region was split 
into smaller territories each under the control of one rebel group. Each group could 
run its own territory and was to levy grain only within the boundaries of their 
respective resupplying areas. In return, villages that collaborated with them would 
receive protection from the repeated harassments of other bandit groups eyeing 
the area. As Peng was told by one of the rebels, “The northeastern villagers are 
such naïve and honest people. We ask them to deliver grain and they do exactly as 
told.” The rebel nevertheless acknowledged that without their help, it would have 
been “impossible to survive for sure [due to the Japanese military operations and 
blockades].” Another rebel who joined in their conversation added, “Absolutely. If 
they had guns, we would take them; if they had money, we would take it too. Since 
                                                        
22 Ibid. 
23 Peng Shilu, Wo zai kangri lianjun shinian (My ten years in the Anti-Japanese 
Resistance force) (Changchun: Jilin jiaoyu chuban she, 1992), p. 85. 
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they have none, it is normal that they give us grain. How can they possibly object to 
this?”24  
 
However, to the Kwantung Army, whether the peasants were coerced into 
cooperating with the bandits unwillingly or whether they did so voluntarily made no 
difference. The authorities indeed did not value the necessity to distinguish the 
underlying causes behind the behaviour of the peasants, and showed no mercy to 
whoever contributed to sustaining the bandits’ activities, whether it was directly by 
joining the bandits, or indirectly, by supplying them with anything instrumental to 
the bandits’ survival. As an officer of the Kwantung Army reluctantly noted in the 
progress report mentioned above, “Contrary to our expectations, the rural 
population and the bandits are not sworn enemies. The villagers usually have their 
own understanding of banditry in these regions. We can even safely assume that 
even though they do not dare to arm themselves with weapons or revolt against us, 
spiritually and mentally, the majority of the thirty million population of Manchukuo 
is no different from the bandits.” 25  Reporting to the central authorities, the 
observations emphasized how large and populous the rural population was, and 
how big of an obstacle peasants represented to the progress of the operations. 
Pressing the government to provide a swift solution to this problem, military 
commanders repeatedly stressed how much “the supportive and friendly allies of 
the bandits contributed to the various failures of the recent military operations”.26 
At the same time, with the backdrop of pressures from the international audience 
towards the regime’s legitimacy, the Japanese urged the Manchukuo government 
to solve the persisting issues in rural areas in a timely manner, which eventually led 
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to the introduction of “defensive collective villages (Shudan buraku/Ji tuan bu luo)” 
in the countryside. 
 
The original vision of “defensive collective villages” was drawn from prior 
experiments conducted in the province of Jilin in 1933. In effect, based on historical 
customs and also because of the Chuang guan dong (Crashing into Manchuria) 
movement dating back from the late Qing Dynasty, the formation of the villages in 
Manchuria was sporadic, scattered around arable resources and lands where an 
average of three to five households would settle in each location. However, such 
layouts gravely complicated all communication processes. The conveyance of 
instructions to rural communities all around Manchukuo was certainly inefficient 
and reached the people living in those areas irregularly. This then often resulted in 
lack of development in many of those more remote locations, rendering them 
impermeable to administrative power.27 With the rise of banditry, Panshi County 
Counselor Jiraiya Senju and E’mu County Counselor Takoi Motoyoshi proposed to 
relocate the dispersed rural families in the region by clustering them into larger and 
more concentrated collective villages so that local armed forces would be able to 
follow the authorities’ instructions as well as guard the clusters more easily.28 
Starting with households that resided in more remote areas, peasants were 
rounded up and rushed into the eight pilot collective villages near the Counties of 
Yanji, Helong, and Hunchun. As peasants were rapidly swept away from their 
homes, their left-behind dwellings were subsequently destroyed by the Japanese 
military to prevent bandits from using them as shelters.29 In the earlier stages of the 
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operation, many leaders within the government expressed scepticism about the 
initiative, arguing against it by pointing out the tremendous costs it involved. Since 
such methods were unprecedented, the results of the initiative provided valuable 
experiences in the making of Manchukuo’s rural relocation policies. 
 
The initial success of the pilot villages eventually caught the central 
government’s attention, who in return praised the experiment as “a unique and 
efficient strategy to separate the bandits from the rural population”.30 Soon enough, 
the collective villages in Jilin Province became a template for the other troubled 
regions in the regime to follow. Eventually, the Ministry of Civil Affairs officially 
approved of the program, which gained momentum under Order No. 969 in 
December 1934:  
 
“…with the establishment of defensive collective villages, we would be 
able to enforce law and order and save the people living in remote 
areas from banditry… under an orderly community life, we would be 
able to promote the spirit of self-governance, and prevent the people 
from walking in the wrong path by becoming accomplices of the 
bandits.”31 
 
To be precise, the typical defensive collective village was designed to receive 
up to 150 households and was built on carefully chosen terrain conducive to 
defensive purposes. Moreover, each collective village was meant to be constructed 
in a square shape, with forts overseeing the surroundings at each corner. Mud walls 
                                                                                                                                                            
data of the Anti-Japanese resistance army in the northeast), Zhongguo 
gongchandang lishi ziliao congshu, ed., Dongbei kangri lianjun shiliao bianxie zu 
(Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chuban she, 1987), vol. 2, p. 805.  
30  Guowuyuan tongji ting, Manzhouguo xianshi (The current situation of 
Manchukuo) (Hsinking: Manzhouguo tongxunshe, 1935), p. 186. 
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and trenches were also envisioned to further reinforce the periphery of the village. 
To enter and exit the community, residents would have to use the only gateway, a 
3.5-meter-wide double door situated on the side of the fort.32 Surely, with a strong 
resemblance to fortresses, the defensive collective villages were promoted as an 
infrastructure designed to offer protection to their inhabitants. But in reality, the 
main function of such structures was to isolate the peasants from unnecessary 
communications with the outside world, which inevitably generated new problems. 
 
Originally, and for the most part, the authorities introduced the defensive 
collective villages to secure and pacify the countryside. They however, still largely 
remained vague concepts which the Manchukuo government was not yet familiar 
with and knew little about how to actually enforce. When peasants were first 
informed about the relocation plans, many expressed dissent. Some refused to 
leave their homes, and others proceeded to file joint petitions to local 
gendarmeries, requesting to remain in their villages or at least, to postpone their 
displacement until after the end of the plowing season in spring.33 Liu Chunman, a 
villager in Heijuzishan village in 1934, recalled: “It was during the coldest days in the 
winter when we heard the news. Nobody wanted to move, where were we 
supposed to go? We had nowhere else to live; we would either starve or freeze to 
death [if we followed the orders].”34 In a report written to Tojo Hideki, who at the 
time was serving as the Kwantung Army Gendarmerie Commander, Captain Nakai 
from the Mudanjiang Gendarmerie expressed his concerns about the difficulties of 
executing his orders: 
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“For the sake of security, the Dongning County authorities planned to 
implement 23 collective villages within its borders…. The peasants are 
all depending on their farmlands to sustain life, but the relocated area 
has less arable land and is far from the collective villages, so there will 
be a reduction in harvests. Most of them believe that banditry is only a 
small problem [in the county]; if bandits could not be eliminated they 
can still be expelled from the region, but moving into the collective 
villages will have a more negative impact and create tremendous 
difficulties for them to be able to feed their families.”35 
 
Regardless of the peasants’ reasons for resisting the uncertainty impeding 
their daily routines, the authorities forcefully displaced and relocated millions of 
families to clusters more easily reachable for the Manchukuo authorities. Although 
it is necessary to take into account the peasants’ concerns to better understand 
their attitudes and negative reactions to the announcement of the new collective 
villages, in practice, it was difficult to distinguish whether peasants were hesitant to 
change because of the anxiety and fear of not being able to sustain a living in the 
new collective villages, or if they were reluctant to leave their old villages because 
they were too accustomed and emotionally attached to the places wherein most 
had spent sedentary lives. And in spite of the firm orders to relocate, many 
reluctant groups therefore acted with indifference, and chose to ignore the call 
altogether. However, the authorities interpreted this response as defiance, which 
triggered an arduous process to enforce clustering. The authorities thus opted for 
more radical methods to move the peasants into collective villages, and resorted to 
the use of violence and coercive means.  
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During the evening of 4 August 1933, two trucks full of Japanese garrison 
soldiers and local police forces arrived at the entrance of Qiupigou village. Panic 
began to break out as soon as the soldiers jumped out of the trucks and ordered 
the peasants to vacate their properties. “The police were igniting torches, and they 
were going to burn our houses. I was completely shocked when it happened,” 
recalled resident Cui Qinglan.36  It was only when a soldier scolded him that Cui 
came back to his senses and rushed to rescue whatever he had left in his home. 
Since fire quickly spread across the village, Cui and his wife only managed to salvage 
one sack of green corn while the rest of their belongings all turned to ashes. “Why 
are you all still here and not moving towards Xiapengjie? Do not expect to find a 
place to sleep anymore if you arrive late!”, yelled a soldier. Following his 
instructions, the destitute villagers faced the facts and came to the conclusion that 
they had no other choice but to head towards the assigned collective village.37 
When the soldiers and the police drove away, some villagers went back to their 
burnt houses looking for anything to salvage, while others went up to the 
mountains to find food. A number of villagers reticent to move to the collective 
village left in a hurry to search for a shelter to live in.  
 
Although the authorities promised security to the peasants once in the 
collective villages, no means of transportation was arranged to reach the new 
villages. Since families consisted of peoples of all ages, the trip from the old to the 
new village could last from a few days to more than a week. As a result, more than 
half of the displaced peasants had to find temporary shelters to spend the nights 
until they reached the assigned collective village, but only a handful of them was 
lucky enough to find a spot to sleep in warehouses, mill sheds or horse stables. “It 
was a complete disaster, a nightmare… but it was real, a living nightmare, it really 
happened in our lives”, shared Cui.38 The forceful relocation from Qiupigou thus 
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37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 97. 
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caused 38 out of the 97 households to be left homeless without shelter for the cold 
nights until they reached the destination. As a temporary solution, some managed 
to find classrooms in a nearby school to live in, while the most unfortunate ones 
had no choice but to build shacks to spend the night.39 When the peasants finally 
arrived at their destination, they discovered to their dismay that only some of them 
were to have their own dwellings. Lacking enough space to accommodate all the 
incomers, families were to share homes in the already packed collective village. 
Such forceful relocation methods became a standard practice employed by the 
military to drive people out of their homes to the designated villages. Moreover, 
anyone caught trying to return to their old villages risked being charged with 
“complicity” and “collusion with bandits”.40 To further discourage villagers from 
returning to their homes, the authorities made sure nothing could be salvaged from 
the burnt houses, burning any ruins to ashes. As it was described: “After the 
forceful relocations, the depopulated areas became desolated and lifeless. Pigs 
turned into wild boars and chickens became pheasants. People simply could no 
longer survive, and those who did not want to enter the ‘Renjuan’ (defensive 
collective villages) escaped to mountain caves to live like ape-men.”41 
 
Indeed, the term “Renjuan”, which literally translates as “pigsty for humans”, 
captures the essence of the misery of daily life experienced in the collective villages. 
In fact, the defensive collective villages could be compared to wastelands, empty 
vessels waiting to be filled. If the authorities had thought through the design of the 
defensive collective villages, their construction was often yet to be commenced or 
at best, just laid out. Upon arrival after a long and toilsome journey, peasants 
discovered unfinished vacant structures whose “defensive” purposes were either 
flawed or outright inexistent. In most cases, the new collective villages were just 
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intended to be the place peasants were told to go after being forced out of their 
home villages. Everything else needed to be built. The new inhabitants were not 
only required to contribute to the construction of fences, gates, and other 
defensive fortifications to protect the “Renjuan” from unwanted bandits, they were 
also ordered to prioritize the building of those protections over the building of their 
own homes.42  
 
Helpless, the villagers complied, settling for temporary huts primarily made 
out of rotten wooden sticks to solve their housing needs: grass mats and mud were 
used to cover the inner and outer layers of the hut, significantly reducing the living 
space to fit one bed only. Without any choice, larger pieces of furniture were 
commonly placed outside the hut whereas personal belongings needed to be 
covered with hay. Wealthier households who could afford additional space would 
set up separate straw sheds to store their cooking utensils, including stove top and 
pots and pans, whereas the average families could only afford to eat outside in the 
open air. In addition, cooking often became impossible on rainy days, and since 
there was no way to make a fire to boil pots under such weather conditions, it was 
not uncommon for the residents of the defensive collective villages to starve or 
choose to cook during irregular hours. Furthermore, water seeping down from the 
roofs and walls made out of mushy mud was also a common problem. For the 
completely deprived families who were unable to even gather the most basic 
materials to construct their primitive huts, the only solution was often to squeeze 
into the village forts to shelter themselves. Essentially, forts were divided into two 
floors, with each floor being three meters long and two meters wide, barely big 
enough to accommodate one family. With only a few blast-holes to serve as 
windows, the inner side of the forts was dark and damp all year round, making it 
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the ideal breeding ground for bed bugs and fleas.43 On the other hand, families that 
had managed to settle in a house in the collective villages did not have it easy either.  
 
Due to the high population density and limited housing availability, one 
home was required to accommodate at least three to four families, with eight or 
nine people sharing a single brick bed.44 As a result of such crowding, typhoid fever 
and dysentery, along with other common infectious diseases, started spreading 
rapidly, for one sick person would inevitably infect an entire household.45 Hence, 
“day and night, patients groaning in pain, children crying tearfully, mourning and 
endless grieving could be heard from one house to another” as villagers dying of 
illness were reported regularly.46 And even though the priority was given to the 
building of the fortification, peasants thought their precariousness would 
eventually come to end. However once again, the reality was otherwise.  
 
In order to build the facility, including the defensive forts and their own 
dwellings-to-be, peasants were provided with materials and supplies. However, 
since the majority of them were originally farmers, their craftsmanship skills were 
often non-existent, which resulted in defensive works being completed through 
trail and error. Since such works were prioritized over the building of homes, the 
resource wastage caused by their errors also meant that the remaining materials 
from the infrastructures that the peasants had spent months working on were no 
longer enough to build their own homes. Consequently, housing issues persisted, 
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gradually intensifying as displaced villagers had not only lost all their belongings 
when they were forced out of their villages, but were also stripped of any sense of 
security, contrary to the promises made by the Manchukuo government. All that 
these displaced Manchukuoans were left with were dwindled spirits and bitterness. 
Even so, living in temporary huts was by no means considered to be a durable 
solution, especially with the prospect of Manchuria’s cold winter seasons. To meet 
their needs and in preparation to fight lower temperatures, many resorted to 
upgrade their shelters into “majiazi (literally “horse shelves”), a cheap version of 
today’s semi-basement shacks, which gradually became the norm for housing in 
rural Manchukuo.47 
 
To be precise, the commonplace “majiazi” was constructed half a meter 
below ground level. Walls were two meters tall and built from mud and grass while 
sorghum stalks served as roofs, and ceilings were supported by a single wooden 
pole. Windows consisted of a layer of paper covering a small hole carved into the 
wall, making the rooms excessively dark. Instead of doors, straw curtains were used 
as an alternative, and the only way to get in and out of the hut was to crawl 
through the straws since the entrance was too low to walk under. Due to the 
materials used to construct such houses, proper indoor heating was impossible, 
which inevitably exposed its inhabitants to heavy moisture and frost during colder 
weather.48 As published in the America Magazine in 1937 in an article entitled “The 
Tokugawa Clan’s search for Credence”, T.A Bithorn compared the phenomenon of 
defensive collective villages in Manchukuo to rural prisons, observing:  
 
“…the so-called construction of the defensive collective villages is, in 
fact, a simple disguise to separate the peasants from the bandits with 
enforcement by the Japanese authorities. They forcefully relocated 
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one-tenth of their total population and burned down their houses, all 
without any compensation. Such five million peasants were also forced 
to engage in hard labour, as well as sharing the burden of material 
costs, excessive taxation, national defence donations and so on, forcing 
them to bear all of the obligations.”49 
 
All in all, despite the downsides of the operations, which were largely borne 
by the peasants, the Manchukuo government considered the implementation of 
the defensive collective villages to be successful in restoring its rural societies. In 
effect, as a result of the clustering of the previously dispersed villages, the raging 
issue of banditry in the countryside witnessed a steady decline over the years, with 
the number of bandits plummeting from over 360,000 in 1932 to merely 200 by 
1941.50 Surely, because of the persistent disturbances afflicting the regime in the 
early 1930s, it can be said that the Manchukuo authorities spent significant efforts 
to tackle the issue of rural security, not only because of international pressure, but 
also because the authorities’ foremost concern was to keep things running and 
prevent society from collapsing altogether. However, peace and order were 
restored at a tremendous price, at the expense of the peasants. Not only did they 
experience a sharp decline in living conditions, the long distances they had to walk 
from the defensive collective villages to the farmlands also caused a significant 
reduction in their cultivation possibilities, which inevitably resulted in the decline of 
personal incomes.  
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4.3. The Rise of Urban “Image Projects” 
 
While the Manchukuo government focused on restoring peace in the 
countryside, Japanese urban planners never ceased to develop plans to achieve 
their ambitions to create new cosmopolitan zones in the Far East. Prior to 
overtaking Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese had already made significant 
contributions towards city planning and had invested in the construction of new 
infrastructure in the northeastern region. Based on Russian colonial legacies, the 
Japanese expanded the small town of Dairen in the Kwantung Leased Territory into 
a mighty city decorated with timely and ample lighting. Modern facilities were built 
along newly paved streets, producing a stark contrast with the adjacent under-
developed Chinese cities. 51  The seizure of Manchuria following the Mukden 
incident allowed for even more freedom for architects and engineers alike to fulfil 
their ambitions and exercise their talents to the fullest. 
 
More than 209 cities and counties were involved in the Japanese grand 
vision to modernize the regime.52 Previously an ordinary and typical northeastern 
Chinese city with an estimated population of 90,000 in 1932,53  the capital of 
Manchukuo, Hsinking, underwent an extensive construction program put forward 
by Japanese urban architects to expand the city into a 200 square kilometre city 
capable of accommodating up to one million people.54 At the same time, major 
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financial and business institutions started appearing to decorate the city’s skyline, 
along with new government edifices, plazas, as well as the Imperial Palace, all built 
in quick succession; and despite such grandeur being intimidating, the magnificence 
of the new constructions was qualified as “the fusion of Eastern and Western 
architectural art”.55 In addition, city planners also took pride in their design of the 
urban ecosystems, wherein seven percent of the total public space in Hsinking was 
dedicated to the construction of public parks, sports fields, and plazas that were 
opened to all, far above the average ratio of green spaces in other urban areas, 
even compared to major western countries of the time.56  
 
While Hsinking was chosen to become Manchukuo’s political and 
administrative centre, Fengtian, being the largest and most prosperous city in the 
region, was thus designed to be the main hub of industrial development along with 
the more traditional mining cities of Andong and Harbin.57 Deemed by Louise Young 
as “a showpiece of modern industry”,58 Tiexi District, located in the city of Fengtian, 
expanded into an eight-square kilometre major industrial hub home to more than 
100 factories, with an additional 36 in construction and 48 more in planning by 
1939. As a direct result of the rapid industrialization, more than 80,000 migrant 
workers were drawn from all over the region, increasing the density of the city’s 
population significantly.59 Apart from first-tier cities, all second and third-tier cities, 
towns and counties in Manchukuo benefited from a varying degree of development 
due to the active construction of roads and railways. Investments to improve the 
overall infrastructure across the regime developed at a steady pace over the years. 
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In Fushun, for example, the mining city witnessed an almost nine-fold increase in 
expenditure, topping at 9,841,000 yuan in 1938 compared to the mere 1,292,000 
yuan spent in 1933. Investments to modernize Hsinking and Fengtian increased less 
than threefold over the same period, with respectively a total expenditure of 
38,227,000 yuan and 45,600,000 yuan in 1938.60 In line with what F.C. Jones 
described as “the chief feature of the epoch of Japanese rule”,61 Manchukuo even 
managed to exceed Japan in manufacturing for a brief period between 1936 and 
1940, which allowed the regime to enjoy a threefold increase in its GDP and a 
productivity index progress of more than 60 percent.62 Moreover, while older cities 
continued growing and benefitted from a nearly uninterrupted momentum, new 
emerging cities began raising their international profile. As a result of the swift 
municipal advancements achieved within the regime’s short fourteen years of 
existence, Manchukuo was even argued to have few equally or better-performing 
counterparts elsewhere nor in the history of the world.63 To be sure, the enormous 
sums poured into urban development were not only meant to remodel the 
Manchukuo cities, but also to improve the regime’s image, not just as a major 
exporter of raw industrial and agricultural goods, but also as a progressive state 
worthy of international recognition. After all, propaganda could always be 
disseminated with ease, but positive attention on the other hand, often had to be 
earned the hard way. 
 
Many of the Westerners who had the chance to visit Manchukuo in the mid 
to late 1930s often associated their experiences with amazement towards the 
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regime’s accomplishments in contrast to their expectations prior to their visits. 
“… we did not know what to expect and we had no idea of what Dairen would be 
like… Because it was the first place we saw, apparently it impressed us more than 
anything we had seen before or have seen since… Dairen was very much like a 
European city.” shared Lewis Schmidt, Chairman of the American student 
delegation to Manchukuo in 1938. “Hsinking was also a refreshing experience in 
many ways, because one half of the city, the new part, was very different, being 
more like what we would expect of any American city, and it was not as dusty as 
other sections of Hsinking or other Manchurian towns.”64 In 1939, similar remarks 
were articulated from a visiting Canadian amateur basketball team, whose team 
members showed no reserve when praising the metropolises that they had visited. 
More laudatory commentaries about the achievements and the prowess displayed 
by Manchukuo were commonly recorded by foreign visitors. “I felt that 
Manchoukuo has more possibilities than any country that I have seen so far in the 
Far East”, noted Al Beaton, a junior partner in a printing firm, “The Japanese have a 
lot of credit coming to them for financing this country and extending aid and 
helping Manchoukuo in putting law and order into effect immediately.”65 When 
commenting on the city’s growth, Dick Wright, a high school teacher stated: “the 
preparations must have been made for a hundred years ahead, to take care of an 
increase of 200,000 in a short time means that there is exceptional organization 
behind everything, the strides taken by Hsinking in seven years are remarkable. At 
the same rate, there should be about a million people here in five years.”66 Further 
describing the regime’s showcase city of Hsinking as “the model city for all 
civilizations to learn from”, Sonny Watson, a mining supervisor who played for the 
team added: 
 
 “I could not believe that the majority of buildings of Hsinking have 
been built within five years. It is tremendous and compared with 
Vancouver with a history of fifty years of building behind it, it is almost 
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incredible… I heard from an American newspaperman in Japan that 
Japan had done considerable development work in Manchoukuo, but 
when we came here I found that the development was on a much 
larger scale than I had ever dreamed.”67 
  
Indeed, the large number of Japanese urban planners actively involved in the 
building of Manchukuo not only shaped the regime’s identity and future, but 
further problematised the conventional understandings of informal imperialism.68 
Japan’s ability to mobilise its society to such magnitude further supports Young’s 
concept of “total empire”, where the nation-building project of Manchukuo was at 
the centre of its Pan-Asianist imagination. The grand and ambitious designs on the 
other hand, suggested a symbolic representation of Japan’s role to guide and lead 
other Asians into prosperity.  
 
 However, beneath the glamorous high-rise city landscapes, urban life for 
most of the Manchukuoans was grim, to say the least. In the eyes of the Japanese 
architects, the titanic task to transform Manchuria’s poorly designed cities into 
modern and orderly developed metropolises necessitated for them to start from 
scratch. But more often than not, starting from scratch also meant that they had to 
get rid of the existing building first. Despite the relatively rich history in the region, 
the city of Fengtian had formerly been belittled repeatedly as a “humiliation” by the 
Japanese.69 Judging the intricate yet disorderly state of the city’s old quarters, 
the Japanese considered the cityscape to have brought shame to Manchukuo, since 
it was thought to be “lacking any of the characteristics a cultural city should 
have”. 70  To make way for a development plan that involved a massive 
reconstruction and extension of 43,455 meters of asphalt pavements and another 
16,578 meters of gravel roads, countless houses that were considered to be 
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“obstructing traffic” or simply “a blot on landscape” were forcefully demolished 
without the residents’ consent, all in the name of modernization.71 Offered little to 
no compensation, many of the residents who received eviction notices protested 
fiercely, only to be eventually greeted with ultimatums and threats of 
imprisonment by the authorities.72 Once more, worse was still to come. 
 
 While it can be said that the urban planners redesigning Manchukuo were 
generally zealous in their efforts to pursue infrastructural accomplishments, few of 
them seemed to have anticipated the tremendous pressure that rapid 
modernization would bring to the cities’ limited reserves of water and land. The 
exceptional expansion of urban regions and the creation of better employment 
opportunities were accompanied by the stimulation of internal rural-urban 
movements as well as flows of migration from China proper. So not only did 
construction work contribute to depleting reserves, the high number of migrant 
workers attracted by such opportunities also drew on these resources. While in 
1933 the total population of Manchuria accounted for roughly 29,120,000 
inhabitants73, two years later, by the end of 1935, the number had increased to 
34,200,923.74 By 1940, the total population of Manchukuo had skyrocketed to 
43,202,880, reaching an impressive urbanisation rate of 11.9 percent, which raised 
the regime’s position to the ninth most populous state in the world.75 However, the 
cities’ development of infrastructures and facilities could not follow the pace at 
which the urban population was growing. For instance, with a 70 percent increase 
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of urban residents, the total growth rate of cities during the corresponding time 
period was no more than 47.8 percent.76 This inevitably brought about the over-
saturation of the cities. With the urban population increasing more rapidly than the 
capacity to receive them, Manchukuo cities began showing signs of resources 
deficiencies (which contributed to a series of shortages, as discussed in Chapter 
Three). Since the authorities had not yet found an effective mechanism in place to 
match the extraordinary rate of population growth, the strain on the cities 
persisted.  
 
As a consequence of the overpopulation in the cities, it became increasingly 
challenging for most people to find accommodation. “Zhu zhai nan (difficult to find 
housing)” was a popular expression among the average urban inhabitants in face of 
the inadequate amount of housing that was available. In Hsinking, “Did you find a 
place to live yet?” was a common greeting phrase among migrant workers who had 
just moved to the city. As vacant rooms usually attracted hordes of potential 
tenants, it was almost impossible to secure accommodation without having stable 
and well-paid employment.77 Indeed, so acute were the housing shortages that 
even governmental personnel transfers were affected: appointed officials were not 
able to find housing either, and were thus unable to assume their new posts. For 
instance, within the Concordia Association (Xie he hui), more than two-thirds out of 
the 320 employees were unable to arrive for their assignments despite prior 
coordination and assistance from local authorities.78 Under such circumstances, 
many of the city residents had no other choice but to share already small spaces 
and live with other families, just to be able to afford a roof over their heads. Known 
as “tenement yards (Da za yuan)”, tenants would resort to the parcelling of their 
shared living space by putting up wooden partitions to create smaller rooms. 
                                                        
76 Taeuber, “Manchuria as a demographic frontier,” 265. 
77 Yoon Hwy Tak and Jin Lan, trans, “Manzhouguo de “liulangzhe (nomad)” zai man 
chaoxian ren de shenghuo he rentong (“Nomad” of Manchukuo: Life and Identity of 
Koreans in Manchuria)”, Taiwan Historical Research, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2015), p. 
88. 
78 SJSB, 7 March 1940. 
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Families thus had to undertake their daily activities cramped in these confined 
spaces, pushing them to search for the most ergonomic ways to optimize any 
corner of the home.79 Often, the lack of space even led households to repurpose 
the house entrance into a communal kitchen, cramming in small self-built shacks on 
both sides to use as extra storage rooms, and in some cases, to accommodate 
another tenant. Shao Jutian, formerly residing in Fengtian, recalled his appalling 
experiences of living in Tiexi District. Looking back on his memories of such times, 
he stated:  
 
“… I lived in Yaming tenement yard, and eating was always a problem. 
The yard had residents from different backgrounds, and it was always 
bustling and noisy. Because we had no kitchen, we had to cook all of 
our meals outside our home in the open air, and it always caused 
disputes with our neighbours over the usage of coal and water. During 
eating hours, the yard was always crowded with families making fires 
and boiling their pots. We always had to be vigilant when we cooked so 
that our neighbours would not steal any grain (from us) or knock our 
kitchenware over.”80 
 
Living in a packed compound in Manchukuo required people to live with one 
another, and Shao’s story illustrates how overcrowded urban dwellings in 
Manchukuo compelled residents to share limited living spaces with strangers, 
having to deal with petty conflicts on a regular basis. Shao’s vivid recollections of 
the trivial yet frequent conflicts between him and his neighbours capture the 
essence of the miserable experiences of everyday urban life.  
 
Apart from the all-too-common overly stingy neighbours, one could also 
understand why something as petty as the usage of coal and water was a genuine 
                                                        
79 Yoon and Jin, trans, “Manzhouguo de “liulangzhe (nomad)” zai man chaoxian ren 
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80 Shao, Jutian. Personal Interview with Qiunan Li. Shenyang, 24 September 2015.  
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concern for most people living in such cramped environments. To begin with, 
Manchukuoan residential quarters were ill-supplied with –sometimes even 
deprived of – the most basic services. Modern sewage and water treatment 
connections were non-existent, making running water a luxury few people got to 
enjoy freely, which impelled the government authorities to set a strict quota of 
fewer than eight hours of running water per day.81 Most of the housing structures 
were built from wooden sheets, and to gain extra space, residents often added 
shabby inflammable planks and clapboards, subsequently causing frequent fires. In 
such highly dense residential areas, small accidents could lead to devastating 
disasters that in turn could potentially wipe out an entire neighbourhood. On a 
windy morning in May 1937 in the city of Yanji, a careless resident in Huibao hutong 
knocked over an oil lamp. The fire spread out over the block, and within an instant, 
350 houses were burned down to ashes and rubble. The fire quickly invaded the 
alleyway before rampaging across the district, leaving the fire brigade’s 
intervention useless as they could do nothing to help but to watch the fire slowly 
fade away. The accident resulted in two casualties and cumulated losses amounting 
to over a hundred thousand yuan.82 In the first half of 1940, the city of Dairen alone 
reported over 1,487 events of fire causing over 1,448 families to lose their homes, 
and over 9.5 million yuan of damage.83 In a way, the hazardous living environment 
of the ordinary urban inhabitants not only showcases the inconceivably low health 
and safety standards for the average households, 84  but it also points to the 
impression that the regime was overwhelmed by the sudden growth of its urban 
population, and was forced to face its incapacity to supply urban Manchukuoans 
with the most basic amenities.   
 
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the poor living conditions 
experienced by ordinary Manchukuoans were not a unique phenomenon. On the 
                                                        
81 Binjiang Special Issue, SJSB, 18 June 1940. 
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83 Hsinking Special Issue, SJSB, 24 June 1940. 
84 For the issue of health see Chapter Five.    
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contrary, such precarity could almost be considered a norm for Chinese people 
during the war years. In Chongqing for example, ordinary dwellings were usually 
built with clapboards or bamboo frames, and were frequently exposed to fire 
hazards with no effective water supply system in place to tackle the problem.85 
Additionally, similar to how Manchukuo cities were saturated by mass migration, 
KMT’s wartime capital of resistance also faced tremendous difficulties to supply its 
residents with adequate housing on top of the massive refugee flight from occupied 
China.86 However, despite the underlying similarities, the ordinary experiences of 
Chongqing point at how people prioritized safety due to the frequent Japanese 
bombardments, whereas the experiences of Manchukuo were more specific to the 
context of life under occupation, where the search for comfort and the sense of 
“home” were an upmost concern.  
                                                        
85  See for example, “Women from Poor Peasant Families,” in Echoes of Chongqing: 
Women in Wartime China, Danke Li (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010), pp. 
83-93. 
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4.4. Landlords, Tenants, and the Escalation of Housing Shortages 
 
Even though the Manchukuo government was fully aware of the housing 
crisis that grew increasingly severe over the years, the authorities never prioritized 
solving the issue until it grew into a state-wide calamity. As a matter of fact, 
housing shortages were never officially recognized as a crisis per se, and were never 
considered as “shortages” either. They were only referred to as “difficulties” at 
most and much later in late 1939; the careful choice of wording can be interpreted 
as a means used by the government to downplay the particular issue of housing in 
the midst of the state-wide shortage of general goods that plagued the Manchukuo 
society discussed previously in Chapter Three. This also suggests that the 
authorities considered the urban housing issue to be only a temporary 
phenomenon stemming from modernization, believing that it would resolve itself 
with time. However, considering that even government representatives were 
having difficulties securing housing, the authorities’ official stance on the matter 
might seem contradictory. At the same time, the authorities may have chosen not 
to prioritize solving the housing “difficulties” given the fact that, despite the soaring 
rent prices across the cities, most urbanites managed to scrape a spot to live each 
day, which surely made the issue of lesser importance in the eyes of the 
government. However, while the authorities underestimated – or plainly ignored – 
how strenuous and loathsome the process of securing a place to live could be, the 
ordinary people, on the other hand, were faced with the complex reality of a tense 
housing market.    
 
Arguably, just about every kind of housing fraud imaginable was practised in 
the urban regions of Manchukuo. Out-of-towners just arriving in the city who were 
in search of short to mid-term accommodation were often the easiest targets from 
which landlords could make money. This meant that anyone speaking without a 
local accent could potentially be subjected to a temporary price increase, often 
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twice the amount of the already exorbitant rent prices, which prospective tenants 
had no choice but to accept.87 Taking advantage of the common people’s inability 
to distinguish real excuses from false pretenses, a small change in the appellation 
“housing tax (fang juan)” to “home tax (jia wu shui)” put forward by the 
government in January 1938 was enough for the landlords to use as a pretext to 
increase rent prices. In truth, the amendments were only made to unify the existing 
tax types and to better control tax evasions, which had little to no impact on 
tenants and property owners.88 In addition, unlike in contemporary societies where 
landlords are normally responsible for repair and maintenance works in their rental 
properties, Manchukuo tenants were unduly held responsible for the costs of 
maintenance of their accommodation, which more often than not, would be 
neglected, ending up in decrepit condition. A typical case was that of Qiao Deren 
and his wife who lived in No. 38 Zhenghongqi Hutong in the Bahumen area. In 
March 1936, the Qiao family mourned the death of their 9-year-old son who was 
crushed under a wall that had collapsed in their tenement yard. Instead of sending 
his condolences for the tragedy, the landlord demanded the family to pay for the 
expenses for the wall. “It is completely absurd and outrageous,” said Qiao, “Not 
only does the landlord refuse to take responsibility, he is blaming us for letting our 
child play near the wall and causing the damage. I could never imagine anybody 
that is as evil and cruel as him.”89 When such tragedies occurred, local police 
officers were often called to act as mediators, and held regular meetings with the 
landlords. However, since law enforcers had no power over regulation and control 
over the rent prices nor over property owner’s responsibilities, few landlords would 
take their warnings seriously.90  Rather, resourceful landlords would frequently 
bribe the police into collusion, not only to turn a blind eye to the large number of 
complaints from the tenants, but also to assist them in the collection of rent 
payments, and in some cases, the forceful eviction of property occupiers failing to 
pay the demanded payments. 
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Shan, a long-term resident of over eight years renting from Zhou Hui’s two-
story building on No. 21 Fude Street was one of the many recipients of such unfair 
treatment by his landlord, supported by corrupted police officers. In a failed 
attempt to collect a rent advance payment from Shan, an altercation broke out 
between Shan and Zhou, resulting in the two parties sharing a trip to the local 
Police Department on Yongle street. However, much to Shan’s surprise, Patrol 
Officer Zhang Tianyi then on duty, showed no sympathy towards his situation, and 
instead began to interrogate him: 
 
“… officer Zhang firmly believed Shan’s statements to be complete 
nonsense. He then forced Shan to kneel on the floor and slapped him 
on the face several times. After Zhang finished venting his anger on 
Shan, he ordered Shan to leave, and to borrow money to pay the rent 
before moving out of the room.”91 
 
Unfortunately for Shan, his nightmare was only beginning. Two days after, on 
7 September 1938, Officer Zhang paid Shan a follow-up surprise visit in his home to 
force him to pay the rent demanded by Zhou again. Realizing the connections and 
influential power Zhou had, Shan ended up begging Zhang to allow him a few more 
days for him to gather the money, as well as to find a new place to stay. Instead, 
because Zhang believed Shan was intentionally procrastinating and resisting his 
orders, Shan was kicked out onto the streets with nowhere to go and his belongings 
were confiscated as mortgage for the rent.92 To be sure, since landlords became 
accustomed to anxious tenants tacitly agreeing to pay whatever costly prices they 
were asking for, Shan’s experience could be seen as a reflection of the general 
unescapable nightmarish conditions of having to rent a home in urban Manchukuo. 
 
                                                        




For many urban dwellers, “homelessness” was an all too familiar feeling 
reflecting the precariousness of their everyday lives. For some, the combination of 
greedy landlords and housing shortages meant that they had to live a nomadic-like 
lifestyle. Many were never able to really settle down for good and were always 
ready to pack up and find another place to stay for a short while until whimsical 
landlords came up with new excuses to increase the already extravagant rents. At 
some point, it became common for people to move into a property in the morning 
and check out before the evening, just to be able to briefly have a roof over their 
heads in-between their searches for more economic options. Such practices were so 
prevalent that the central post office in the city of Hsinking reported that in April 
1940 alone, over 857 letters failed to be delivered due to the frequent relocation of 
addressees and for not having a new address for the mail to be forwarded to.93 For 
some others, the shortage of housing meant that they would need to lodge 
successively at their relatives or friends’ homes, until they could find an affordable 
place of their own. Recalling his childhood memories of growing up in Fengtian with 
his mother, He Yonggui stated: 
 
 “… we were very poor because my mother could not find a proper 
job in the city, jobs were hard to come by. We also had no place to 
stay, and since my mother was originally from Shandong, we knew 
nobody [in Fengtian]. When my father left us, I and my mother 
wandered from door to door on the streets, begging for our 
neighbours to take us in or to give us some food.”94 
 
Every now and then, kind-hearted neighbours would show sympathy towards the 
mother and son pair and offer a corner in the hallway or kitchen with straw bits 
(gan cao) as beds for them to spend the night. During the day, He and his mother 
worked as servants for the host families, helping with cleaning and cooking chores, 
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conducting all possible manual chores as a return for the shelter that had been 
offered to them.95  
 
 The miserable conditions of urban living aroused countless concerns among 
an increasingly weary and disgruntled society. The growing pressure eventually 
prompted the Manchukuo government to make large-scale adjustments in an 
attempt to remedy its housing crisis. By 28 December 1939, Prime Minister Zhang 
Jinghui and the Minister of Economic Affairs Yu Jingyuan introduced a new 
Temporary Housing Rent Control Law (Lin shi zhu zhai fang zu tong zhi fa) under 
Order No. 349, Article 36 of the Constitutive Law. Starting from Hsinking, and later 
implemented to all provincial capitals across the regime, the Temporary Housing 
Rent Control Law was later extended to 28 metropolitan areas in Manchukuo in 
total, along with the creation of local housing review boards (Fang zu shen cha wei 
yuan hui) in each city. Under the new law, the general rent prices for housing were 
set to be based on regulated prices suggested by the local administrations and 
housing review boards in each city, which needed to be approved by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. In addition to overseeing rent prices, individuals caught violating 
the new law were to face a hefty penalty of 300 yuan as well as a risk of 
imprisonment.96 In many ways, the implementation of the Temporary Housing Rent 
Control Law could be paralleled to the rationing system approach introduced earlier 
that year. However, as was detailed in Chapter Three, the rationing system only 
made sense because of the state-monopolized distribution scheme in place to 
support it. For the authorities to implement price regulations on housing even 
though they had no real control over distribution suggests that the Manchukuo 
government began to view accommodation more as a common commodity, 
neglecting the social functions of housing as a living space wherein people live, find 
rest and security.  
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 The new housing law instigated a state-wide peak of evictions with landlords 
hastening to throw out their tenants forcefully in fear that the government’s 
interventions would substantially hinder the value of their properties. In Hsinking, it 
was reported that a few weeks before the official implementation date of the Rent 
Control Law, landlords on Dongsan, Dongsi and Yongchang Streets had colluded, 
and jointly began to evict their tenants, on the pretext of the necessity to retrieve 
the houses for their own personal use.97 Similarly, in the city of Harbin, tenants 
living in the downtown area were forcefully driven out of their homes after 
receiving evasive excuses from their landlords who claimed they needed to conduct 
maintenance work or use the property for themselves. This resulted in a sharp 
increase of disputes with 59 cases filed in just under two weeks’ time after the 
implementation of the Housing Rent Control Law.98 Indeed, it may well be argued 
that the new law in place had little impact on the total demand for housing in 
general, but severely decreased the supply of available accommodation in the 
housing market. The “hoarding” behaviour of the landlords could be attributed to 
the deviation of housing from their main function of being a space for inhabitation 
to becoming an asset that offered financial security to property owners in face of 
the strict rent regulations and the ongoing shortage crisis. 
 
 Utilizing case studies of present-day metropolitan areas in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, political economists were able to coin the term 
“financialization of housing” to identify the risks of aggravating wealth inequality 
and the displacement of people within urban society.99 Even though major cities in 
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Manchukuo such as Fengtian and Hsinking at the time were nowhere near the scale 
of development of modern megalopolises such as London and New York, some 
parallels can still be made, especially with regards to the lingering impact of the 
commoditization of housing on urban residents. In March 1940, governmental 
buildings and old city offices in Fengtian were converted into temporary shelters 
that hosted over 1,000 homeless families who could not find an affordable place to 
live. As the shelters were already beyond their capacities, many more families were 
denied asylum, which often left them no other option but to sleep on the streets 
even during the coldest weather. 100  During the same month, teachers from 
Shuntian elementary school in Hsinking were reported to have collectively resigned 
from their jobs for the sole reason that they could not find a place to live in the 
city.101 Recognizing the issue as “a serious social problem for society” that has 
“affected the wellbeing of the nation”, Sun Qichang, the Minister of Civil Affairs 
placed great emphasis on how the acute housing shortages had generated negative 
impacts on all aspects of the society during a national governor meeting held in 
Hsinking. With regards to the occurrence of resignations, he stated: 
 
 “…It [housing] has become a hot topic in the capital but we never 
properly addressed it. I know about the hardships that the teachers are 
facing, but the occurrence of collective withdrawals brought great 
humiliation to the education sector… Two days ago, during the [school 
entrance exam] interview, one of the pupils answered that his father 
was a landlord when asked about his parent’s occupation. The 
examiner immediately asked the child if his father had a vacant room. 
On top of this, teachers also began to ask their students during class if 
any of their parents had spare rooms to rent, this is simply absurd and 
ridiculous!”102 
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Indeed, being a landlord in Manchukuo was not only perceived as a well-respected 
full-time occupation, it was also a fearful one. Most often, tenants applying for an 
accommodation were required to present a lump sum of more than a full year’s 
rent at once for their housing application to even be considered by the landlords. In 
order to remain in the property quarrel-free, a good amount of “royalty payments 
(quan yi jin)” usually had to be compensated to the landlords to make up for the 
low rent prices as regulated by the government.103 In contrast to the ways in which 
influential individuals maintained a certain network of “friendships” with ration 
shop owners to obtain general goods, no amount of personal connections or power 
were sufficient to secure housing without having to pay the premium fees to the 
landlords. This was mainly due to the mechanism of personal connections, which 
functioned on the basis of acquiring continuous access to goods under the shortage 
of supplies. Although the Manchukuo government implemented rent regulations in 
the hope of keeping rent prices affordable, the root cause of the housing issue was 
the market’s inability to respond to the growing demand. And even though the 
result was the same, the housing crisis began because of the overwhelming 
demands of an extraordinary surge of urban population prompted by rapid 
modernization. 
 
 On the other hand, the Manchukuo authorities announced new construction 
plans that were to be swiftly put into action to provide more residential building in 
the cities in the midst of the urban crisis. In an effort to alleviate housing pressures, 
a new design of “secure housing (an quan zhu zhai)” was brought forward and 
adopted by the government to be the new norm of state-owned affordable housing 
for all major cities in the regime. With a total living space of 15 square meters, the 
“secure housing” was designed to house up to six people, and featured a basic 
brick-heated bedroom and a shared bathroom.104 For most eager potential tenants, 
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the concept of “secure housing” had a certain charm to it, as it provided a sharp 
contrast to the miserable living conditions and overcrowding of the common 
tenement yards, and perhaps most importantly, reasonable rent prices. But the 
reality differed from the promises made by the authorities as even during the 
planning stage, there was no explanation of how such ambitious projects could be 
achieved in face of the ongoing shortages. 
 
 Even so, a total of 10,000 secure housing was nonetheless announced for 
Hsinking and anticipated to be completed by the end of 1940, with a ratio of 7,000 
housing to be allocated to government officials and 3,000 allocated to city 
residents.105 The way the government imagined it to work was simple. In a fashion 
similar to today’s council housing, eligible citizens were required to apply and join a 
waiting list once the construction was done. However, despite the promises made 
to the public, the project was challenged before it had even started, due to the 
unavailability of civil construction materials, mainly because they were prioritized 
to support the needs of the war. Concrete pipes were thus replaced by wooden 
tubes and cement was replaced by low-quality plaster, a necessary compromise to 
meet the pre-established targets set by the government. 106  Despite the 
controversies and overall scepticism over the government’s decision to focus on 
quantity instead of quality, only 1,726 out of the initial plan to construct 10,000 
houses were completed in time by 31 August 1940 due to the lack of materials. 
Predictably, the new housing were to be distributed in priority to members of 
45 different government agencies and institutions in the city: 196 were allocated to 
the South Manchuria Railway Company, 200 to the Manchurian Colonization 
Corporation (Manshu takushoku kosha), 100 to the Daily Necessities Company 
(Sheng huo bi xu pin hui she) and the remaining ones to various other departments, 
leaving none for the disillusioned public applicants.107 Indeed, with more than 
40,000 families, the equivalent of approximately 200,000 citizens in the city were 
                                                        
105 SJSB, 13 March 1940. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Hsinking Special Issue, SJSB, 31 August 1940. 
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unable to obtain any kind of housing in the beginning of December 1940, when the 
winter season was in full force. For this reason, government officials reluctantly 
admitted that the construction projects achieved thus far only represented “a drop 
in the bucket”, and that the people would “need to keep faith during such 
extraordinary circumstances and believe that the hardships [would] eventually 
end”.108 Overall, it can be said that the concept of “secure housing” was the 
Manchukuo government’s response to its failing regulatory laws over the staggering 
rent prices in its urban areas. At the same time, it was not surprising for the 
authorities to prioritize such housing to accommodate their own personnel in the 
government, for no one in Manchukuo was spared from the constant pressures and 
restlessness generated by housing shortages.   
                                                        





All in all, it can be said that the ordinary people’s sense of “homelessness” 
was largely neglected by the authorities throughout the existence of the regime. 
The housing crisis first began to soar following the abnormal flow of asylum seekers 
from the countryside attempting to escape from the social turmoil and banditry 
issues in the early years of the puppet state. The Manchukuo government 
reorganized the countryside into clusters of defensive collective villages, 
supposedly to offer safer homes to peasants. Even though they were unwilling to 
abandon their native villages, the authorities left no choice to villagers but to follow 
their directives and to adjust to a new life of discomfort in housing that could hardly 
be called homes, all in the name of security. Indeed, for the peasants, life in the 
collective villages meant having to start over from scratch, with living standards 
being miserable for most. Albeit the government eventually got rid of banditry and 
restored security in the countryside, it was not to save peasants from the bandits’ 
persecutions. Rather, the authorities were driven by the need to legitimize the 
regime, but also by the necessity to alleviate the burden of the cities being 
overcrowded by floods of rural migrants attempting to flee from bandits. In a way, 
peasants were comparable to pawns in the government’s game – puppets that 
were passive receivers of mandatory change. And even though they did not wish for 
change and wanted instead to live their normal lives, peasants were forced into 
adapting to promises that did not always follow through.  
  
  On the other hand, “image” projects to showcase Manchukuo’s 
achievements began to spring up all over the urban regions. Under the vision of 
urban planners, the old and disorganized cityscapes underwent a complete 
transformation, and were replaced by breath-taking governmental, financial and 
commercial buildings as well as boulevards and plazas that were considered to be 
magnificent works of art. However, as the metropolitan areas continued to expand, 
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the exceptional growth generated a boom in the regime’s urban population, which 
resulted in a significant deficit of urban housing capacity that confined urban 
dwellers into cramped and miserable living environments. Ordinary urban 
Manchukuoans’ quality of life can thus be said to have been rather low, as they had 
to live their everyday lives within uncomfortably confined and overcrowded spaces. 
Their situation contrasted sharply with the grand image of modernization that gave 
birth to spacious and imposing buildings decorating the cities. The appalling living 
conditions combined with the inadequate housing capacity eventually led the 
Manchukuo government to intervene in 1939 by regulating rent prices in every city 
across the state. However, in fear of losing a big portion of income, the authorities’ 
direct invention caused landlords to treat their properties as valuable commodities, 
which exacerbated the existing shortages as time went by. As such, urban residents 
whose housing depended on greedy landlords, witnessed a shift in their daily lives 
that incrementally became characterized by disruptions and relocations, with the 
only constant being the inability to settle down safely in a place to call home. 
 
Finally, despite being achieved at the expense of its people, the authorities’ 
enormous investments to modernize Manchukuo did have some positive effects. In 
the short run, it served the propaganda purpose that presented a positive image of 
the regime to fend off foreign scepticism. In the longer run, it laid down the 
foundation of development for many more years to come. With hindsight, it is 
difficult to ignore Manchukuo’s phenomenal urban achievements and the long 
vision that urban planners had for the future. In today’s Changchun (formerly 
Hsinking), Manchukuo-era boulevards and avenues continue to function as major 
traffic points, whereas the administrative and public architectural structures later 
transformed into hospitals and universities still emit a sense of awe compared to 
the Soviet-style buildings constructed in the subsequent years. Once the major 
trading port of the old Empire, Dairen became the model city of new China, 
providing valuable experiences of development for the tottering communist 
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leadership after the liberation.109 On the other hand, the industrial base in South 
Manchuria served as the People’s Republic of China’s economic powerhouse for 
several more decades, with some of the factories still operating to this day. 
However, while the impact of these positive legacies is undeniable, the ordinary 
experiences of Manchukuoans discussed in this chapter also pointed out that 
Japan’s “developmental imperialism” in Manchuria was far from being an 
exceptional case. Despite the infrastructural and industrial efforts deployed in 
Manchukuo, the level of development achieved was in fact far less remarkable than 
that of the Japanese accomplishments in Taiwan.110 Indeed, historians and theorists 
have long argued that colonial development largely occurred to meet the needs of 
the colonising power rather than for the benefit of the colonised subjects. The 
example of ordinary Manchukuoans in this chapter, who at the time found 
themselves in a constant struggle to keep a roof above their heads, supports the 
idea that this was indeed the case in Japanese imperialism in Manchukuo. 
   
                                                        
109 Christian A. Hess, “From colonial port to socialist metropolis: imperialist legacies 
and the making of ‘New Dalian’”, Urban History, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2011), pp. 373-390. 
110 For a comparison between Japanese colonies see Anne Booth and Kent Deng, 
“Japanese Colonialism in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of World History, Vol. 
28, No. 1 (2017), pp. 61-98. 
221 
 




When addressing issues related to health and hygiene in the colonies, 
historians of medicine have argued over the fact that although colonial agents 
brought public health measures into the colonies, they mainly brought new types of 
diseases. Previous scholarship also discussed how biomedicine and westernized 
health systems were often imposed upon indigenous societies without taking their 
existing health structures and cultural values into account.1 In a way, both critiques 
can be applied to the case of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria. In spite of the 
ongoing debate regarding the Japanese military’s association with the various 
epidemic outbreaks during wartime, the notorious deployment of biological 
weapons by Unit 731 under the disguise of epidemic prevention in Harbin pointed 
towards the undeniable fact that atrocities were committed with the use of 
scientific biomedicine.2 On the other hand, the colonial agents’ dismissive view of 
indigenous practices of traditional medicine contributed to a conflictual relationship 
between the two. This often resulted in the colonized population being dismissed 
as “backwards” and “uncivilized” in the midst of Western medicine’s claims of 
absolute superiority, which is at the core of this chapter.  
 
                                                        
1 Andrew Cunningham and Bridie Andrews, “Introduction”, in Western medicine as 
contested knowledge, eds., Andrew Cunningham and Bridie Andrews (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 2. 
2  For literature regarding Unit 731 see for example Peter Williams and David 
Wallace, Unit 731: Japanese Army’s Secret of Secrets (London: Grafton, 1990); 
Sheldon Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932-45 and the 
American cover-up (London: Routledge, 1994). 
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It is therefore essential to look into the forceful implementation of 
westernized health concepts in Manchukuo, and how these impacted on ordinary 
people’s everyday life. Since the ways in which the Japanese management of 
diseases within the Kwantung leased territory was of key importance to the 
formation of health concepts after the establishment of Manchukuo, this chapter 
begins with a brief overview of the outbreak of the Plague in 1910, and the various 
efforts adopted by the Japanese in efforts to contain it. This chapter then moves on 
to examine the various sanitation and disease control measures put forward by the 
Manchukuo authorities, highlighting the role of public health interventions and 
their effects on the everyday life of ordinary people. Next, this chapter turns to look 
at the formation of a modernized medical system that primarily aimed to drive out 
the prevalent practices of traditional Chinese medicine in the regime, a process that 
met with resistance from the people and ultimately resulted in a compromise. 
Lastly, this chapter examines the pathological abuse of opium in Manchukuo, 
focusing particularly on how the authorities’ negligence of the people’s well-being 
led to a sharp increase in the number of drug addicts, who, in turn, were further 
exploited by the regime. In essence, this chapter shows how the Manchukuo 
authorities repeatedly implemented changes in the name of progress, promising 
benefits for the people, while in reality, the ordinary masses were far from 
benefiting from the supposedly modernized public health system. On the contrary, 
these further disrupted the people’s everyday lives, and reinforced the existing 
discriminatory practices by ostracizing ordinary Manchukuoans even more. The 
overall negative experiences of the ordinary people demonstrated how the 
Manchukuo authorities used the development of its health policies to pursue 
control over the daily lives of its subjects. Furthermore, this also enables us to have 





5.2. The Outbreak of the Manchurian Plague 
 
Manchuria was sparsely populated and under-developed for more than 200 
years until the banning order3 was completely abolished by the Qing government in 
the late nineteenth century following the introduction of the Open Door Policy 
brought forward by the United States. With the influx of immigrants from China 
proper, Manchuria dramatically shifted from being a no man’s land to a melting pot 
where various powers rubbed shoulders and competed for the region’s rich 
resources and strategic interests in the Far East. Consequently, successive wars and 
spates of occupation followed, which also brought about the scourge of diseases to 
the peoples of the land. Five years after the Russo-Japanese War, the sudden 
outbreak of the Plague in Northern Manchuria in October 1910 took the region by 
surprise once again when it had barely recovered from the ruins of war. In the 
absence of the most basic knowledge about modern public sanitation and disease 
control, the Plague rapidly swept through the entire region as panicked civilians 
rushed to flee southwards along the railway lines. By May 1911, it was estimated 
that over 40,000 people had lost their lives to the pandemic.4 Despite the Qing 
government’s efforts to manage the containment of the disease by appointing the 
young Cambridge educated Dr. Wu Lein-teh to take charge,5 the prevention means 
were still met with great resistance and hostility from the people who deemed 
methods such as cremation and other Western treatment methods to be too 
offensive to the traditional local customs.  
                                                        
3 Regarding Manchuria as “the land of the Dragon rising”, the region was placed 
under strict reservation for the Manchurians (man zu) after the Qing conquered 
China and banned Han Chinese from accessing the lands. These banning policies 
later resulted in an effortless occupation by the Japanese forces during the First 
Sino-Japanese War that also generated sovereignty disputes between Qing and 
various powers, which eventually prompted the Qing government to completely lift 
the banning policy for the protection of its own interests. 
4 “Zhongguo Dashiji [China Memorabilia]”, Dongfang Zazhi, 1911, 8(1): 15. 
5 Birdie Andrews, The Making of Modern Chinese Medicine, 1850-1960 (Honolulu: 




During the International Plague Conference held in Fengtian, the Qing 
government’s inexperience and overall lack of preparedness in preventing the 
outbreak of the pandemic drew much criticism of its inability to contain the spread 
of the disease. In addition to lacking proper modern medical knowledge, the Qing 
officials’ stubbornness in refusing to cooperate or even to receive any form of 
assistance was also heavily condemned by the Japanese. Pointing out the extent of 
their exasperation towards the officials’ inflexibility, the Japanese criticized the 
Chinese government for “showing no sincerity and [for] severely obstructing the 
processes of prevention and management of the epidemic” in the region. 6 
Somehow, the Qing bureaucrats’ reluctance to respond to the Japanese’s demands 
can be understood as the Qing officials’ expression of reservations about the 
potential further spread of Japanese influence into Northeast China. Such 
geopolitical considerations were evident as the Korean peninsula had just been 
annexed after a series of events involving the Japanese just two months prior to the 
outbreak of the Plague in Manchuria. These pessimistic views were not uncommon. 
In May 1910, Roger Sherman Greene, then acting as the Consul General of the 
United States in Harbin, wrote a letter in which he warns that the general panic 
provoked by the Plague could “easily become an excuse for Japanese and Russian 
aggression”.7 Furthermore, in view of the recent acquisition of Port Arthur, Dairen, 
and the surrounding areas as trophies from the Russo-Japanese War, it was 
apparent that the Chinese administration was not fully confident regarding the 
future sovereignty of Manchuria. 
 
                                                        
6 Man shihui, Manzhou kaifa sishinian shi (40 Years of Development in Manchuria) 
Vol.2 (Yingkou: Internal release, 1988), p. 489; See also Bu Liping, Public Health and 
the Modernization of China, 1865-2015 (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 47-49. 
7 Wang Xueliang, “1910 nian dongbei fasheng shuyi shi zhongmei yu ri’ejian de 
zhengzhi douzheng (The political struggle between China, United States and Japan 
during the 1910 Plague)”, Shehui kexue zhanxian, Vol. 3 (1992), pp. 216-222.  
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Politics aside, the eradication of epidemics and preventive operations to 
contain contagious diseases had always been a lingering issue to tackle for the 
South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), ever since its establishment in 1906. 
Even though the SMR’s founding aspirations were to introduce a more advanced 
civilization to the people of Manchuria, early on, the Company was confronted with 
the task of protecting the health of tens of thousands of Japanese militia stationed 
nearby, as well as guaranteeing the well-being of pioneers and technical personnel 
flooding into the region from Japan. Eager to prove to the world that Japan was 
capable of governing colonies like its Western counterparts, the SMR began to 
invest significant resources into the development of modern medical and public 
sanitation systems in the leased territory despite the absence of profit and 
funding.8 In contrast to the Kwantung Army’s initial proposal to manage the colony 
with brute force, inaugural SMR Director Goto Shinpei emphasized the necessity to 
construct modern hospitals, clinics, as well as medical research institutions. Coming 
from a similar Western educated background as Dr. Wu and drawing on his 
previous experiences as the Head of Civil Affairs in Taiwan, Goto was well aware of 
the importance of improving the well-being of the colonial subjects in order to 
justify the Japanese presence and influence in Northern China. Hence, led by long-
term planning, SMR conducted a comprehensive survey recording the health profile 
of the population in the region. For the first time in history under its sanitation 
division, thorough investigations were conducted to learn about the endemic 
diseases, dietary habits, nutrition and physical fitness of the people.9 On top of that, 
various welfare and health relief programs were carried out, even in more remote 
areas. Benefits and free treatments were provided to the masses who suffered 
from poverty, unemployment, and disease.10 Moreover, numerous hospitals and 
sanitation facilities were established in major urban areas and along railway lines, 
including the new South Manchuria Railway hospital in Dairen, deemed to be “the 
                                                        
8 Gong Ruibo, “Riben qinlue Zhongguo dongbei de weisheng zhimin jigou luekao 
(Research in Japan invading Northeast China’s Health Colonial Institutions)”, Riben 
qinhua shi yanjiu, Vol. 4 (2014), pp. 61-68. 
9 Man shihui, Manzhou kaifa sishinian shi (40 Years of Development in Manchuria), 
486. 
10 Ibid., p. 507. 
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best [medical facility] in East Asia”, that was supplied with a unparalleled variety of 
Western pharmaceuticals directly by the Japanese Army. 11  As such, it was 
estimated that by 1907, the 28 largest hospitals established by the SMR had 
reached a reception capacity for both inpatients and outpatients of approximately 
one to two million per year.12 The deployment of these then advanced methods 
proved to be successful in preventing and controlling large-scale disease during the 
full outbreak of the Plague in the following years. 
 
As soon as the pneumonic Plague emerged in 1910, emergency teams were 
immediately put together to treat patients and to prevent further spread of the 
disease.13 Pest control teams were established and dispatched into the streets 
wherein monitoring outposts were scattered all over to ensure the blockade of any 
individual, vehicle or goods from entering the leased territory. 14  Despite the 
remonstrance of Chinese officials over the leadership of public health services, SMR 
hospital personnel and medical teams in Manchuria were assigned to adjacent 
neighbourhoods to disinfect and conduct regular check-ups and diagnoses. As the 
epidemic subsided in 1911, it was estimated that, including a direct donation of 155 
thousand yen to the Chinese government, a total expenditure of 860 thousand yen 
was invested by the SMR in the region for the elimination of the Plague.15 These 
financial efforts were eventually reflected in the drop of recorded cases: compared 
to the over 50,000 cases discovered in the entire region, only 228 confirmed cases 
were reported in the leased territory.16 The SMR’s success in the case of the Plague 
not only contributed to containing the contagious disease, preventing further 
                                                        
11 Ibid., p. 142. 
12 Shunsuke Tsurumi, Goto Shinpei (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2005) p. 259. 
13 Wang, “1910 nian dongbei fasheng shuyi shi zhongmei yu ri’ejian de zhengzhi 
douzheng (The political struggle between China, United States and Japan during the 
1910 Plague)”, 216-222.  
14 Wang Yuqin, “Riben zhiminshiqi de dongbei yixue tongzhi (Medical control in 
Northeast China under Japanese colonization)”, Shehui kexue zhanxian, Vol. 8 





ravages of the people’s lives; it also became a placard directly promoting the 
modernization of health care services in Manchuria. Under Goto’s doctrine of 
“cultural armament”, a considerable amount of progress was accomplished 
towards the compartmentalization and initialization of various sanitation 
institutions as the natives’ inherent concepts of health care also gradually shifted 
from being a personalized life-preserving and nourishment service17 only for elites, 
to public health and hygiene services that were available to all. As time went by, all 
such efforts proved to have laid the foundations for the modern medical and health 
services of Manchukuo.   
                                                        
17  The term “health” in the traditional Chinese concept refers to “yangsheng 
(nourishment)” and “baojian (longevity)”, which differs from the western concept 
of health and hygiene.   
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5.3. Sanitation and Disease Control 
  
After the establishment of Manchukuo, the Central Government and the 
Kwantung Army were immediately confronted with a series of major challenges 
regarding the matter of public health. Regardless of the success of the Japanese’s 
management experiences of the relatively monophonic climate and circumstances 
of the Kwantung leased territory, such were certainly far too limited to be 
replicated in Manchuria, which was incomparably vast and far more populated. 
Realizing the magnitude of the task ahead from the beginning, the government 
attached importance to the development of a comprehensive healthcare system 
and to the implementation of corresponding policies. To promote new concepts 
advocating public health, the Manchukuo government used propaganda and 
education channels, introducing numerous measures to overturn the Manchukuoan 
masses’ lack of hygienic habits and ways of living.  
 
Without a doubt, constant chaos instigated by perennial wars prior to the 
Mukden incident caused the people of Manchuria to accumulate unhygienic habits, 
ingraining unsanitariness into the daily activities of the people. Such habits, along 
with the limited access to clean resources, squalid food staples, and unclean water 
inevitably developed into different infectious diseases that spread like wildfire 
among the people. The two most prominent illnesses were dysentery and typhoid 
fever, both of which were mainly transmitted through unclean food and beverages 
in urban regions.18  As the Manchukuo police depart summed up, “Before the 
founding of the nation, the rulers did not care about the people’s health at all. Most 
of the Manchukuoans are illiterate to begin with, and they do not possess any 
knowledge or understanding regarding the importance of health care…. Especially 
                                                        
18  Wang Luo, Jianming fangyixue (Concise Epidemiology) (Hsinking: Manchuria 
Health Briefing Committee, 1942), p. 47, p. 126. 
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towards the purchase and sale of crudely made food staples.” 19  Indeed, the 
association and the emphasis on the need for sanitation in the traditional diet of 
the people suggested a fundamentally different approach to the concept of health 
between the warlord regime and the Manchukuo authorities.  
 
Affiliated to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Health Department swiftly 
proposed a number of suggestions to remedy the situation. In 1932, all local police 
authorities across the regime were called to enforce a new edict to be implemented 
in the name of epidemic prevention.  As such, as soon as the summer season 
arrived, all vegetables and fruits internally produced and circulating within the 
region underwent compulsory disinfection and sterilization before they were 
allowed for consumption.20 In the city of Yingkou, limited selling permits were 
issued daily to greengrocery vendors in marketplaces. At the same time, shoppers 
were encouraged to report any peddlers operating without a disinfection license to 
the local police department for investigation and punishments.21 On the other hand, 
Jilin Province, then the political centre of Manchukuo, issued a comprehensive ban 
to prohibit the sale of sorbet and of decaying fruits during the entire season 
because of the high humidity and frequent heatwaves. 22  Expectedly, all such 
measures suddenly attempting to transform the Manchukuoans’ deeply ingrained 
dietary customs – regardless of how unhealthy these were – immediately met with 
opposition. Owing to the bad sanitary conditions and the general lack of economic 
capacity, shoddy and substandard food staples were often the only reliable source 
of food available to ordinary people during such times of martial law and curfews 
due to the political turmoil. The imposed disinfection regulations inevitably 
generated price rises, which was unacceptable for the already famished population 
of the regime.  
                                                        
19  Manzhouguo zhi’anbu jingwusi, Manzhouguo Jingchashi (The History of 
Manchukuo Police), 412. 
20 Ibid. 
21 SJSB, 6 July 1932. 




As a consequence, the strong stance taken by the government towards the 
sterilization of food staples did not directly result in gaining effective controls of the 
spread of various infectious diseases in the state. On 25 June 1940, it was reported 
that in the city of Harbin alone, out of the total of 300 inpatients who were 
diagnosed with contagious diseases during the month, more than two-thirds had 
been infected due to being in contact with contaminated food staples or water.23 In 
the city of Hsinking where disinfection routines were the strictest, 618 patients out 
of the total of 858 confirmed cases in 1938 were found to have been infected 
because of impurities found in various foods.24 Evidently, the generally dirty and 
disorderly cooking spaces in kitchens and restaurants exacerbated the spread of 
diseases among the people. Ernst Cordes, a German journalist who visited 
Manchukuo in the 1930s, documented in detail one of his dining experiences with a 
hand rickshaw puller in Fengtian, wherein he wrote: 
 
“[We went to an] extremely simple and shabby small wooden shed, 
I would imagine that the people who went there to eat were among 
the poorest in the city…. It was even hard to stand straight or to 
breathe properly inside. The restaurant was full of exhausted 
coolies who covered themselves in greasy and dirty rags. In front of 
them were wobbly wooden tables that shook and quavered 
whenever it was being used… I sat down on a crude wooden bench 
that was about 70cm in length and 20cm wide, with no arm or 
backrest, it was difficult to even keep balance while sitting on it.”25 
 
Despite the strong urge to leave, Cordes managed to overcome his nausea caused 
by the sordid surroundings and decided to stay. “I convinced myself that if four 
hundred million Chinese people can live, work and grow up in a smelly and dirty 
place like this, because this was a real living environment, why couldn’t I stay for a 
                                                        
23 SJSB, 25 June 1940. 
24 Hsinking Public Office, Xinjing tebieshi tongji nianbao (Hsinking Statistical Yearly 
Report) (Hsinking: Internal Release, 1938), p. 10. 
25 Cordes, Das jüngste Kaiserreich, 119. 
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few hours?”26 As Cordes and his companion settled down at their table, he looked 
around in the restaurant, and noted:  
 
“There was no electricity there, only a small oil lamp that was 
hung on the wall. There was no wallpaper or any flooring either. 
As a matter of fact, the floor consisted of hardened soil and 
rubbish stomped out by people over the years. Making loud noises, 
spitting on the ground, and even urinating along the walls was not 
taboo there, and it did not seem to affect the appetite of the 
others around. A large iron wok that was being used for cooking 
stood on top of a primitive clay stove that was built in the corner 
of the shed. One person was in charge of putting small twigs, 
wooden blocks and some small black, almost peanut-like mud 
balls into the fire while another was working the wok and serving 
food to the customers. Their off-putting appearances made me 
lose my appetite immediately, their dirtiness was like they had 
never taken a shower ever since the Great Wall of China was 
built.”27 
 
Despite having to hire a European doctor to cure his gastrointestinal discomfort the 
following day, Cordes nonetheless acknowledged that such an exclusive cultural 
episode became for him an eye-opening experience allowing him to grasp a sense 
of the reality of the life of the working poor in the city.  
 
However, bad sanitation conditions were not only limited to small food stalls 
and makeshift diners. Even the most prestigious restaurants were not spared from 
criticism targeting the repugnance of the food cooked in insalubrious conditions. 
Tiancheng restaurant, a well-established fine diner located in Tomihisamachi, 
Dairen was frequently denounced by its customers for its “uneven” quality of dishes. 
Despite being critically acclaimed and enjoying the reputation of being “second to 
none in the city”, it was revealed that the food served to customers was cooked in 
abject conditions, with bugs and flies infesting the kitchen so frequently that even 





cooks were no longer surprised at the sight of those pests. “Whenever the chefs 
were cooking, it was always a battle between them and the insects. It was all too 
common to find bugs mixed in dishes and plates”. As it was exposed, customers 
would sometimes find dead roaches in their food. Some other times, they would 
find that pork dishes were tainted with rice-like spots that looked like parasitic 
ovum. “It is just striking that the restaurant can still maintain their business like 
this.”28 Without a doubt, if even Tiancheng, a supposedly high-end restaurant 
located in one of the most prosperous areas of the city, wherein the pool of 
consumers were mostly Japanese, managed to operate normally under such 
unsanitary conditions, more modest kitchens and restaurants were also certainly at 
least as insalubrious as Tiancheng.  
 
As such, according to a survey conducted in 1944 that assessed the 
sanitation situation and living customs among the average Manchukuoan 
household across the regime, only 10 percent of all the families surveyed met the 
minimum hygiene standards. 29  To put it into context, the so-called “hygiene 
standards”, as specified by the health department, referred more precisely to the 
most basic requirements of cleanness in each household. These were measured by 
the amount of peculiar odours, as well as by evaluating the level of air circulation 
and brightness indoors. However, due to the climate, most households in 
Manchuria were designed with the intention to preserve heat in order to withstand 
the harsh winter season. Additionally, since the residents habitually kept the 
windows and doors shut at all times to prevent heat loss but also to ward off 
burglaries, the air inside the rooms was often pervaded with stenches that were 
blended with the smell of body odours, cigarette smoke and wall paint coatings.30 
The pungent smell trapped within closed doors, along with the overall bad sanitary 
                                                        
28 Dairen Special Issue, SJSB, 6 October 1940. 
29 Liu Zuyin, Manzhou nongye jingji gailun (Introduction to Agricultural Economy of 
Manchuria) (Hsinking: Founding Nation Printing House, 1943), p. 463. 
30 Ibid., p. 466; See also Manchuria Situation and Information Office, Manzhou 
Kuailan (Quick Facts of Manchuria) (Hsinking: Manchuria Situation and Information 
Office, 1939), p. 29. 
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habits had raised serious concerns among the health personnel that participated in 
the survey, who argued that this could potentially cause permanent damage of eye 
irritation and even parasitic diseases for people living in such environments, and 
was particularly risky for infants and young children. Their worries were indeed well 
founded inasmuch as statistical reports published after the collapse of Manchukuo 
have shown that the incidence of intestinal ascariasis among Manchukuoan 
children and teenagers was over 40 percent on average. Cases of trachoma on the 
other hand, were found to be as high as 85 percent among the same groups.31  
 
Beyond the insalubrious conditions of the bedrooms and the living room, it 
was also discovered that the cooking space – which was not always a separate 
kitchen area – was the most squalid of all the spaces in the average Manchukuoan’s 
home. Indeed, during the investigation, it was found that cooking spaces that were 
damp and moist accounted for 28 percent while the ones without sufficient light or 
ventilation made up 64 percent of all the homes surveyed. Kitchens evaluated as 
dirty and infested with insects respectively accounted for 62 and 69 percent, 
whereas the casual disposal of sewage and kitchen waste composed over 72 
percent of all the household surveyed. 32  All such foul unhygienic habits 
accumulated over the decades were so strongly ingrained in the people’ ways of 
living that their dirtiness and insalubrity had become their everyday normal. This 
was not only reflected in the people’s unawareness of their own filth and states of 
living in untidy homes, it was also translated into the putrid use of latrines pits and 
toilets within households. 
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 It is interesting to note that despite its unprecedented comprehensiveness, 
the state-wide survey failed to provide a precise figure on the usage habits of 
lavatories among Manchukuo subjects. As the observers discovered during the 
investigation, this was primarily due to the fact that the vast majority of households 
in the regime were not even equipped with any proper toilets. Indeed, for over 92 
percent of the surveyed households, outhouses with no fence or walls for privacy 
served as lavatories. And since only less than 20 percent of these were disinfected 
on a regular basis, the survey failed to find any toilets free from swarming maggots 
and flies. “In the countryside, it was quite frequent to see people discharge their 
feces in front or in the back of their houses,” noted the report. “It does not end 
there; in every city that we came to visit, we would see ignorant people defecating 
along the streets, making the already dirty roads excessively filthy.”33 Perhaps the 
most detailed description of the living environment of the Manchukuoans came 
from the diary of Dugald Christie, a Scottish missionary who resided in Fengtian for 
more than thirty years before the Mukden incident: 
 
“The houses of the common people defy all our laws of sanitation. 
The floors are either of earth or brick, and are on much the same 
level as the ground outside, or even lower... At one end of the room 
a small kitchen is partly partitioned off; here is the millet-stalk 
furnace, under a large pot, and the flues of the chimney pass back 
and forward inside the kang (brick bed), raising its surface to a 
comfortable heat which lasts for hours. If liberally fired twice or 
thrice a day when cooking the food, the warmth will linger in the 
bricks all the rest of the time; but the smoke of the millet-stalk fuel 
fills the apartment, making the eyes water and the throat smart. No 
attempt is made at keeping the whole place clean, nor at sweeping 
behind cupboards or in corners; it is considered sufficient if the 
kang is clean, and a great many houses are unspeakably dirty. The 
windows have paper instead of glass, allowing very insufficient light 
to penetrate. Few rooms have proper ceilings, and the dust and 
cobwebs of years hang about the roof-beams. The number of 
people living, eating, and sleeping in one room is excessive, and all 
these expectorate freely on the floor. The surroundings of the 
houses are also dirty and insanitary. Stagnant water is allowed to 
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accumulate and every kind of garbage and filth, dogs and pigs being 
the only scavengers.”34 
 
The Manchukuo government on the other hand, was no stranger to the 
unsanitary habits of its subjects. In the Daowai district of Harbin, it was reported in 
1942 that excrement and general waste that had accumulated over the winter 
overflowed entire streets as the waste melted down to liquid in the spring season, 
which subsequently produced “tangy stenches that assailed the nostrils”.35 Such 
phenomena were not unique to the city of Harbin and stretched far across the 
regime. Similar instances were reported in major cities throughout the state, as 
feces and urines disposed on the streets were often described as “piling up to the 
height of a small mountain”, which would also constantly flutter and pollute the 
ambient air with horrendous smells that soon became synonyms to describe 
Manchukuoan residential areas.36 However, despite the government’s efforts to 
maintain a high profile by implementing a series of pervasive economic policies that 
covered and impacted almost all aspects of the people’s daily lives over the years, 
the issue of personal hygiene and concepts of social morals and ethics were always 
an unsettled grey area pending the authorities’ regulation. This is not to say that 
the Manchukuoans were given a great amount of privacy regarding the way they 
chose to live their personal lives, but the widespread apathy and lethargy among 
the authorities indicated that such occurrences in Manchukuoan residential 
quarters did not need to be solved in an urgent manner, as long as it was controlled 
and did not spread beyond these very Manchukuoan residential quarters.  
 
Indeed, it is arguable that the clear hygiene boundaries drawn by the 
authorities could be interpreted as an “enclavist” approach similar to the measures 
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adopted in the concessions in Chinese treaty-ports to prioritize the protection of 
health and well-being of their own.37 It was also evident that the Manchukuo 
government had clearly recognized how the formation of its public health policies 
would invite opposition and resentment given its intrusive nature into the everyday 
life of its population. To be sure, despite the need for disease control, a forceful 
implementation of high personal hygiene standards onto the population would not 
only have been impractical, it would have also hindered the influence of public 
health measures and the exercise of power over the people.38 Essentially, the 
unsanitary images of the Manchukuoans were utilized by the Manchukuo 
government as a justifiable cause to intervene in the private matters of the ordinary 
people. 
 
Historians have long argued about the ways in which the enforcement of 
modern colonial health policies were often, if not always, accompanied by 
mobilization and physical coercion.39 In the case of Manchukuo, this could be seen 
through the implementation of regular spring and autumn wholesale cleansing 
campaigns in all urban neighbourhoods. Posing as voluntary to appeal to the public, 
the binary cleaning activities were in fact mandatory and required the participation 
and contribution of all urban Manchukuoan residents. For the majority, the 
cleaning events were initiated before the beginning of each spring and autumn 
seasons and were led by local police authorities in their respective jurisdictions. As 
the name suggests, the practice of spring cleaning usually consisted of a series of 
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cleaning activities ranging from the removal of general waste, dirt, and filth from 
the streets, sweeping homes, getting rid of excess construction materials, and every 
household was also compelled to purchase garbage and waste bins. Overall, these 
“voluntary” cleaning events mobilized all Manchukuoan residents for an average 
duration of seven days, often referred to as “the week-long event (zhou jian)”, 
wherein they were subdivided into cleaning units under the enforcement and 
supervision of the health police.40 
 
The concept of the health police was formed during the early days of the 
establishment of Manchukuo. With joint supervision and management from 
provincial governors, police chiefs, mayors and county magistrates, the health 
police division was established with the intention of disseminating and popularizing 
health concepts, the prevention of infectious diseases as well as the control and 
suppression of opium and illegal drugs in Manchukuo.41 Intrinsically, the blurred 
and inexplicit affiliation to various government agencies resulted in a shirking of 
responsibility and a lack of funding dedicated to the maintenance of day to day 
operations, which eventually led to the restructuring of the entire division to the 
sole leadership of the Health Department, under the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 
January 1939.42 Ironically, during its existence, the health police was well known for 
its lethargy as well as for being untidy and unkempt. Short of funding even to 
supply officers with the most basic uniforms, health policers were left to wear 
dishevelled personal clothing with no formal tag or sign to display their identity or 
any indicator to prove their authority. As a result, much of the financial remediation 
came from the day to day extortions and bribes taken from the ordinary people. 
Such practices were particularly blatant during cleaning activities. 
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In general, extortions were executed by the health police nit-picking over 
minor faults during examinations. As a result, complaints were frequently 
formulated to denounce health police officers’ abuse of authority and for coming 
up with excuses to fail the hygiene inspections in anticipation of bribery, if not for 
hefty penalties. “They [the health police] visited me one day and said that my home 
was not clean enough,” stated a dejected citizen, “I made sure to clean to the best 
that I could, but when they came back again they found a strand of hair on the floor 
and declared that my home was dirty because of that, they were just cavilling at 
anything they could find.”43 And even though the people’s patience was put to the 
test, all such captious nit-picking was largely tolerated by the government, insofar 
as the methods employed by the health police officers remained well within the 
boundaries of the vaguely expressed indications given by the local authorities. 
Indeed, with ambiguous descriptive terms such as “excessive” and “effluence” were 
adopted to describe the amount of mess or dirt tolerated along with the levels of 
cleanliness to be achieved, such inspection methods almost seemed to have been 
formulated intentionally by the decision makers to be equivocal.  
 
However, the underlying reasons for such behaviour were rather 
straightforward. Due to the limited budget, the authorities saw the routine cleaning 
events as a great incentive to generate and promote the efficient functionalities of 
its own department to reach the set objectives. Since corruption was rampant in 
the government, receiving bribes in order to have work done almost became an 
unwritten norm. Furthermore, regardless of the actual hygiene and living conditions 
of the Manchukuoans, it was also crucial for the Japanese to prioritize state-wide 
safety and prevent any potential spreads of pandemics in the region. Indeed, the 
daily life of the Japanese living in Manchukuo, as well as their needs for everyday 
necessities, were inevitably highly dependent on the services of the people of 
Manchukuo. The frequent daily contacts and interactions made it unavoidable for 
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the potential spread of fatal infectious diseases such as cholera and tuberculosis, 
common within the Manchukuoan communities. 
 
This was especially evident when it was found that the sickness rate among 
Japanese immigrants in Manchukuo was at least seven times higher compared to 
the Japanese living in mainland Japan. More precisely, the mortality rate among 
children was two times higher, and incidences of tuberculosis, dysentery, typhoid 
fever, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and smallpox were respectively 4 times, 19 times, 7 
times, 5 times, 53 times and 120 times higher than in Japan. With the addition of 
immigrants who were forced to return to Japan because of illnesses or for being 
unable to adapt to the conditions that had caused the deaths of thousands more 
annually, it was deemed by Japanese medical professionals that tuberculosis and 
pneumonia, along with other various types of respiratory and infectious diseases, 
were “the most horrible maladies that [had] caused Manchuria to bear the stigma 
of being a land of filth and insalubrity.”44 And yet, the number of Manchukuoans 
affected and perishing from all such diseases was far higher. On 24 June 1942, a 
random screening of sputum on the streets of Dairen was conducted by the 
Kwantung Army doctors, which revealed that over 14 percent of the total sample 
assayed contained Mycobacterium tuberculosis in areas with a higher 
concentration of Manchukuoans.45 Furthermore, another study conducted in 1944 
by physician Zhou Zikui later confirmed the prevalence of infectious diseases in the 
region. Using the Mantoux Test (PPD), Zhou was able to discover that 100 percent 
of the Manchukuoans living in the region were exposed to Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis at some point in their lives. “Some have advocated that the primary 
reason for the rampant spread of diseases is due to the extraordinary geographic 
location and climate [of Manchukuo] … but that is not true,” concluded Zhou in his 
research, “The main reason still lays in the bad hygienic habits of the people. What 
is more, the local residents lack basic knowledge regarding the prevention of 
diseases. As a result, most of them are unable to take appropriate measures and 
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actions if a patient was discovered.”46 Indeed, Manchukuoans had long been living 
unaware of their own filth, and the arrival of the Japanese hustled their routinely 
unsanitary way of living.  
 
In spite of both the Manchukuo and the Japanese governments’ alarmist 
comments regarding the overall incidences among the Manchukuo people, it is 
worth noting that no exact figures or statistics, but only estimations of the number 
of patients were officially produced, largely due to false reports, unclear diagnoses, 
and concealments. Generally speaking, as a direct result of the bad sanitary habits 
and conditions, the demography of Manchukuo always maintained a reproduction 
profile with high birth and death rates, and low natural growth rate overall. In the 
province of Jilin for example, the death rate peaked at 20.6 percent during the 
establishment of the regime, reaching an average of 18.9 percent over the time 
period between 1932 to 1939.47 Similarly, in Liaoning province, the crude death rate 
settled at 19.88 percent in 1936, with the County of Tieling alone registering a 
decimating mortality rate of 74.2 percent caused by an outbreak of multiple 
consecutive diseases, simultaneously surpassing its own population growth rate (74 
percent) for the first time in the county’s history.48 In comparison to the annual 
death rates of major countries in 1935, the corresponding death rate in Manchukuo 
was conspicuously high compared to the United States (10.9 percent), England and 
Wales (11.7 percent), Australia (9.5 percent), Germany (11.8 percent), Japan (12.5 
percent), Italy (13.9 percent) which at the time was in the midst of the Second Italo-
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Ethiopian War,49 and even the city of Shanghai in 1951 (14.2 percent) when its 
corresponding death rate was at its highest in decades.50 Admittedly, regional 
improvements and progress were achieved, for Manchuria used to suffer from a 
much higher mortality rate of over 20 percent during the 1910s and 1920s. 
However, with the mortality rates still high, Japan’s insistence on defining and 
presenting Manchukuo as an established regime that should be “one of the role 
models of East Asia” lacked in credibility.  
 
Regardless, no one was more critical and aware of the need for epidemic 
prevention other than the Manchukuo government itself. More specifically, regular 
publicity campaigns and propaganda emphasizing the importance of pandemic 
prevention were conducted to raise awareness among the Manchukuoans, 
especially during the warmer seasons. In Hsinking, comprehensive teachings and 
information drills about how to perform seemingly basic daily household cleaning 
tasks were communicated and disseminated by the City Office, including how-tos 
on washing and cleaning clothing to regular reminders to shower daily.51 In addition 
to these, the authorities declared the first week of every month as the “rodent 
control week”, during which citizens would be rewarded three jiao and a lottery 
ticket to win up to 1,000 yuan for every mouse corpse submitted to the authorities. 
“It does not matter what method is used to kill the mouse, or if it is dead or alive,” 
as the city officials advertised, “we will not ask for any personal information, and 
we encourage everyone to participate.” 52  Driven by material rewards, such 
activities contributed greatly to the reduction of infectious diseases, as it was 
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reported that over 5,000 mice corpses had been brought to the local police stations 
in Fengtian in just under five days’ time.53 
 
In rural areas, villagers were forced to watch health propaganda films 
wherein rats and flies were depicted as “the Yama from hell” and “the messengers 
of diseases”.54 Village leaders were required to report any suspected cases of 
illnesses and deaths to their superiors in real time, and instructions on disease 
awareness were cleverly compiled into rhythmic jingles and songs.55 Furthermore, 
routine medical treatment teams dispatched by the Manshu Medical University also 
coordinated voluntary check-ups and examinations for people living in more 
remote areas in the countryside during the summertime. With tempting posters 
and slogans offering “free treatments” and displaying catchphrases to “bring the 
dead back to life”, the self-funded treatment teams were well known among the 
villagers as free medicine was always issued to every patient, even if they were 
perfectly healthy.56  
 
All such efforts in attempting to contain the disease and avoid further 
spreading eventually paid off. All in all, only a few major epidemics were recorded 
to have taken the regime during its entire existence. The occurrence of the Plague 
each year from 1932 to 1937 only resulted in a mere 2,698 deaths in total, a 
number that was considered to be very low compared to the outbreak of the 
Plague in 1910.57 As a matter of fact, the total incidence of all legal communicable 
diseases recognized by the government was all kept within a reasonable amount, 
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with only 192 cases of cholera, 4,459 cases of typhoid fever, 1,679 cases of 
smallpox, 4,583 cases of dysentery, 312 cases of diphtheria, 1,484 cases of scarlet 
fever and 426 cases of epidemic meningitis reported in 1935.58 It is worth noting 
that the outbreak of the various infectious diseases over the years were strongly 
regional by nature, with the majority of cases recorded occurring in villages and 
counties with only a few incidences in cities nesting a much denser population. 
 
As a matter of fact, only one confirmed case of the bubonic plague was ever 
reported in Hsinking from 1932 to 1937. The successful preventions could only be 
accredited to the efficacious measures adopted by the government in the face of 
the successive outbreaks. By dint of the authorities’ intervention, cities nesting a 
population larger than 50,000 people were all well-equipped with disinfection and 
quarantine facilities staffed by trained personnel.59 Often executed by force, urban 
residents were vaccinated in prevention against legally-recognized communicable 
diseases, under the supervision of local police forces. The authorities’ vigorous 
efforts would also multiply whenever a new suspected case was discovered. In 
parallel, traffic control and regulations were conducted frequently and travellers 
who failed to provide proof of vaccination would often be denied from boarding 
public transportation or to enter or leave certain regions. Indeed, with the 
emphases on investigation, segregation, and disinfection, the prevention methods 
practised by the Japanese were acclaimed to be at least “on par with those 
implemented in most civilized countries”.60 
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Predictably, such a remarkable track record was achieved at the detriment 
of Manchukuoan people who suffered in the process of the making of the new 
health system. Strict enforcement methods caused a rise of vigilance and more 
cautious attitudes often resulted in the wrongful segregation of patients, for the 
sake of precaution. “The mentioning of the epidemic prevention team alone was 
enough to make people nervous,” recalled by Cao Binghuan, “They would throw 
people into the quarantine wards regardless of the type of disease, even healthy 
people who only had cupping therapy marks on their heads and necks that looked 
like disease symptoms.”61 During the panic of the pneumonic plague outbreak in 
Siping in 1941 that resulted in the death of a merchant whose last name was Ma on 
Daodong street, resident Cao remembered the fear and disorder that followed: 
 
“Specialists affiliated to the city department of health were 
dispatched to evaluate the situation. The majority of them were 
Japanese, with a few Manchukuoan medical graduates… One day a 
worker at the dye house on Daoli 5th street caught a minor ailment 
and was resting on the brick bed. Three of his co-workers were 
taking a nap as well, and one other was in a different room making 
lunch. The epidemic prevention team broke into the house and 
stubbornly insisted that the four workers on the bed were all plague 
patients, and the one that was cooking was inevitably infected and 
in the latent period. They were all sent to the quarantine zone [in 
Yaozhan]. As the isolation unit paid no regards to the life and death 
of the patients inside, four of the workers tried to escape by prying 
through the windows and jumping over the walls. Two of them got 
caught in the process by the Japanese and were beaten to death. 
The remaining two feared for their lives and did not dare to go back 
to the dye house and returned to Siping when the plague alarm was 
lifted the following year. Even though the one with illness did not 
have the plague, he still died in the quarantine unit as no one was 
there to treat or look after him.”62 
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To be sure, the epidemic prevention team’s suspicions were not completely 
unfounded but justified by the fact that the location of the dye house was close to 
the source where the Plague originated in Daoli. However, ironically, the brutal 
enforcement of the health department that generated a large number of 
unnecessary arrests and deaths often made the people view the prevention teams 
as “the bringers of plague (wen shen)” themselves.63 Quarantine zones rapidly 
became a synonym for death row and often, the families of patients who did suffer 
from the Plague would rather conceal the truth than to send their beloved one to 
face certain death. 
 
Equally violent and inhumane was the forced vaccinations activities each 
year. “The inoculations were supposed to be a good thing,” protested Cao, “but it 
was conducted forcefully on the crossroads where the medical staff would pull 
people off the streets for injections. [Sometimes] no proof or registration [of the 
shots] were given and if you were unlucky enough you could get caught at the next 
checkpoint and be forced to take the shot again. They did not care about your 
health status, whether you were pregnant or disabled, or whether that would cause 
potential miscarriages or any future problems.”64 Such oppressive enforcement 
surely fed the ever-present fear and wariness of the people towards disease 
prevention as the years went by. Unlike how the Japanese managed the outbreak 
of the Plague in its Tianjin concession by “sanitizing” the Chinese,65 it can be said 
that the public health measures implemented by the Manchukuo authorities were 
largely mismatched with the needs of the masses. The blind sanitizing that did not 
take account of the Manchukuoans as people with individual needs but as a broad 
sick ensemble to purify also shows that the government only extended its interests 
to the people when the well-being of its own was in jeopardy. Nevertheless, the 
prevention of pandemics proved to be successful, producing low incidence rates, 
which was more than enough to add to any government officials’ political 
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transcripts to advance in their careers, while in contrast, actually caring about the 
peoples’ wellbeing was hardly convincing to even pass as an achievement.   
247 
 
5.4. Doctors, Charlatans and Treatments 
              
 On the administrative level, proactive measures to kick-start the region’s non-
functional medical system was added to the official agenda as early as 9 March 
1932, along with the announcement of the bureaucratic system of the State Council. 
Under the authority of the Director of the Central Ministry of Civil Affairs, the 
Health Department was formally established and subdivided into the Healthcare 
Branch, Medical Treatment Branch, and Epidemic Prevention Branch. In the wake of 
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, the medical system was further 
centralized and unified under the leadership of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In 
addition, the Healthcare Branch was separated into the Education, Community and 
Health Sections in January 1940, while the additional Epidemic Prevention Division 
and Medical Equipment Division were established under the Health Section in 
August. In March 1945, the medical system of Manchukuo was expanded for the 
last time with the new establishments of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Branch, Public 
Welfare Branch, Nursing Branch and the Sanitation and Healthcare Branch. 66 
Undeniably, the deteriorating effects of war were the main cause leading to 
frequent radical reforms to the system. However, the continued centralization of 
administrative power over the health system indicated more than just the 
strengthening of control over strategic materials. 
 
 The introduction of the medical system in Manchukuo was largely driven by 
previous experiences acquired from both the management of the Kwantung leased 
territory, and from the development of the health system in Japan. Influenced by 
Western systems, Japan had progressively adopted the system of private medical 
practitioners during the Meiji Restoration period. However, the overwhelming 
demand for logistics and usable manpower during the first Sino-Japanese War and 
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Russo-Japanese War rapidly made the Japanese government realize the drawbacks 
of its health system in the time of need. Indeed, as the availability of manpower 
within the population was largely determined by physical fitness, the relatively 
expensive healthcare prices stipulated by the Japanese medical association 
undoubtedly failed to meet the governments’ needs for the overall improvement of 
the wellbeing of its people. 
 
 Meiji Japan’s statist approach on national development was therefore 
revamped and reshaped into the “Nationalized Health (guo jia wei sheng)” in 
Manchuria through the SMR under Goto’s leadership. For the Japanese reformers, 
Manchukuo was the perfect experimental field to put their ideas into practice 
without the obstruction of powerful opposing vested interest groups. Reflecting on 
the various shortcomings of the health system in Japan, a public health system was 
officially established in Manchukuo by 1933.67 Contrary to the health system in 
Japan, the public health system of Manchukuo emphasized the popularization of 
non-profit state-owned medical institutions around the state. In order to achieve 
the goal of having at least “one public practitioner in each county”, doctors 
appointed by the government were dispatched to each province with the approval 
of provincial governors. Under the supervision of local magistrates, public doctors 
not only had the responsibility to treat patients, they were also in charge of 
providing guidance and assistance to the health police to improve the overall local 
sanitation conditions. Being subsidized by the government, the prices charged to 
patients for treatment, surgery, and medicine were all strictly monitored and 
regulated by the local administrations to keep the expenditure as low as possible.68 
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 Even though reformers considered such progress to be an important 
achievement, the implementation of the new health system did not come without 
its own set of obstacles. Indeed, for a long time, the practice of traditional Chinese 
medicine had been a well-anchored norm for the people of Manchukuo to turn to 
when they needed to cure ailments and treat illnesses. Private traditional clinics 
were prevalent and established in both the countryside and in urban areas. Doctors 
would normally receive patients for a consultation and apply treatments, or even 
visit patients directly at their homes to deliver remedies. Since reformers were 
advocating for the generalization of Western medicine, traditional Chinese 
medicine practitioners in Manchukuo were inevitably looked down upon by 
Japanese physicians. Such disdain worsened as traditional Chinese medicine was 
widely criticized as it proved to be inefficient during the outbreak of the Plague in 
1910. Not only were the treatments prescribed by Chinese medicine practitioners 
ineffective, they were also believed to have aggravated the spread of the disease 
and for being responsible for a mortality rate of over 90%.69 Certainly, compared to 
the undeniable success in containing the spread of the Plague in the Kwantung 
leased territory through modern methods, the authorities perceived the practice of 
traditional medicine as an inferior medical system impeding on the progress of 
Manchuria. But for the people, on top of being treated as ignorant and backwards, 
the brutal plague-combating measures adopted by the Japanese and the focus on 
treating the disease rather than the patient often meant that they were forced to 
give up their loved ones to epidemic isolation centres and incinerate the deceased 
instead of burying their remains, without being given the chance to even bid 
farewell or to pay their respects.70 As Mark Gamsa later argued, the Japanese 
efforts to control the Plague outbreak in North Manchuria “ranks among the most 
intrusive of Western-managed epidemics”, for which the scientific methods used in 
the process “would have been inconceivable [on a similar scale] in late tsarist Russia, 
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not to mention Western Europe.”71 This explains why the people of Manchuria did 
not waver in their faith in traditional Chinese medicine as the epidemics subsided. 
The Japanese, on the other hand, were equally adamant in seeking their utopian 
conception of the ideal health system for Manchukuo. 
 
 The government’s plan to reform the health system was clearly announced to 
the public when the authorities first attempted to formally abolish the practice of 
traditional medicine in the regime. On 27 June 1932, the first official proclamation 
to outlaw the practice of “superstitious treatments” and “witch doctors (wu yi)” 
was issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs under Health Order No. 313, which was 
carried out by the Fengtian City government, under Civil Order No. 67. “[The witch 
doctor’s] evil nature is fuelled by the bad habits of the ignorant and benighted 
people,” as the order stated. “When people get sick, they would rather put their 
faith in witch doctors instead of in the good medicine that will cure their diseases, 
which also caused the unfortunately high number of deaths.”72 Fostering its own 
saviour image to the people, the government vouched for the responsibility of 
eradicating both the bad habits of the people and the false practices of traditional 
medicine.  
 
 Certainly, the authorities’ ambiguous description of “witch doctors” could be 
interpreted in many different ways. Although superstition was often associated 
with conventional medicine in one way or another, traditional treatment methods 
carried out by Chinese doctors were largely based on theories of herbal therapy and 
acupuncture, which most people were more familiar with at the time. Regardless, 
to the authorities, traditional medicine was deemed to have no logical and scientific 
mechanism of action, and was not so different to the ones waving spades, singing 
and dancing, and believing that they are possessed by the god's power to treat 
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people. Consequently, in 1932, the government of Manchukuo announced to the 
public that medical licenses would no longer be issued, and only those who already 
held a license were allowed to practice traditional Chinese medicine, though 
temporarily. 73  From that moment on began the purge of traditional Chinese 
medicine in the region. Following the prohibition of medical licenses, Chinese 
medicine was forced to change its appellation into “Han medicine”, whereas 
practitioners were to address themselves only as “Han doctors (han yi)” as 
instructed by the government in 1934.74  It can be said that in doing so, the 
authorities attempted to downplay the influence of traditional medicine by 
devaluing it as a narrow “ethnic tradition” rather than a state-wide practice. On the 
other hand, designations such as “charlatans” or “quacks” were openly used by the 
officials when addressing Chinese physicians as an everyday reminder of their 
derogatory status to ensure the boundaries were clear between what was 
considered as “advanced” as opposed to what was “dragging back”.  
 
 Singling out traditional Chinese medicine practitioners did not end with only 
the use of discriminating slurs. To further bring their reputation down, Chinese 
physicians were typically depicted as “charlatans”, publicly presented and shamed 
ignorant deceivers with limited or no medical knowledge, barely literate frauds who 
feinted empathy only to make a fortune out of other people’s tragedy. “Homicide 
by quackery” was the dark humour preferred by the regime’s propaganda machine 
to refer to those who blindly put their lives into the hands of traditional Chinese 
doctors.75 Cautionary stories of traditional medicine malpractice were disseminated 
to the people in a vivid manner. In Heilongjiang, Lü Shaoting’s wife, Lü Cheng 
suffered from sudden abdominal pain and requested Doctor Han Lishun from 
nearby Sanligangzi to come for treatment. The doctor insisted Lü to be treated with 
acupuncture instead of medicine. As the anxious couple agreed, Han inserted 
                                                        
73 Tokutomi Masataka, Manzhou jianguo duben (Readings on the Foundings of 
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74 Ibid. 
75 See for example, Binjiang Special Issue, SJSB, 3 July 1935. 
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several needles into Lü’s abdomen, one of which unexpectedly broke in half with 
one half buried deep in Lü’s stomach. After the doctor nervously tried to remove 
the needle from Lü’s body, the poor woman was rushed to the SMR hospital where 
she received a small open surgery to locate the needle.76 Similarly, in the nearby 
West street, Miss Zhao, who suffered from yellow sores was found to vomit blood 
after taking a dose of medicine prescribed to her by a traditional physician located 
in the north street of Lisandian. After a short battle with the illness, Miss Zhao 
passed away the same day whereas her husband insisted that the physician was 
responsible for her death by giving the wrong dose of medicine. The two parties of 
the dispute took their respective arguments to the police station, where the 
traditional physician was deemed to be guilty and was demanded by the police to 
cover the burial expenses as requested by the husband.77 In the city of Yimianpo, 
Tofu shop owner Mr. Wang visited Liu Guiqin, the in-house physician of the local 
prestigious traditional pharmacy Tianfuhe to prescribe medicine for his three 
month old son who was suffering from diarrhoea. However, Wang’s son soon 
started twitching uncontrollably after taking the medicine and died early in the next 
morning with his entire body covered in purple rashes. The supposedly prestigious 
doctor was later discovered to be an illiterate camel keeper who had somehow 
made his way into becoming a physician thanks to his eloquence and talent for 
deception.78 
 
 What was intriguing about these stories was not only the focus on exploiting 
the “backwardness” of the traditional physicians under the description of the 
authorities, but also their similar traits to avoid responsibilities and their general 
lack of medical ethics. The sympathetic tone of the tales showed more than just 
focusing on the dominant features of “unscientific medicine” and the consequences 
as well as the sufferings of the ignorant people who choose to believe in such 
treatments, it also highlighted how even minor illnesses could be potentially life-
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threatening if they were to be put in the wrong hands. Indeed, as many of the 
Manchukuoan readers at the time would surely have realized, the conclusion was 
made to emphasize the superiority of western medicine, which if the protagonists 
in such stories had chosen, they would have a much happier ending. 
 
 The denouncing traditional Chinese medicine and the slandering of the 
practitioners reached its climax following the introduction of the Chinese Medicine 
Law (Han yi fa) in 1936. The newly established law further regulated the Chinese 
doctors’ activity in the regime, stipulating that all traditional medicine practitioners 
were required to have studied Chinese medicine under official approval and to have 
passed the Chinese medical examinations organized by the local ministers in charge. 
Practitioners who failed to meet the regulations were subjected to a sentence of up 
to six months of imprisonment, or to a fine of up to 500 yuan.79 Additionally, those 
who still practised medicine after the revocation of their licenses incurred a 
potential penalty of up to 300 yuan as well.80 The introduction of the new law 
inevitably set off a new wave of finger pointing and accusations, as the paranoid 
atmosphere generated was becoming more and more evident.  
  
 The planned “purging” process achieved considerable success in Harbin in 
January 1937, with more than 27 traditional medicine practitioners being labelled 
as “charlatans” from the first day of the implementation of the Chinese Medicine 
Law, accounting for approximately ten percent of the total Chinese doctors 
operating in the city.81 Regardless of the mechanisms behind the selective process 
of determining who consisted of a “charlatan” and who was not, a sharp and rapid 
decline of doctors in the city eventually led to further overwork of the already 
strained health services. Consequently, with a ratio of 1 to 3143, the city of Harbin 
was already affected by the deficit of doctors to potential patients, which resulted 
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in an average of 6,000 deaths reported annually. By June, the mortality rate in the 
city almost tripled, recording 15,550 deaths annually, officially marking Harbin the 
city with the highest death rate in the world followed by Tokyo, New York, London, 
and Berlin.82 
 
 The impact of the new law was equally devastating in the countryside, if not 
worse. The movement to eradicate “charlatans” drastically affected the social 
structure and interactions in the countryside, where most rural traditional doctors 
were farmers by nature and treated patients during idle seasons. Looking back at 
his life in the village, Gaochengzhai resident Liang Qibin recalled vivid memories of 
his father, a physician working to help the local people. Serving as his apprentice, 
Liang remembered the peaceful interactions his father had with the villagers. 
 
“My father learned how to practice medicine from his father when he 
was 18 or 19 years old. There was no school, it was all passed down to us. 
He opened a pharmacy [in the village], and there was always a lot of 
people who came to him. Barely anyone paid him with money, the 
villagers always paid with grain, either right away or during the following 
harvesting season... It was silly to ask for money anyways; the people in 
the village did not possess much knowledge. When they caught a cold 
they would come to my father for help, and my father would tell them 
to drink more water, or to make some pepper and ginger soup and they 
will be fine. Sometimes my father will give some yellow lotus, wolfberry 
or peony that he harvested [in the nearby mountains] as anti-
inflammatory medicine to them to treat their illnesses. There was no 
point in charging money for it, the villagers always gave my father some 
grain or food during festivals as a way to thank him, and it was 
enough.”83 
 
The widespread habit to barter goods for services in the countryside can be 
interpreted as one of the main obstacles to the promotion of the new concept of 
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public doctors to the vast rural population. However, even with the absence of 
traditional practitioners, many villagers still sustained their faith in folk 
prescriptions and remedies when they fell ill. Liang Guangshan, a villager in 
Liangjiacun, was one of them, and he recalled: 
 
“[After 1936] there was no Chinese medicine and no Western medicine. 
If people got a serious illness, the only thing that they could do was to 
wait for it to heal by itself, if not then they could only die. There was no 
money [to go see public doctors] for treatments. Minor illnesses are 
easy to tend to. To treat a cut, we would use metal scraps from the 
burning boilers to apply to the wound. If we had a boil, we would go to 
the wood workshop to find some iron leaves to use as cuppings, and 
then slap the boil until it is soft. After that, we would use potato skins to 
apply on the boil to get rid of the toxins. To treat a stomach ache, we 
would heat up the tobacco leaves with the tobacco pipe and roll it very 
thin and wipe it in the belly button.”84 
 
 Regardless of how ineffective or unscientific the remedies Liang used to 
overcome his illnesses were, never once had he or his fellow villagers considered 
the option to go see a public doctor. In addition, even though the medical expenses 
remained low and regulated to be as affordable as possible, most villagers regarded 
the expense as excessive. The average outpatient fee of one to two yuan was 
considered to be of better use purchasing the equivalent of 3.5 to 7 meters of fabric, 
or one to two dou of sorghum rice. With the average peasant in Manchukuo 
earning an average of four yuan per month, the costs involved to treat a minor 
illness at the public doctor’s represented too large a portion of their monthly 
income.85 On the other hand, the negative response of the rural population can also 
be understood as form of resistance vis-à-vis the forceful replacement of their 
indigenous medical practices by Western medicine. In her case study of North India, 
Helen Lambert pointed out that the natives’ refusal to use beneficial biomedicine 
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could mainly be attributed to the claim of its absolute supremacy over indigenous 
treatment methods.86 Similarly, it can be said that the exclusive status of Western 
medicine as the only form of treatment in Manchukuo provided an important 
illustration of how the authorities neglected the real needs of its people. Indeed, 
the rural population was satisfied with the practice of traditional medicine, which 
was both economical and easily accessible. However, the authorities thought 
otherwise. 
 
 Out of the countryside, the situation was a bit different, but still problematic. 
The abundance of medical supplies and well-trained personnel in every major city 
did not necessarily guarantee the systematic supplying of proper medical treatment 
to the Manchukuoans. Reflecting the hierarchical nature prevalent in all spheres of 
the Manchukuo society, hospitals were adept at drawing boundaries and giving 
privileges to the right people. The issue of ethnicity was essential in determining 
what kind of treatment one could receive, and whether they were to receive any at 
all. Fan Zuopeng, a graduate from the South Manchuria Railway Medical University, 
revealed his experience as an employee of the first municipal hospital in Hsinking. 
 
“… The hospital was basically a Japanese hospital, the doctors were 
Japanese, nurses were Japanese and most of the patients who came 
here were all Japanese. Manchukuoan patients were unwelcome and 
looked down upon, so they would rather go to a private [traditional 
medicine] clinic than to come here, the ones who did come were usually 
the ones with severe illnesses that could not be treated anywhere else. 
Among them, the most undesired ones were the dirty and smelly coolies. 
The Japanese doctors would start frowning and wear their masks as 
soon as they entered the room. Dr. Hashimoto from internal medicine 
was a good example. Whenever he needed to diagnose a coolie he 
would stand far away from the patient and quickly use his stethoscope 
to complete his job. Afterwards he would always say to us ‘He had lice! 
Did you see that? It would be really bad to catch typhoid fever from him.’ 
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Sometimes he would even come to me and ask why all Manchukuoans 
had lice and wondered if I had lice as well.”87 
 
 Since no Japanese doctors were willing to treat Manchukuoan patients, the 
hospital was forced to set up a special “Manchukuoan treatment room” fixed up 
with worn out furniture and equipment. And even though a Manchukuoan doctor 
was specifically hired as a replacement, nurses remained problematic, as the only 
official language used among the medical personnel was Japanese. “When they 
called out the names they would use the Japanese pronunciations, and nobody 
would know that they were being called” Fan stated, “when the patients collected 
their medicine, they were often clueless on how to take them as well because the 
personnel in charge of the dispensary was also Japanese.”88 However, there was 
more. Due to “hygiene concerns”, no bedding was ever provided to inpatients 
staying in the Manchukuoan wards. And not only were they compelled to bring 
their own bedding, they were also in charge of maintaining the cleanliness of the 
wards. Bearing some resemblance to prison cells, Manchukuoan patient wards 
were generally overcrowded with 20 or more bunk beds, or two rows of slab beds, 
occupied at all times. A long table was placed at the centre of the room with two 
large basins on both ends to serve food.89 Fan Yulin, a railway maintenance worker 
in Liaoyuan, had the first-hand experience of being hospitalized in Xi’an following a 
car accident while he was working on the tracks. Covered in blood and unconscious, 
Fan’s fellow workers rushed him to the nearby hospital when they saw that he was 
still breathing.  
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“The wards were not so much different from warehouses. There was 
only a slab bed with nothing else inside. Helplessly I requested one of 
the workers to bring some bedding from my home so I could settle down. 
The room was unreasonably dirty. Used cotton balls from cleaning blood 
and pulse were spread all over the floor and the smell made me want to 
vomit.”90 
 
 This was the first thing Fan recalled after being injected with drugs and 
waking up in the hospital with a severe head trauma. Shortly after, Fan’s fellow 
workers brought in surgical doctor Wu to come to attend to his wounds. However, 
the treatment procedure abruptly came to an end as the impatient doctor became 
annoyed at Fan’s constant moans and screams due to the pain. “Forget about it, 
just stay here, your injuries are not serious enough for you to die anyway.” Unable 
to receive the treatment and medicine he needed, Fan was discharged from the 
hospital with some wound dressings after a few days of agony. “My wounds did not 
get any better at the hospital, so I had to resort to a private clinic,” shared Fan, “I 
did not have a salary anymore so I had to borrow money to treat my injury, but at 
least I am healed.”91 
 
 Fan’s relatively optimistic attitude following undeniable neglect at the 
hospital was rather uncommon, as most Manchukuoans who had visited public 
hospitals generally shared disappointing experiences that resulted in sheer anger 
and resentment. A popular jingle that circulated among patients was “Hospital is 
the palace of hell, doctors determine life or death, if you got sick and come here, 
you will face devastation if not death”. 92  Although this was an exaggerated 
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statement of the various discriminations presented to them, the outburst of 
dissatisfactions were undoubtedly caused by the empty promises that were left 
unfulfilled after the introduction of the new medicine law. The government’s 
emphasis on regulated treatment and medicine fees were to ensure the 
affordability of medical care in the state, which could be considered a success, to a 
certain extent. However, as the type of treatment or medicine to give to a patient 
were often determined by public doctors, it was inevitable for Western medicine 
practitioners to be tempted by the ingrained norms of corruption and personal 
favours that ran deep in Manchukuo society. As such, a patient’s financial means 
and social status were very often the only “relevant” factors for doctors to 
determine which treatment to prescribe to the patient. Without material incentives, 
lower class labourers like Fan, who generally had a low salary, were managed and 
moved around like livestock by their bosses, and were bound to be dismissed and 
considered a waste of time.93 On the other hand, the doctors’ refusal to provide the 
proper treatments to the common patients shows how much Japanese doctors 
were unwilling to associate with the average Manchukuoans, and how far they 
were willing to go in order to maintain firm boundaries between them as those who 
they perceived as lower-class peoples. This suggests that although scientific 
medicine could be seen as the most intrusive element in the colonial society,94 it 
was still “enclavist” by nature, with the primary concern being to provide benefits 
for the subjugators themselves.  
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 One of the few individuals who questioned and challenged the State’s 
decision to focus on quality over quantity was Zhang Jiyou, Chief of the Epidemic 
Section, operating under the Healthcare Division, who later became the dean of the 
Fourth Municipal Hospital in Hsinking. “The habitual trust of traditional medicine 
among the people could be traced back to thousands of years ago and it is wrong to 
eradicate it completely. [If it is fully banned] more than 20,000 practitioners will 
lose their jobs, let alone the tens of millions of the Manchukuo people who face the 
threats of illness with no available doctors there to treat them.” 95  Zhang’s 
statement could be considered to be against the broader anti-traditionalist current 
and sentiments, and to some extent, represented the unofficial opinions regarding 
the new law within the bureaucracy. Seldom voiced out loud, the unpredictable 
waves of purging of traditional doctors made every remaining Chinese medicine 
practitioner in the regime fear for their livelihoods. Those who managed to fulfil the 
demanding requirements enumerated by the government were placed under strict 
surveillance, with records of their personal information, date of birth, address and 
the date of approval all collected forcefully by local governments.96 The idea behind 
this was simple enough. Even though the authorities heavily relied on denunciation 
as one of the most effective ways to control and lower the number of traditional 
physicians in the regime, instilling fear among the peoples and pressuring the 
traditional practitioners worked wonders in similar ways. Risking jail time and 
monetary penalties, many practitioners were forced to adopt a prudent attitude 
towards patients insofar as one small mistake would be enough to end their careers.  
 
 Notwithstanding the above, in the case of Manchukuo physicians, things took 
a turn for the better with the introduction of the Chinese Medicine Examination 
Order (Han yi kao shi ling) and the implementation rules of the Chinese Medicine 
Examination Order (Han yi kao shi ling shi xing xi ze) on 1 August 1941. Serving as 
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an amendment to the Chinese Medicine Law of 1936, the new regulations extended 
the limitations on traditional practitioners by issuing new medical licenses to 
include physicians who studied Chinese medicine for at least five years and who 
passed the Chinese medicine examination organized by the authorities. Accordingly, 
Chinese medicine workshops were established across the state for a period of six 
months prior to the examinations to instruct applicants on basic Western medicine 
and clinical treatment knowledge.97 The introduction of the two new laws could be 
seen as an appeasement policy to mediate the conceptual conflict between 
traditional and Western medicine in the regime. However, the worsening war in the 
Asia-Pacific theatre demanded the mobilization of more Western medicine doctors 
to serve in the frontlines, which inevitably created a bigger deficit of the availability 
of medical resources in Manchukuo.  
 
 However, from the government’s perspective, such a compromise was 
without a doubt carried out reluctantly. This was further reflected in the new 
outline of the National Healthcare System (Guo min yi liao zhi du gang yao) 
promulgated in 1943 and the Medical Group Law (Yi liao tuan ti fa) introduced in 
1944. The two laws ensured the integration of traditional practitioners into the 
State’s non-profit public health system framework, which in turn allowed the 
government to re-shuffle them into publicized services that could be regulated by 
the State in a unified manner.98 After a series of trial and error, the government’s 
recognition of traditional medicine was eventually replaced by the suppression of 
traditional medicine practionners’ liberty to establish private clinics unless they 
followed the authorities’ guidelines. Technically allowed to exist, the guidelines 
were so strict that, by 1945, the number of traditional physicians in Liaoning 
Province still witnessed a gradual decrease to 6,106, which is 1,478 less compared 
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to the number of 7,584 in 1937. 99  David Arnold argued that the process of 
introducing biomedicine and normalizing its use in an “alien” society often required 
taking practical possibilities into consideration.100 In line with Arnold’s argument, it 
could be said that the Manchukuo government’s compromise vis-à-vis the practice 
of traditional medicine after 1941 was mainly due to the ordinary people’s 
resistance towards the practice of a westernized public health system that was 
discriminatory by nature. Nevertheless, it is also important to specify that the 
government’s compromise was only possible because of the progress of the war, 
which pressured the Manchukuo authorities to lessen their medical commitment to 
the people. 
 
 Overall, as a result of the vigorous efforts of the Manchukuo government, the 
successful implementation of a comprehensive medical system was achieved for 
the first time in the region. Modern Western medicine concepts and practices 
developed tremendously by dint of the nationalization of the hospitals and health 
services across the regime. The effective deployment of medical personnel and the 
rational use of resources ensured an adequate health coverage and supply even 
during times of shortage. And apart from vials and packaging papers, the reserves 
of medicine in the hospitals in Hsinking were never found to be running out or close 
to being in short supply.101 Ironically, even though the public health system was 
reformed with the intention to provide accessible healthcare to all, only the 
privileged members of the society were able to fully enjoy its benefits. Indeed, 
comparing the life expectancy of Manchukuoans who merely averaged 36 years old 
by 1945 with the United States (65.58), United Kingdom (65.75), Japan (48.25), 
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Taiwan (43.8), Korea (44.89) and China (37),102 the case of Manchukuo, a relatively 
peaceful regime that did not participate directly in any warfare,103 was strikingly 
low.104 Although little data nowadays can be found on the life expectancy of the 
people of Manchuria during the warlord regime, it is still safe to say that the overall 
life quality in Manchukuo was in important ways no better after 14 years of 
Japanese rule than in 1931, and noticeably lower than the formal colonies of Korea 
and Taiwan, let alone be compared to Japan itself. This would in return suggest that 
reforms to the public health system, which were placed at the expense of 
traditional Chinese medicine, had little if any positive impact on the public health 
situation overall.  
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 In Manchukuo, opium was infamous for multiple reasons. Although nowadays, 
opium is understood as a devastating drug that led to the decline of the Qing 
dynasty, at that time, such considerations were relegated to the back of ordinary 
Manchukuoans’ minds. Highly sought after in the region, opium made its way to the 
people through a variety of misleading designations and descriptions. The 
competition was fierce, and countless labels and brands were created and 
popularized by opium dens in attempt to attract new customers and retain habitual 
ones. Opium that was harvested from Jilin Province was most commonly referred to 
as “pine (song)”, “bamboo (zhu)” and “plum (mei)”, whereas opium harvested from 
Rehe Province in the west was -ironically-  sold under the names of “blessing (fu)”, 
“good fortune (lu)” and “longevity (shou)”.105 In addition, opium was popularly 
thought by Manchukuoans to hold medicinal properties able to cure ailments and 
illnesses. It was thus believed to be especially efficient against common colds, 
headaches, and to fight abdominal pain. A survey conducted by a health officer in 
Fengtian in 1942 showed that out of the 1,800 individuals surveyed, only 170 used 
opium as a recreational drug whilst the remaining were all motivated by its 
therapeutic efficacies.106 On the other hand, despite being held as an efficacious 
medicine by some, it was also commonly viewed as a main cause of death for many. 
A deprecating joke that circulated among drug addicts pointed out to the three 
benefits of being a drug user, “get poor faster, die faster and coffin bearers walk 
faster.”107 
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 The Japanese and Manchukuo authorities did attempt to solve the opium 
problem, in which they were eventually successful to a certain degree. As one of 
the 12 signatory countries that took part in the International Opium Conventions in 
The Hague in 1912, 1925, and 1931, the Japanese government took a stance on the 
drug problem in Asia and vowed to contribute towards drug prohibition to the best 
of its abilities. Therefore, in the early years of the state, the entirety of Manchukuo 
indulging in opium represented a tarnished image the Japanese could not proudly 
showcase in front of the League of Nations. Naturally, following the seizure of 
Manchuria came the condemnation of the previous warlord administration policy 
on opium that resulted in the number of drug addicts in the region.108 Even though 
the warlord administration in Manchuria did operate on a prohibition policy, its 
efficacy was limited as the region was torn by war. Indeed, drugs were 
instrumentalized as a form of political and economic capital, and were regarded as 
a form of hard currency the value of which was even more stable than the various 
monetary currencies issued in the region over the years.109 Under such concerns, 
many attempts were made under the successive governments of both Zhang Zuolin 
and Zhang Xueliang. However, despite these efforts, only the partial suppression of 
the cultivation and usage of opium were reached in some provinces, such as in 
Jilin.110 Without a doubt, eradicating opium usage in Manchuria was far from being 
in the warlord government’s priorities. The partial restriction on opium achieved 
little success in bringing down the total number of addicts in the region.111 Although 
poppy fields and opium dens could be eradicated in one area, nothing really 
stopped drug addicts from travelling to the next one. 
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 With tremendous success and experience in controlling the drug problem in 
Taiwan, the Japanese brought about a new plan for opium and drug regulation in 
Manchuria under the Opium Act (Ya pian fa) introduced in September 1932.112 
Under the law passed during the 53rd State Council meeting held in Hsinking, it was 
dictated under Article 3 that the purchase and production of opium and medicinal 
opium were to be executed by the State only, while the cultivation of the poppy 
without governmental approval was strictly prohibited.113 The semi-legal status of 
opium in the state granted by the government was followed by a brief explanation 
given by the officials. 
 
“The policy, unlike the unsuccessful attempts of the former 
administration, does not completely prohibit smoking, as past 
experiences have shown that such an attempt only aggravates the 
situation, instead of affording any remedy. The government, therefore 
realizes that careful and gradual eradication of the practice are essential. 
This will naturally be a slow and painstaking process, but it provides the 
only realistic and practical solution to the opium problem.”114 
 
 The approbation of the authorities brought a new wave of poppy cultivation 
in the countryside. Driven by the huge potential profits of opium, during harvest 
seasons, poppy fields attracted tens of thousands of fortune seekers from nearby 
towns to partake in the rush for revenue. In Raohe County alone, more than 60,000 
individuals were attracted to the “black gold rush” each year. During the harvesting 
times, addicts scrambled to barter commodities with the local farmers for opium, 
opening up temporary gambling houses, performing acrobatics and resorting to 
prostitution to get their hands on what they were craving for.115 In cities, opium 
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circulated in a much more civilized and sophisticated manner. Euphemistically 
described as “blossom cloud houses (hua yan guan)”, private opium dens were 
operated under the approval of the authorities at the price of a small business 
license fee of 500 yuan to be remitted annually.116 Semi-finished opium was issued 
by the local monopoly bureaus and was processed and packaged carefully into 
small delicate bags categorized by their place of origin in the dens. The art of opium 
smoking was perfected to the extreme. Dens were known for their elegant designs 
and the fastidious use of various smoking tools. Swan lamps with silver shades, 
famous paintings, exquisite tables and chairs made out of alluring wood were the 
usual decorations preferred by the dens owners. Interiors were generally divided 
into common rooms and private single rooms, each staffed with experienced 
employees, or young and attractive waitresses for an extra fee, to help with the 
preparation of the opium paste prior to smoking. During evenings and holidays, the 
dens would witness a constant stream of customers, for not only the regular addicts, 
but also people who wanted to entertain their guests or to host informal business 
meetings.117 
 
 The bustling opium scene generated so much competition that it had become 
increasingly difficult to make a profit at all due to the number of competitors. By 
1933, a total of 245 government-approved opium dens were founded in Dandong, a 
dramatic increase compared to the mere 20 dens that were in operation in 1931. 
Approximately 400 to 500 were registered in the city of Yingkou, and more than 
750 were found in the downtown area alone in Fengtian.118 Produced in bulk by 
State-invested opium paste factories, the opium issued by the government was not 
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reputated for its taste and quality. Indeed, the ways in which opium was processed 
in the drug dens were crucial to stand out from from competition.  
 
  Adulterating opium with shredded tobacco leaves from cigarettes was one of 
the most common and economical way to boost the efficacy of the drug. After 
processing, the tobacco leaves were known to induce a special whiff of incense that 
would also increase the paste by size, giving a much smoother overall sensation for 
the users. Another popular method was to mix opium together with spirits to 
enhance the calm and sedated state, despite the dangers of causing respiratory 
arrest potentially leading to death. The most infamous method preferred by the 
users was the blending of heroin or morphine into the opium paste that could give 
a much bigger boost, which was described as “gold inside silver”.119  
 
 In order to purchase opium, addicts were required to be registered with the 
local police, and strict rules were set to determine how much drugs one could buy 
per diem. Without a doubt, there were still issues within the new model of opium 
regulation. Legally, government officials, teachers, doctors and students were not 
allowed to apply for a smoker’s permit, but it was common practice for the dens’ 
employees to set aside some of the rations to deal with unlicensed addicts or to sell 
on the black market, for extra money. By the end of 1935, a total number of 
217,069 drug users were licensed and registered by the police. However, a 
conservative estimation of the total amount of drug addicts in the state reached 
over 1.11 million, accounting for approximately four percent of the entire 
population.120 On the streets of Manchukuo, typical drug addicts could be easily 
identified by the dull and absent look on their faces, their pale skin and thin frame, 
the constant yawning, watery eyes and running noses. To support their overhead 
habits, pawning, thieving, begging and even selling their children were considered 
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as options. For 7.5 kilograms of crude opium, Tuanshanzi resident Jiang sold off his 
wife and daughters to a trafficker. Xie, an addict from the same town, forced his 15 
years old daughter to become a prostitute to support his cravings. A drug abuser 
named Cui on the other hand, rented out his own wife to others for three years for 
the price of 1.5 kilograms of opium paste.121 Often unimaginable in today’s society, 
such absurdities almost became a second nature among drug addicts. The 
uncontrollable desire for drugs not only led to the scattering of families, but often 
led to the addicts’ own death as well. 
 
 “Where is Wang? How come he is not here today?”, “Wang has quit 
smoking.”, “Well, if he is not dead already he will eventually be back.”122 Such were 
the sarcastic yet casual conversations between an opium den owner and one of his 
regular customers in Haicheng. Apart from the steady supply of legalized drugs, the 
government provided little help towards addicts who were fighting their addictions. 
Despite the set objectives to gradually reduce the numbers over time, too few 
detoxification centres (guan yan suo) were established in the regime, and all of 
those had the capacity to accommodate around 4,000 to 5,000 addicts in total 
only. 123  The authorities’ indifference towards the well-being of drug addicts 
eventually resulted in disintegrated scenes filled with putrid corpses adorning the 
streets and alleyways of the cityscape.  
 
  In the city of Harbin, 2,193 dead bodies devitalized by opium, heroin and 
morphine overdoses were found on the streets in the year of 1935 alone, averaging 
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in around 200 deaths per month or five to six deaths daily.124 In Dairen, deaths 
related to the use of recreational drugs accounted for 60 percent of the total 
annual death toll of approximately 19,000, for which it was discovered that heroin 
laced with lead powder was one of the main causes of deaths in the streets.125 In 
the capital city, the municipal administration was forced to dispatch police officers 
to patrol the streets regularly in order to remove the increasing number of dead 
bodies in a timely manner. With only 474 corpses found in 1934, the number 
doubled in 1935 and reached almost 1,000 by November 1937. “The 
implementation of the Opium Law caused a good number of weak-willed citizens to 
covet to such temporary reliefs,” documented a worried Hsinking official, “an 
average of at least three corpses can be found on the streets daily, in all honesty, 
this has now become a major social issue.”126  
 
 The lack of specific regulatory actions determined by the Manchukuo 
authorities took a sudden turn in 1937. A new policy prohibiting opium (Duan jin ya 
pian fang ce yao gang) was put into effect to replace the old Opium Act, limiting the 
cultivation of poppy fields to Rehe and Xing’an Province only. Correspondingly, with 
the intention to gradually eliminate the use of opium by 1946, the government also 
pledged to cure the addictions of all drug users in the state within ten years’ 
time. 127  The abrupt change in the regime’s stance towards opium could be 
attributed to the introduction of the Five-Year Industrial Development Plan in the 
same year. Indeed, even though the Manchukuo government was enjoying an 
annual income of approximately 10 million yuan gained from the semi-legalization 
of opium, the enormous number of insatiable drug addicts in the regime led the 
authorities to estimate that more than 180-million-yuan worth of opium were 
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consumed. 128  The hefty sum invested into the industrial development plan 
suggested a high demand for available labourers within the regime, whereas the 
common drug addicts that were weak in their physical fitness, did not fit the 
required standards. 
 
 As a result, the number of opium dens in the state was slowly brought down 
by the authorities, with the ones that still remained in business nationalized by the 
government under the new monopoly system. On par with the policy promoting 
“one public practitioner in each county”, a similar “one rehabilitation centre in each 
county” was proposed and put into practice. Previous detoxification centres and 
relief shelters were reorganized into Recovery Living Institutions (kang sheng yuan), 
a primitive version of today’s drug rehabilitation clinics. However, unlike more 
contemporary drug rehabilitation clinics, such institutions operated in ways similar 
to labour camps and prisons. To begin with, unlicensed drug addicts were no longer 
tolerated by the State, and often faced compulsory detoxification once discovered 
by the police. Recovery Living Institutions were known for their harsh rules and 
punishments. “I felt like I was in jail, not allowed to talk, move, or to contact outside 
people or meet with family members.”, stated a former detained addict, “If any of 
the rules were broken, they [the staff] would beat us and curse at us, and not give 
us food nor allow us to sleep at night.”129 In addition, a type of detoxification jab 
named “Eastern Light (dong guang ji) were forcibly given to the addicts, which was 
considered by the authorities as the “detox panacea” that could cure the addicts 
within a week of regular injections. 
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 More precisely, under the joint development of pharmacist Yamaguchi 
Kazuichi and Harbin Medical University researcher Shozan Masaru, the “Eastern 
Light” injection was advertised to have significant efficiency, with a treatment 
success rate of over 98 percent. Deemed as the latest and most innovative drug 
treatment medicine of the new era, the injection was further exported in large 
quantities to various Japanese occupied regions in China proper. “I know a lot of 
addicts are sitting on the fence and having doubts about the new medicine, but 
there is nothing to fear for.” stated Guan Tiantao, the former director of a 
rehabilitation clinic during a promotional speech in Tangshan, “Last year, the 
Northern China Drug Control Bureau requested 200 samples from Manchukuo for 
testing, and all participated patients came back with good results. This is the 
medicine that will bring addicts out of the darkness and into the light again.”130 
Slogans stressing on the harmfulness of drugs were displayed on the streets of 
Manchukuo, whereas propaganda events advocating the need to ban drugs were 
held regularly by the local administrations.131 Official letters were sent to schools to 
raise awareness among students, along with candy boxes printed with the images 
of smoking pipes being destroyed.132 Arguably, over 370,000 addicts in Manchukuo 
were reported to be “cured” between 1940 and 1941, and most of them with the 
ability to work were organized into labour teams to work in construction, factories 
and mines.133  
 
 With regards to the Eastern Light injection pharmacological effects and 
chemical composition, little can be found nowadays to inform or even justify the 
reports and statements on the numbers of addicts officially claimed to have been 
“cured” by it. Both Norman Smith and Mark Driscoll have suggested that the key 
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component in the injection consisted of amphetamine, a synthetic stimulant that 
was known for its short-term energy enhancing effects that allowed its users to 
combat fatigue. 134 Indeed, whether drug users, especially the ones who were 
addicted to opiates, could actually become highly functional physical labourers 
remains debatable, and it is without a doubt that the Manchukuoan addicts were 
devalued by the Japanese into what Driscoll defined as “disposable robots”.135 
Historians of medicine have argued how the development of biomedicine in 
colonies was usually driven by concerns about the well-being of the colonized 
subjects, mostly as a way to preserve, or to ensure the continuous reproduction of 
usable labourers.136 On the other hand, it should be noted that Manchukuo’s opium 
policies bear strong resemblance to the ones adopted by the Kuomintang 
government throughout the 1920s. Both Manchukuo and Kuomintang governments 
heavily depended on the monopolization of the opium trade to generate an 
essential portion of their financial income, and both vowed to accomplish 
eradication targets that were unrealistic politically and economically.137 But for the 
drug users in Manchukuo, who were not only denied by the authorities to receive 
the proper treatments and detoxification medicine to overcome their addictions, 
but instead were forced to be injected with another powerful and addictive drug to 
temporarily boost their efficiency to work as manual labourers, shed new light on 
the forceful and exploitative nature of the modernized public health system of 
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 All in all, this chapter suggests that to some extent, the Manchukuo 
authorities instrumentalized the ordinary people’s pressing issues and needs with 
regards to health and hygiene, not only because of the necessity to control the 
spread of diseases in the region, but also as an effective “tool of the empire”. To 
begin with, that the authorities deployed relentless efforts to regulate public 
sanitation and resources to force vaccinations highlights how miserable the private 
hygiene standards of the ordinary people were. At the same time, the 
government’s deliberate attempts to concentrate “unhealthy activities” within the 
Manchukuoan living environments falls in line with what Ruth Rogaski described as 
the creation of things that could “neither be seen nor smelled.”138  Although during 
its existence, the regime saw relatively few large epidemics, the average 
Manchukuoan barely witnessed any improvements to their health standards given 
the overall high death rate and low life expectancy. This further shows how public 
health measures were implemented with the intention to fulfil the sanitation needs 
of both the Manchukuo and Japanese authorities while barely extending its benefits 
to the ordinary people.  
 
 The introduction of a modern public health system came at the cost of well-
established traditional Chinese medicine practices that had been dominant in the 
region for hundreds of years, which became the holy grail for denunciation and 
discrimination by the advocators of advanced Western medicine. In the process of 
transforming the images of “spade waving illiterate witch doctors” into “needle 
waving white-coated physicians” in the regime, traditional doctors were subjected 
to numerous incriminations, and the number of practitioners was strictly controlled 
and monitored by the Manchukuo government. However, the development of a 
scientific health system was met with both resistance and indifference from the 
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people, who often found themselves denied any healthcare services altogether due 
to the sharp decrease of traditional physicians and the discriminating attitudes of 
public doctors. 
  
 The “war on drugs” on the other hand, was a completely different story. 
Despite being perceived as a notorious drug known for its devastating effects, 
opium was partially legalized by the Manchukuo authorities who were not shy in 
taking advantage of its value. As a direct consequence, the regime witnessed a 
sharp increase in the total number of drug addicts while at the same time, the 
government enjoyed a high income from taxing the drug. Following the 
introduction of the Five-Year Plan in 1937, the Manchukuo authorities took 
measures to control the growing drug addiction within the regime. Drug addicts 
were forcefully rushed into detoxification centres, injected with performance-
enhancing substances, and transformed into disposable hard labourers. This 
effectively showcased how, within the context of modernized healthcare, the well-
being of the ordinary people of Manchukuo was not only neglected to an 
exceptional degree, but also exploited to great lengths by the colonial authorities. 
 
 The ways in which heath developments unfolded in Manchukuo add another 
layer of complexity to the understanding of Japanese imperialism. On the one hand, 
the clear hygienic boundaries drawn by the authorities to prioritise the well-beings 
of the colonisers, the lack of consideration to indigenous cultural practices, and the 
exploitation of its subjects discussed in this chapter were common features of 
colonial societies at the time. However, the role of the puppet state as testing 
grounds to experiment progressive health reforms to eventually implement in 
Japan’s home islands, along with the prevalent establishment of state-of-the-art 
healthcare institutions across Manchukuo on the other hand, were not features 
shared in other comparable colonial regimes. While the needs and well-beings of 
ordinary Manchukuoans were undoubtedly ignored to a great length, the few 
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outbreaks of major epidemics and a relatively low mortality rate can be considered 
as a noticeable achievement, especially with the backdrop of high crime rates and 
shortage issues that plagued the regime during its entire existence. It could indeed 
be said that there was some exceptionality to Japanese imperialism in Manchuria 
through the lenses of public health developments. The massive structural 
investments made to the development of a new public health system in 
Manchukuo suggest that the Japanese had a long-term vision for the puppet state, 
which hints to the fact that had it not been for Japan’s sudden defeat in 1945, they 
were most likely intending to see the fruits of their efforts.  
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Chapter Six – Conclusion 
 
 Regardless of the underlying political motives, Manchukuo operated like 
many other states, with its own legal system accompanied by various governmental 
agencies that kept the regime’s motor running until the final days of its existence. 
The ordinary people of the puppet state, who constantly found themselves 
navigating in a grey zone between compliance and resistance in order to survive, 
were harder to pass a verdict on. Incentives to accept the new state varied from 
one individual to the next. People who were in a position to exercise power that 
collaborated were generally motivated by either the pursuit of personal political or 
economic achievements, regardless of their actions being supportive or against the 
regime.1 In contrast, the ordinary masses’ everyday lives were filled with onerous 
chores and work the only purpose of which was to keep food on their tables and 
roofs over their heads. In their case, collaborating or not was far less of a concern 
insofar as they were mostly preoccupied by their own worries of daily survival.2 
Indeed, this thesis started with a series of questions in mind: In what ways did the 
specific political framework of Manchukuo have impact on ordinary people’s daily 
lives? Did their living standards improve at all? Or perhaps the most important 
question in retrospect, was it all worth it in the end?  
 
To answer these questions, this thesis thus explored and discussed various 
elements and aspects of the everyday life of ordinary people during the existence of 
Manchukuo. First and foremost, life in Manchukuo was filled with unpredictable 
events and predicaments that never permitted the people of Manchukuo to be in 
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full control of their own fate. The early years of the regime were full of turbulences 
and circumstances that forced the authorities to make dramatic political 
manoeuvres to respond to the Japanese’s eagerness to present the puppet state as 
an independent sovereign power to its international audience rather than just a 
titular one. Surely, the necessity for Japan to deploy such efforts in order to justify 
its presence in Manchukuo could be contested, which would indicate that the 
occupation of Manchuria aimed to accomplish a situation of autarky in anticipation 
of total war. Although this is indeed accurate, solely resorting to sheer force never 
really sufficed to sustain dominance, as even the most despotic and oppressive 
regimes need to rely on the cooperation of their subjects.3 
 
Undoubtedly, rallying the Manchukuoans to adopt visions of Pan-Asianism 
and of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was essential to create hordes of 
willing collaborators. The youths of Manchukuo were thus one of the most 
vulnerable and malleable puppets the authorities chose to mold. Considerable 
efforts were put into establishing and fostering a new national consciousness. 
Carefully selected knowledge and information were instilled in the students in a 
sophisticated manner, stressing in the importance of Japan as the saviour of East 
Asians, and as the irreplaceable ally of Manchukuo. With hopes of the new 
generation becoming faithful and devoted servants to aid in Japan’s cause, the 
youths were bestowed with a certain amount of social privileges. High school 
uniforms served as a symbol of social status, a visual representation to indicate 
superiority above others within Manchukuo society. In return, the authorities 
demanded absolute obedience from the youths, as any offensive behaviour that did 
not comply with their requirements was met with severe punishments. 
 
However, this outward obedience did not mean that the youths held the 
Japanese in high regard. Much like the rest of the society, the youths were 
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generally passive in face of the repressive demands of the authorities, but yet were 
active in voicing their dissatisfaction in a subtle manner. Such resistance took shape 
in cleverly formed jingles, name calling, and truancy as the education system 
gradually revealed its militaristic nature that emphasized labouring activities. This 
thesis hence uncovers the making of the youths’ “public selves” and “private selves” 
through this process and the parallels of their two different types of 
interchangeable behaviour. One that was sycophantic towards the Japanese, 
adopted as a necessity for survival, and another that came into play as time went 
by, that demonstrated the youths’ resistance of and dissatisfaction with the 
Japanese.  
 
Even though the schools overlooked the repeatedly voiced discontentment 
triggered by unequal treatment between the Manchukuoan students and their 
Japanese counterparts, venting political dissatisfaction, on the other hand, was 
absolutely not tolerated, and the Japanese authorities did not hesitate to 
demonstrate their will to punish anyone even remotely suspected of partaking in 
political opposition. The process of generating a new national consciousness meant 
that the old one had to be extirpated, and the authorities made sure that the 
boundaries were clear. The youths were therefore stripped of their identity as they 
were forced to take on new identities. At the same time, any mention of “being 
Chinese” and any association with their old identity resulted in criminal charges on 
the basis of being “Anti-Manchukuo and Japan”. However, imposing new identities 
onto the youths only produced more insecurities, and forceful assimilation through 
the implementation of the Bushido spirit led to the creation of a new generation of 
bewildered students, an effort that was inevitably met with failure as the youths 
were worn down by the regime. By exploring the everyday life of the Manchukuo 
youths, this thesis showed why the Japanese ultimately failed to anchor a long-
lasting sense of loyalty in the youths, which also served as a significant comparison 




On the other hand, the various economic problems that weighed down the 
daily lives of the people were undoubtedly the main concerns that increased 
dissatisfaction towards the regime, challenging its legitimacy and governance 
during its fourteen years of existence. Querulous yet cautious and relatively passive 
students were problematic, but manageable. However, the realities of severe 
shortages and famine were lingering issues that the Manchukuo government had to 
deal with head on. In a nutshell, people were living poorly, and in too many cases, 
far more poorly than before the Mukden incident. Along with the creation of 
Manchukuo came the growth of banditry in the countryside, which caused a great 
deficit in the supply of grain in the regime, since fearful peasants and farmers fled 
to cities. People were hungry, and the soaring prices affected all food staples, 
gradually becoming unaffordable for the masses, which largely worsened the 
already tense socio-economic situation.   
 
Worse again, the disrupted social order generated further chaos in the 
fragile monetary system carried over from the warlord administration, forcing 
countless merchants throughout the state to go out of business. Since basic 
commodities were hard to come by, desperate Manchukuoans began acting out in 
consequence. It was not uncommon for the most obedient and submissive citizens 
to become radical risk takers and opportunists. Stealing, looting, robbing and 
committing fraud became essential survival skills that an increasing number of 
people developed and acquired regardless of the constant possibility of being 
caught and punished by law enforcers. 
 
After a series of governmental reforms, the chaotic situation improved for a 
brief period, as businesses showed signs of being sustainable once again. However, 
the short age of economical rejuvenation was abruptly interrupted by the Second 
Sino-Japanese War in 1937, which shattered the ordinary people’s hopes and 
dreams of future abundance. With the introduction of the rationing system, the 
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government urged its citizens to economize the limited resources at hand with 
promises of a more stable life in the future. The Manchukuoans, however, had 
already become familiar with the regime’s official rhetorical discourse, and knew 
that the rationing of goods was in fact related to the ongoing shortages that had 
been plaguing the regime.  
 
The everyday life of the Manchukuoan people was characterized by the 
constant entanglement and pressure to have access and to obtain goods, an 
overwhelming concern that weighed down the lives of the people continually until 
the collapse of the regime. And if scarcities were synonymous with hardships for 
the larger part of the Manchukuoans, for some others, shortages were seized as 
chances to build a fortune. State monopolization was met with more and more 
opportunists who were often individuals with the same risk-taking mentality that 
was honed from previous struggles. To be sure, since the rationing system 
introduced by the government could barely keep up to its own promises, no one 
was capable of surviving without bending or breaking at least a few rules. 
 
The Manchukuo government attributed the flaws of its distribution and 
rationing systems to the “backwardness” of its subjects, condemning hoarders, 
speculators, and their customers altogether. However, for the majority of the 
Manchukuoans, personal favours, connections, and privileges had become so 
closely linked together with the distribution of rations that little room was left for 
them to obtain goods through the official channels. By examining the behaviour of 
the ordinary people during times of shortage, this thesis has shown the ways in 





On top of dealing with shortages, the sense of being homeless was also an 
essential factor that contributed to the misery of life in Manchukuo. The raging 
issue of banditry in the countryside resulted in the forceful relocation of a 
considerable proportion of the rural population. Stressing the imperative to 
separate the peasants from the bandits, thousands of villagers were forced out of 
their native homes and placed into defensive collective villages in the name of 
safety. With the priority of withstanding any possible attacks from bandits, the 
defensive collective villages were designed to look and perform like fortresses, with 
strict surveillance and regulations put into effect to insulate the villagers from any 
“unnecessary” outside communications. Needless to say, life inside the collective 
villages was grim. Not only were the residents forced to build the fortresses, even 
the most basic construction materials were ill supplied causing the impoverished 
residents to have no choice but to live in primitive huts made out of straw, mud, 
and scraps of material left over from the construction of the gates and fences.  
 
Such primitive sheds meant that most inhabitants often had to put up with 
dark, damp, cramped, and overall uncomfortable living spaces. Privacy, or any type 
of personal space was a luxury few could enjoy. Having to cook, eat or even sleep in 
common areas was not uncommon as the simply built shelters barely had enough 
space to accommodate an entire household. Amenities such as electricity and 
running water were non-existent in such facilities and due to the lack of heating and 
insulation, cold seasons were the hardest to endure. 
 
Ironically, one way for the Manchukuo government to show off its glorious 
achievements to the citizens as well as to international audiences was through the 
extensive display of the newly constructed infrastructure and buildings 
ornamenting the roads of the capital while elsewhere, Manchukuoans were living in 
poor sheds. Indeed, the Manchukuo government presented itself as a modern, 
advanced and progressive entity with nation-building as its centrepiece. Starting 
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with Hsinking, the capital city, and Fengtian, the region’s financial centre, the 
Manchukuo government transformed the chaotic cityscape by replacing old and 
disorganized structures by sublime high rise architecture, boulevards and public 
parks. Urban areas enjoyed phenomenal industrial development, which remains as 
one of the few substantial legacies of Manchukuo that are still visible in northeast 
China today. 
 
Nevertheless, the rapid expansion was achieved at the expense of urban 
dwellers. Demolition projects in the old districts compelled the neighbourhoods’ 
residents to relocate with limited or no compensation. Development in the cities 
increased the number of job opportunities, which attracted thousands of migrants 
from all over the region in hope of a better wage and life quality. Consequently, the 
growth of residents led to the over-saturation of urban housing capacities, often 
leaving the new arrivals at a loss with no place to stay. 
 
Due to the shortage of housing, flats and houses were rearranged into 
multiple confined corners with paper thin walls to lodge as many tenants as 
possible, leaving tenants with no choice but to live in small spaces that were 
excessively crowded or noisy. The practice of converting communal areas into 
private spaces was common, and it often brought out quarrels and conflicts 
between neighbours that sometimes escalated gravely. The stressfulness of urban 
living was also exacerbated by various hazards that resulted from to the high 
density in the residential quarters. Fire disasters repeatedly occurred owing to 
accidents and overall negligence, which often resulted in the burning down of 
entire streets and neighbourhoods considering the lack of modern sewer facilities. 
  
In addition, a variety of scams and frauds were practiced by landlords in the 
metropolises. Tenants were required to pay rents at unreasonable prices on top of 
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unjustified but skyrocketing premium fees and tips. Moreover, despite the progress 
of modernization since the mid-1930s, new housing construction programs were 
considered to be utterly inadequate. With the priority to fuel Japan’s war, the 
number of state-led housing construction projects were insignificant compared to 
the enormous urban housing needs. Rather than exploring homelessness per se in 
Manchukuo, this thesis looked into a new sense of “homelessness” that existed 
among the Manchukuoans who had no place to call home, since they were always 
on the move. This thesis emphasizes how the modernization of the regime came at 
the cost of its people, which resulted in a decrease of their living standards. 
 
To some extent, it can be said that diseases were the only scourge that 
affected all strata of the population indiscriminately. As the region had already 
been heavily battered by the spreads of epidemics in the past, the Manchukuo 
authorities quickly realized the importance of public health and disease control. The 
government’s urgency and commitment to improving the health system and 
preventing large scale outbreaks and spreads were reflected in the implementation 
of multiple measures, aiming to improve the regime’s overall urban sanitation 
conditions. This was especially clear in the authorities’ attempt to reduce the 
amount of filth on the streets within Manchukuoan quarters. In addition, urban 
dwellers were also mobilized to partake in mandatory cleaning events under the 
supervision of the police department. The uneasiness associated with the likely 
consequences of potential pandemic outbreaks kept the government on its toes, 
which resulted in the wrongful segregation and mistreatment of suspected patients. 
However, even though it came at the cost of ordinary people, the authorities’ 
extreme methods to reform the public health system were eventually fruitful. With 
epidemics consistently kept under control, significant improvements were achieved 




For a long time, Manchuria has been regarded as the ideal testing ground 
for Japanese policymakers to try out various socio-political ideas and experiments.4 
The successful implementation and management of a new modernized public 
health system in Manchukuo was crucial for the Japanese reformers who lacked the 
political capital to promote amendments to the healthcare system in Japan. For the 
Manchukuo authorities, this meant having to start from scratch, which necessitated 
getting rid of the old system. 
 
Traditional Chinese medicine practitioners were among the first to bear the 
brunt of the reforms that promoted progress and modernization. Due to their poor 
performance during previous epidemic outbreaks, it was not difficult for the 
Japanese authorities to justify a casus bello against traditional medicine. They were 
firm believers in Western medicine, so traditional medicine physicians in the state 
were demonized by the Manchukuo government. Denunciations were made via 
official statements. Cases of malpractice related to traditional doctors were 
highlighted in magazines and newspapers, often with a contemptuous tone that 
reflected the authorities’ stance. Laws to restrict Chinese medicine were eventually 
introduced in 1936, which consequently brought the total number down as the 
state-organized terror became unbearable for traditional practitioners all over the 
regime. 
 
Shifting to a Westernized medical system was met with great resistance 
from the people. At the same time, the decrease of accessible medical services led 
many to revert to relying on folk remedies and prescriptions. Contrary to the 
utopian vision of the government, the prohibition of traditional medicine did not 
necessarily make Western medicine more appealing to its citizens. Although 
regulated by the state, medical resources and fees under the nationalized health 
system were in reality often determined by privilege and social hierarchy. Prejudice 
                                                        
4 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 183. 
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and animosity were the norm when it came to dealing with the average 
Manchukuoan patient. Indeed, few doctors were willing to waste their time and 
resources to diagnose a treatment or prescribe medicine that patients would not be 
able to afford. 
 
On the other hand, the popular use of opium in the regime was considered 
to be a moral issue to the Japanese, but a common supplement to the 
Manchukuoans. The Manchukuo authorities took the situation to its advantage by 
partially legalizing the use of opium as a way to increase its revenue, resulting in 
opium dens around the regime flourishing under the acquiescence of the puppet 
state’s rulers.  
 
The art of smoking was perfected. Mass produced opium paste was supplied 
at a steady rate from Japanese factories on a daily basis. And even though addicts 
were required to apply for a smoking permit to obtain their fix, it also became 
common practice for opium dens to deal under the table with unregistered addicts, 
which in turn contributed to the sharp growth of drug addicts in the regime. By the 
mid to late 1930s, drug-related issues had become more serious than they had ever 
been in Manchukuo society, accounting for more street deaths in total than the 
authorities were willing to acknowledge. 
 
Eventually, the tolerance of opium and drug use was put to a halt following 
the introduction of the Five-Year Industrial Development Plan in 1937 that called 
for a high supply of workers. Subsequently, drug addicts were arrested in large 
numbers and placed in newly established detoxification centres throughout the 
regime. Without being given the proper treatments to overcome their addictions, 
drug addicts were instead forcefully injected with stimulants and transformed into 
physical labourers to meet the regime’s demands. The analysis of the overall 
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impacts of the numerous measures implemented by the Manchukuo government 
reveals the exploitative nature of colonial healthcare.  
 
All in all, this thesis demonstrated that life in Manchukuo was full of 
uncertainties, of seemingly arbitrary yet disastrous events, state-organized violence, 
and punishments. These contextual elements stimulated the passivity in the 
mindsets of the ordinary people of Manchukuo in face of the changes that were 
imposed upon them. For a regime that appointed itself to be in charge of education, 
the dislocation and relocation of people, as the sole distributor of commodities, 
rations, materials, services, medical resources, and served as the region’s biggest 
drug dealer, it is hard for the ordinary people not to become the compliant citizens 
that the regime wanted them to be. Passivity generated obedience, not active 
resistance against the authoritarian power that had the ability to determine the 
fates of the people it dominated. Superficially complying with the regime’s agenda 
did not lead to an improvement in life quality for ordinary Manchukuoans, but their 
passive mentalities of “waiting things out” and believing that “this would pass” 
certainly did not make the everyday life in Manchukuo any worse than it already 
was. 
 
One way to conceptualize the “caretaker” role of the Manchukuo 
government towards its subjects is through Sheila Fitzpatrick’s illustration of Stalin’s 
Russia in the 1930s.5 In essence, the Manchukuo society could be viewed as a 
penitentiary, an enclosed environment with its own set of disciplinary rules. The 
behaviours of the Manchukuoans, or prisoners of the institution, mirrored their fear 
of the authorities. An uncrossable line separated the privileged and the ordinary 
people, marking the difference between the rulers and their subjects, or in this 
metaphor, the prison guards and the prisoners. Constantly being on the receiving 
end of punishments and repeated sufferings inevitably caused discontentment and 
                                                        
5 Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, 226. 
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animosity among the prisoners. At the same time, prisoners could be tempted to 
fall for the illusion that it was only logical for them to succumb to the system 
instead of attempting to fight against it actively. 
 
In contrast with the ordinary people’s passive stance vis-à-vis the various 
implementation of social policies and guidelines that were forced onto them by the 
regime, the masses were seldom passive when expressing resistance whenever the 
government failed to properly assume its role as a “caretaker”. As was suggested in 
this thesis, the ordinary people’s resistance emerged as an alternative tactic, a last 
resort when normal means to comply with the regime failed to make ends meet. 
This could also be seen as a way for the powerless ordinary people to gain some 
leverage when renegotiating their terms for compliance with the Manchukuo 
government. Indeed, historians have long argued that the needs of individual 
survival could be perceived as a justifiable cause for one to accommodate the 
enemy.6 Through the examination of the everyday lives of the ordinary people of 
Manchukuo, this thesis shed light on the complexity of ordinary life under 
occupation, and showed how choices could be made when no choices were given. 
It also uncovers the ways in which the voices of dissatisfaction, which projected an 
unignorable amount of power, could make their way to the government’s ears, 
even though the authorities considered its subjects to be voiceless. 
 
In the end, to evaluate whether compliance or resistance was worth the 
effort for the ordinary people, it is essential to refer back to the primary reasons 
why the people adjusted their behaviours when they first encountered foreign 
invading powers that took over their everyday routines. In fact, the ordinary people 
were mainly driven by their will to survive, which translated into appreciating and 
rebelling against the education system, obtaining goods legally and illegally, 
                                                        
6 Lo Jiu-Jung, “Survival as Justification for Collaboration, 1937-1945,” in Chinese 
Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation, eds., David P. 
Barrett and Larry N. Shyu (California: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 116- 134. 
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sustaining through hardships, overcoming shortages, taking risks, deceiving the 
authorities, self-protecting and more. The everyday life of the ordinary people in 
Manchukuo was anything but ordinary. During its existence, the regime was 
punctuated with numerous crises that regularly disrupted the everyday life of its 
colonial subjects until its ultimate downfall in 1945. But perhaps most importantly, 
Manchukuo collapsed, and the people survived. 
 
Whilst this thesis addressed a series of issues that addressed the gaps in the 
current literature regarding the colonial experience of the people in Manchukuo, a 
number of limitations were identified during the course of this research project. 
First of all, the availability of primary sources placed great constraints on the 
direction and development of the case studies presented in this thesis. More 
precisely, it was discovered during fieldwork that provincial archives in Northeast 
China (Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang) immensely restrict the number of archival 
materials from late Qing, the Republic of China (pre-1945) and the Manchukuo 
period, making it nearly impossible to obtain and collect any exploitable data. The 
Liaoning provincial library and Jilin provincial library on the other hand, were 
respectively in the process of relocating and under renovation during my time of 
visit in 2015, thus making their collections unavailable for access. Limited success 
was achieved in municipal archives in second-tier cities (namely Benxi) that were 
more relaxed towards the sensitivity of the primary materials, although it was 
subsequently discovered that their collections were inadequate both in terms of 
quantity and quality. As a result, alternative measures were adopted towards the 
collection of data. A great number of primary materials used in this thesis were 
obtained from vintage bookstores, antique markets, private collectors in the 
Northeastern provinces as well as from the National Library of China in Beijing, 
which proved to hold a good variety of primary sources in the form of microfilms.7  
                                                        
7 A wide variety of primary sources regarding Manchuria in general (government 




Furthermore, this thesis looked at a sample of 12 interviews in total, 
predominantly residents in Liaoning province, with one who lived in Heilongjiang 
province during the Manchukuo era. Although interviews were used to supplement 
the primary sources in this thesis, the number of interviews conducted by no means 
could be considered to be sufficient to represent the experiences of the entire 
population in Manchukuo. With the majority of interviewees concentrated in 
Liaoning province, residents of other provinces in the time of Manchukuo might 
find little to relate to their personal experiences given the difference in economic 
and social developments between the provinces. In addition, information obtained 
from recollections might deviate from the actual facts due to objective factors such 
as memory loss, exaggerations, personal emotions and considerations, hence 
making the outcomes variable. 
 
Although this thesis focused on exploring the passive acts of the ordinary 
people to resist and comply with the regime, it is not to say that the puppet state 
was without any support at all from its subjects. In other words, the emphasis on 
the sufferings of the people of Manchukuo and the brutality of the authorities 
created a tendency to downplay the role and experiences of beneficiaries and 
favoured individuals of certain policies among the ordinary population. To be sure, 
propaganda played an essential role in the Manchukuo society, and it consequently 
generated a number of “role model ordinary citizens” that assimilated Manchukuo 
values and actively collaborated with the regime. The examination of the influence 
of this particular social group in the society might contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of the everyday life in Manchukuo. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
found outside China. See Ronald Suleski, The Modernization of Manchuria: An 
Annotated Bibliography (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994). 
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Nevertheless, all of the factors mentioned above, and the limitations 
observed in this thesis do not nullify the findings. Instead, they can serve as lenses 
to provide directions and recommendations for future research related to the 
understandings of the everyday life of colonized subjects. Utilizing this thesis to 
examine the mindsets and experiences of ordinary people could contribute towards 
placing the topic of wartime China in a comparative perspective. The understanding 
of the lives of ordinary people under occupation should not be limited by physical 
borders and boundaries. Exploring the similarities and disparities of the lives of 
colonial subjects under different regimes might significantly enhance the studies of 
collaboration under the theme of colonialism during the war. 
 
Finally, studies focusing on the reverse influence of the colonies would also 
be a welcome addition to future research. More specifically, it would be interesting 
to explore the impacts that colonial subjects could generate through the medium of 
poems, novels, travelogues and motion pictures on occupiers. An examination of 
the positive or negative influences under the scope of empire-building might 
provide an excellent opportunity to analyze the opposite perceptions of colonialism 
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Appendix 1: List of interviewees 
 
  
                                                        
1 Age at the time of the interview. 
2 Name was not given. 
3 Only surname was given. 
 Name Date of Interview 
Place of residence 
in Manchukuo Sex Age
1 Appeared in the thesis 
1 Anonymous2 11/11/2015 Fengtian M 80  
2 Anonymous2 30/10/2015 Benxihu F 83  
3 He, Shanshui 29/10/2015 Tongbei M 87 Chapter Three 
4 He, Yonggui 05/01/2017 Fengtian M 90 Chapter Four 
5 He3 29/10/2015 Caohekou M 84  
6 Liang, Guangshan 28/10/2015 Liangjiacun M 88 Chapter Three; Chapter Five 
7 Liang, Qibin 01/11/2015 Gaochengzhai M 87 Chapter Five 
8 Lin3 29/10/2015 Fengtian F 85  
9 Liu3 29/10/2015 Benxihu M 84  
10 Lu, Bingxiang 27/09/2015 31/01/2016 Fengcheng M 88  
11 Shao, Jutian 24/09/2015 Fengtian M 87 Chapter Four 
12 Zhang3 29/10/2015 Benxihu F 81  
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